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VALOR WROUGHT ASUNDER: THE MEXICAN GENERAL OFFICER CORPS
IN THE U.S.-MEXICAN WAR, 1846-1847

By

Javier E. Sánchez

B.A., Business Administration, University of New Mexico, 2008
ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a reappraisal of the performance of the Mexican general officer
corps during the U.S.-Mexican War, 1846-1847. Often negatively libeled, Mexico’s
defeat is often attributed in no small part to the moral shortcomings of the generals who
led her armies. By a detailed analysis of their background, motivations, and military
careers, a more accurate perspective regarding the Mexican general officer corps’
performance during the war can be obtained by the reader.
It is the argument of this thesis that the operational tactics and organizational
weakness of the Army’s High Command sufficiently account for the failures of the
generals without examination of its moral shortcomings. Both the Bourbon Spanish
military heritage and political/social heterogeneity of the officer corps impeded its
success as a corporate entity. By a detailed analysis of senior Mexican military leadership
during the war’s two major land campaigns, it becomes apparent that the army’s failure is
attributable in no small part to both of these factors whose detailed analysis has been
overlooked in past scholarship.
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Introduction

The U.S.-Mexican War is a subject that is well covered in American historiography.
The two principal works from which almost every other English-language work has been
derived are Nathan Covington Brooks’ A Complete History of the Mexican War, 18461848 (published in 1849) and Justin H. Smith’s The War with Mexico (published in
1919).1 Although the many aspects of American military leadership during the war are
well-covered, a complementary coverage of the wartime Mexican military leadership is
lacking. Furthermore, many of the works that have succeeded those of Brooks and Smith
do not seem to shed more light on the subject and merely vary the narrative with the
positive focus on the American side and derision on the Mexican side. In Brooks and
Smith, Mexican generals are variously described as “half-savage,” “conspirator,”
“drunkard,” “dolt,” “lackey,” “sot,” “ruffian,” “ignorant,” and “pompous,” while their
behavior on the battlefield is described in phrases such as “took flight,” “cowered
behind,” “gave up,” “keep himself out of danger,” and one officer is even described as a
man with “one excellent quality: the instinct of self-preservation.”2
Having injected such negative characterizations of the Mexican generals in their own
works and given that most subsequent writings on the subject has been modeled on theirs,
it is no surprise that the characterizations of Brooks and Smith remain unchallenged. This
is particularly noteworthy because so little evidence is presented by Brooks and Smith to
support these characterizations; indeed they appear to be mere speculation. In contrast to
scholarship which so often dismissed the Mexican soldiers in the same language used to
1

For complete references please consult the bibliography. Footnotes will present sources by author and
abbreviated title. Tutorow, The Mexican-American War: An Annotated Bibliography, pp. 238 & 241.
2
Smith, The War With Mexico, passim.
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deride their commanders, many contemporary American historiographers have conceded
that the average Mexican soldier was just as hardy and brave as his American
counterpart.3 Despite this recognition, there persists a belief that the Mexican soldiers
were somehow “stabbed in the back” by their own generals who remain the disdainful
characters that Brooks and Smith first described decades ago. To the average American
student of the war, the Mexican military leadership remains for the most part a negatively
characterized and faceless mass of unpronounceable names derisively overlooked as
incompetent, corrupt, deceitful, and ruthless characters whose perfidy and shortcomings
were central to their nation’s defeat and to the wasted valor of their troops. Perhaps this
view is a reflection of general American perceptions of Mexicans at that time. Perhaps it
reflects a need for American historiographers to overlook the accomplishments of the
enemy in wartime and discredit their leaders’ performance and motives to justify
American actions and present them as acts of “liberating” Mexican territory from a
leadership cadre that was utterly unable to govern or defend it adequately. Even much
contemporary Mexican historiography strives to justify the destruction of Mexican
conservatism during the post-war period by rendering members of that political class as
corrupt demons who sought only to chuck their nation into the depths of the abyss. It was
tragic for the Mexican generals of 1846 that both their foreign and domestic enemies saw
the need to negatively characterize them after the war, although albeit for different
reasons. It is important to reflect upon the motives of postwar scholarship in
characterizing the Mexican generals of 1846 because the varying viewpoints allow us to
put the recriminations made against the generals into perspective.

3

Eisenhower, So Far From God, p. 371.
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Literature Review

English-language literature devoted specifically to the Mexican generals who served
during the War of 1847 is practically non-existent. Their lives and careers have remained
for the most part un-examined other than in the context of the war itself. Whereas the
lives of the American generals of 1847, however obscure, are easily uncovered within
memoirs, unit histories, and biographies, very few Mexican generals left memoirs and the
political tumult that continued in Mexico following the war overshadowed their
contributions and relegated them to obscurity. Obtaining vital statistics on the generals
and piecing their lives into a coherent narrative is a challenge because the information is
dispersed. Individual works containing passages mentioning specific generals must be
cross-examined and collated with that of other passages from other works in order to
piece together various pieces of the puzzle.
The first American scholar to cover the Mexican officer corps in any detail was
historian Justin Harvey Smith (1857-1930), who spent nearly forty years of his career
studying the war and authored The War with Mexico (1919), which remains one of the
seminal works on the war. By his own account, Smith claimed to have consulted 100,000
manuscripts, 1,200 books, and 200 periodicals during the course of his writing the
manuscript for The War in Mexico. Although he blames the Mexicans for starting the war
and remains unsympathetic to their cause throughout, it is significant that Smith traveled
extensively in Mexico and conducted interviews and used sources that had never before
been consulted and have not been cited since. When trying to locate some of the items
pertinent to my subject from his extensive bibliography, I frequently ran into blind alleys
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and was unable to locate any reference to the material he cited in the academic databases
available to me. Nevertheless, his work was the first English-language work to describe
the Mexican generals in any detail. As previously mentioned, his characterizations were
for the most part negative and biased. The reasoning for this biased attitude is rooted in
Smith’s belief that impetuous Mexican aggression provoked the war and then Mexican
moral failings and incompetence lost it. Smith seeks no further explanation for Mexican
reverses than their moral failings as a “race” and his unsympathetic conclusion that
Mexico’s defeat was richly deserved.
Although American works on the war have been published since the mid-twentieth
century, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that scholarship emerged that treated the
Mexican officer corps more objectively. William DePalo’s The Mexican National Army
(1997) was perhaps the first English-language work to deal specifically with the Mexican
Army and officer corps of 1846-1847. Although the work features the excellent use of
primary and secondary sources, the generals’ lives are not examined in depth. The work
is outstanding in light of its objective portrait of the officer corps and its presentation of
much new information that although common in Spanish-language scholarship dealing
with the war, had not been available in English. DePalo’s focus is an examination of the
origins and development of the divisive politics that existed within the army. The
generals are examined within the parameters of that context and the reader comes away
with a better understanding of the political fractures that affected Mexico’s prosecution of
the war, but with little analysis of what motivated the generals’ actions on the battlefield.
Pedro Santoni’s Mexicans at Arms: Puro Federalists and the Politics of War (1996) is
another rather recent work that does an excellent job of outlining the political conditions
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within Mexico during the War. Santoni’s work focuses on the role of the puro federalists
in prosecuting the war and although it emphasizes Mexico’s internal politics rather than
its military aspects, the roles of many previously un-mentioned generals in the political
upheaval are described in detail. It seems to me that the works of Santoni and DePalo go
hand in hand. DePalo’s work discusses the effect of endemic political conflict on the
army, while Santoni analyzes the consequences of political conflict on the prosecution of
the war.
John S.D. Eisenhower’s highly readable So Far From God: The U.S. War with
Mexico, 1846-1848, (2000) is a general history of the war that presents a fairly balanced
view of the war. Eisenhower is considerate of the Mexican cause and presents a
sympathetic portrait of the average Mexican soldier. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s focus
upon the American side of the conflict is evident in the fact that the only Spanishlanguage source he lists in his bibliography is the standard Apuntes para la historia by
Ramón Alcaraz. Eisenhower’s work makes great reading and is partial to the Mexican
view, but his focus is broad, and apart from Santa Anna, Arista, Ampudia, and Valencia,
the Mexican general officer corps goes relatively unexamined.
Mexican scholarship specifically regarding the Mexican generals of 1847 is difficult
to locate. The seminal Mexican works are Alberto María Carreño’s Jefes del Ejército
Mexicano en 1847 (1914) and Ramón Alcaraz’s Apuntes para la historia de la guerra
entre México y los Estados Unidos (1848). Carreño’s work presents biographical sketches
on all of the generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels who served during the war.
Unfortunately, the sketches read more like abbreviated service records and personal data
is not presented at all. The sketches are helpful in forming a general view of the officers’
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service records, but because anecdotal information is missing, a researcher must go far
beyond Carreño to piece together a clear understanding of any officer in question.
Alcaraz’s work is the Spanish-language source most cited by modern Englishlanguage works and is the Mexican standard general history of the war. However the
narrative avoids any discussion of the polemics that are crucial to understanding why the
Mexican military was defeated. The theme of Alcaraz’s work is that Mexico was unjustly
attacked by the United States and that her generals and politicians were too politically
divided to present the united front that could have defeated the Americans. This thesis
takes this argument, which is so well substantiated, and extends it by adding other
considerations such as the Spanish Bourbon military influence and the heterogeneous
nature of the general officer corps.
Vital statistics and brief sketches can be gleamed from biographical registers of
various kinds such as encyclopedias and dictionaries containing indexed biographies of
state officials and regional personalities. The primary works are the multi-volume
Diccionario Porrúa de historia, biografía, y geografía de México (1995) and Manuel
Mestre Ghigliazza’s Efemérides biográficas (1945).
During the 1980s and 1990s, two government publications regarding the battles of La
Angostura and the Mexico City Campaign were published that present new primary
information gleamed from the diaries and memoirs of several noteworthy Mexicans of
the time, including Guillermo Prieto and several writers who collaborated with Ramón
Alcaraz in the compilation of his Apuntes. The works contain anecdotal information on
many generals as well as firsthand descriptions that are helpful. However, the
descriptions are few and far in-between these multi-volume works which lack an index.

6

My Argument

Unquestionably, the Mexican Army of 1846-1848 was beset by many fundamental
challenges. My argument is that the operational tactics and organizational weakness of
the Army as a corporate entity sufficiently account for the failures of Mexican general
officer corps without examination of its moral shortcomings. However great the
contribution of other factors, it was Mexico’s military culture that largely determined the
technological imagination, force structure, and operational-tactical expertise of the armed
forces with which the national government sought to protect its national territory;
therefore it is necessary to examine the propagators of this military culture in detail in
order to gain a proper perspective on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexican War.
Mexican arms failed to inflict even a single reverse on the American forces during the
course of the entire war despite exercising the advantages of fighting within its customary
logistical base on home territory and superiority in numbers. Those advantages were
insufficient to compensate for the Mexican armed forces’ inferior firepower, operational
tactics, financial backing, and command structure. This arose in large part from a lack of
political or social homogeneity among its generals and from the continuation of a
decayed military tradition inherited from Bourbon Spain. This, amidst the backdrop of
civil war and political infighting, further prevented the professional development of the
army’s leadership cadre. The political and social heterogeneity, when coupled with the
lack of professional development produced a command structure that employed officers
not suited to command collectively in the same army and were susceptible to the
constantly varied political conflicts of the day. It is interesting to note that some of the
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generals who were appointed to high command during the war had been in ascendancy
since the days of Guerrero and Iturbide.4 As noted, the influence of the long-decayed
Bourbon military tradition was also strong. It must be remembered that it was Iturbide
who won the war of Mexican Independence and that the majority of the generals who
remained in ascendancy thereafter were veterans of his army, which was a royalist army
firmly rooted in the Spanish Bourbon rather than the contemporary Napoleonic French
military tradition. It must also be remembered that the forces of Bourbon Spain had
already been laid low by Napoleon in 1808 and that the maintenance of that obsolete
military system was to have severe implications in Mexico, where it was the veterans of
the realist forces that espoused this tradition who ultimately became responsible for
national defense in 1846-1848.
In this thesis, I present a detailed analysis of senior Mexican military leadership in the
field during the two major land campaigns of the war. I argue that the inability of the
Army and State to produce a homogenous officer corps contributed as much to the
army’s failure to conduct a successful defense of the national territory as the continued
reliance on Spanish Bourbon military traditions. By analyzing the development of the
senior officer corps during the course of the war, it will become apparent that the context
of loyalties was more complicated than merely choosing between the federalist and
centralist camps. The charged atmosphere that permeated the Mexican High Command
following the return of Santa Anna proved that santanismo in and of itself could generate
both violent rejection and unquestioning fealty amongst both federalists and centralists.
Thus, the senior military leadership came to reflect the political and social convulsions of
wartime Mexico, many of which were actually propagated by the general officers
4

Rodríguez de San Miguel, La República Mexicana en 1846, pp. 133-136.
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themselves. For example, at La Angostura, the centralist Santa Anna relegated command
of the 2nd Observational Division to the puro federalist Brigadier-General José Cosme
Urrea and at the battle of Molino del Rey, Santa Anna entrusted command of the cavalry
to Major-General Juan Álvarez, who had been a ringleader of the federalist conspiracy
that had ousted him from power in January 1845.
In this thesis I unravel the complex issues that affected the Mexican military
leadership and sort out the interrelated causes that account for the army’s defeat. To this
end, I will strive to put a human face on the men in question by highlighting their origins,
careers, and personalities, with the goal of understanding their motivations and potential
effectiveness (see appendix for biographical sketches of the leadership). I also examine
the safeguards in the Mexican governing system that held military officers accountable to
civilian authority because this issue’s relevance looms large in understanding the
generals’ notions of social responsibility. An examination of the generals’ political and
social background also helps demonstrate the lack of unity of vision regarding the nationstate that permeated the officer corps. By shedding light on the lives of these men, we can
both better understand the course of a war that has shaped the destinies of so many and
begin to perceive the actual contours of Mexico’s national fabric as expressed by that
unique set of men into whose hands her destiny as a nation was thrust in May 1846.
The core of this work will focus on presenting a chronological cross-analysis of the
corporate entity that constituted the Mexican military leadership. By this I mean that I
will examine in detail the decision-making processes of the generals during the two major
land campaigns and demonstrate the complexity of the issues that affected the outcome of
each individual battle and ultimately contributed to defeat. I also will address the many
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questions and controversies that have arisen, such as Arista’s reputed blundering at Palo
Alto and Resaca del Guerrero, Ampudia’s role at Monterrey, Santa Anna’s return and
reorganization of the army prior to the battle of La Angostura, Miñón’s role at La
Angostura, Álvarez’s role at Molino del Rey, Valencia’s role at Padierna, and Terrés’s
role in the final battle for Mexico City. Singly, these errors might have been remedied. In
the historical circumstances in which they occurred they added up to defeat. It is obvious
that such errors were symptoms of a deep-seated malady, roots that went back to the
embrace of Acatempán, when the arch-enemies Guerrero and Iturbide united to free
Mexico from Spain and in so doing condemned much of her future to be spent sorting out
the terms of that negotiation through bloodshed and violence. The ultimate goal of this
analysis will be to demonstrate that organizational weaknesses such as a lack of unity of
vision and the use of obsolete organizational strategy and tactics are sufficient to account
for the defeat of the Mexican Army. In addition to the narrative, I include an appendix
containing brief biographical sketches of as many of the generals as my sources permit.
All were key players in their own right.

10

Chapter 1: The Origins of Mexico’s Military Disaster

It is a commonplace belief that the outnumbered American armies of 1846-1847
vanquished the masses of Mexican troops arrayed against them time and time again in the
supposed fashion of the Spanish conquest of Mexico during the sixteenth century when a
brave, but small band of conquerors toppled the Aztec Empire in the face of great odds. 5
The reality was different. The American and Mexican armies that faced each other in the
spring of 1846 were grossly mismatched, with the Mexicans at a severe disadvantage.
Surely, from a command and control perspective, a paucity of standardized training,
outmoded manuals, and the persistence of regionalism amidst a climate of near-constant
civil war hampered progress in the development of professionalism in the Mexican
Army. When coupled with a scarcity in equipment and ammunition, immense class
differences between officers and common soldiers, and rampant desertion, the
deficiencies in the command structure of the Mexican Army rendered it unable to mount
an effective resistance against the invader. Thus, a description of the command structure
of the Mexican Army at the eve of war is sufficient to understand its performance during
the conflict.
The reality of Mexican institutions during the post-independence contest for power
was chaotic. Military figures such as Santa Anna or Bustamante held governmental
power by the force of their armies but could not claim legitimacy to rule. In the Mexico
of the 1820s to the late 1840s, the traditional sources of political legitimacy had collapsed
with the colonial structure and had not been replaced by a government based on popular
will reflecting ideals of public welfare or patriotic principles. For their part, the civilian
5

Eisenhower, So Far from God, p. 267 & Henderson, A Glorious Defeat, pp. 165-169.
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politicians who had emerged with the republic such as Lucas Alamán and Valentín
Gómez Farías, may have held a vision of a new political order, but they had no military
power with which to realize them.6 Thus, they continuously sought to harness their star to
that of the generals in command of armies who effected regime change. This grouping of
politicians and generals in constant struggle was but a symptom of the illness that was
borne of the “Embrace of Acatempán,” of the unworkable marriage of conservative
(centralist) and liberal (federalist) ideals that would condemn Mexico to a century of
political upheaval.7
It is important to elaborate on the meanings behind the labels various groups took on
during the political infighting that characterized Mexico’s post-independence period. The
primary groupings associated with this period are the centralists and the federalists. The
federalists could be further categorized into sub-groupings of puro federalists and
moderado federalists. The political groups were further complicated by the emergence of
personality-based groupings such as the santanistas who were followers of Antonio
López de Santa Anna.8
The centralists favored a strong central government, a paid national army, stringent
regulation of interstate commerce, a preservation of the extractive colonial social
structure, and Roman Catholicism as the state religion. The centralists were reactionary in
the sense that they believed that the key to social and political order was an emulation of
the viceregal governmental and social structure which had given Mexico relative stability
throughout the colonial period. It is not surprising that many of Mexico’s general officers
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embraced centralism since the majority actually hailed from Iturbide’s royalist army
which defended the viceregal regime against the insurgents up until 1821.9
The federalists, on the other hand, favoured limited central government, local militia,
and nearly autonomous states. The puros constituted the radical wing of the federalist
camp that espoused ideas such as the abolishment of state religion, the complete
disbandment of the national army, the uplifting of social barriers such as debt peonage,
and the deregulation of interstate commerce. The moderados, on the other hand were
middle-of-the-road in the sense that although they adhered to federalist ideas regarding
religion, social progress, and the loosening of restrictions on interstate commerce, they
believed in a strong central government with respect to the army. It is not suprising that
many of the generals who became the front-runners of the military wing of the puro
federalist camp during the post-independence period began their careers as insurgents in
the peasant armies of Hidalgo and Guerrero. Thus, the “Embrace of Acatempan” loomed
large on the Mexican Army of the post-indepedence period in the sense that the
successors of both Iturbide and Guerrero were to serve in the same army thereafter.10
It is significant to note that with respect to the early 19th century European conflict
regarding liberalism and conservatism, all of the Mexican groupings would be considered
liberal in the sense that a monarchy was thoroughly unpopular. However, when
considered within the context of the economically extractive colonial structure fostered
by Spain, regionalism became the root of the political fracture between federalists and
centralists with its emphasis on differing perceptions of benefit among economically or
politically divergent geographical areas. Thus, many border regions far from the
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administrative hub of Mexico City that had history as places of economic exchange, such
as the northern frontier territories of California and Texas, as well as the costa chica
region of present-day Guerrero state became hotbeds of federalism where free market
ideals were embraced by a populance eager for economic betterment. Such was the desire
for the adoption of federalist policies that significant numbers of the tejano elite actually
joined in the Texian Revolution of 1836. In like terms, a subsequent federalist revolution
in Nuevo Léon and Tamaulipas, which included Brigadier-General Antonio Canales who
would later command the irregular cavalry at the battle of Palo Alto, resulted in a
declaration of independence by the short-lived Republic of the Rio Grande. Different
regional perspectives not only fostered but mirrored the centralist/federalist split.11
By contrast, in the agricultural and mining centers of the Valley of Mexico, centralism
emerged as the dominant political force in areas where colonial economic and social
structures persisted and even thrived. In fact, apart from their military careers, many of
the centralist generals, including Santa Anna himself, owned large haciendas in the
Valley of Mexico and generated considerable profit from the regulated sale of
agricultural products such as wheat, beef, and barely to other parts of the republic. It was
in the interest of landed men such as Santa Anna that the centralists persevere for the
same reasons that it was in the interest of mestizo freedom fighters such as Álvarez that
the social and economic structure that benefited the centralists be torn down. The
integration of these dissident factions into Iturbide’s Army of the Three Guarantees in
1821 resulted in a brief unification of conflicting parties that was not to last.12
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The Mexican Army of 1846 was an offspring of this unworkable marriage between
conservative and liberal ideals and the ranks of its leaders reflected all of the conflicts
that could be expected from such a dysfunctional union. The progenitor of the Mexican
Army of 1846 was the Spanish Bourbon Army of 1808. Prior to Independence, Iturbide’s
Army of the Three Guarantees had been a branch of the Royal Spanish Army that
counted amongst its forces the armies that opposed both Napoleon and the South
American insurgents.13
The Bourbon military tradition which was at the forefront of Spanish military thinking
in 1808 emphasized a Frederickian reliance on infantry volleys and the shock value of
cavalry to win battles.14 In accordance with Frederickian theory, Mexican officers would
advance their infantry to within a few paces of the enemy and then fire into the
opponent’s ranks by volley. After the enemy’s ranks were thinned sufficiently, the
commanding officer, often mounted with his staff upon a distant vantage point, would
signal a bayonet charge, with massed cavalry attacks on the flanks of the enemy meant to
shock him into retreat. Little attention was given to the development of the artillery arm.
Instead, a reliance on the cold steel of fixed bayonets and the iron discipline of wooden
batons across the backs of wayward soldiers was widespread. Frederickian methods were
obsolete by the time revolutionary France introduced and Napoleon developed a new
system that relied on a national pool of patriotic soldiery and a combined-arms approach
to war that is the antecedent of the modern concept of “total war.” The reliance by
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Bourbon Spain on mid-eighteenth century doctrine is understandable given that until
1808, Spain had not engaged in any significant warfare for over fifty years.15
Following the French invasion, events moved too quickly for New Spain to adopt
substantial reforms. The regular armies of Spain disintegrated with such alarming rapidity
before the French invasion that the struggle quickly degenerated into a barbaric war of
attrition maintained by a combination of the remnants of the Spanish forces and an
impassioned citizenry formed into partisan bands. The continuance of the struggle by the
British and their Portuguese allies enabled a Spanish revival and by 1814, regular Spanish
forces laid siege to Toulon beside the British, who remained as justifiably scornful and
mistrusting of their allies as ever.16 Following the successful conclusion of the war
against Napoleonic France, the dismantling of empire occurred so rapidly and amidst
such rampant domestic political turmoil, that the Spanish military establishment again
had no time to implement reforms of any kind. Thus, following Iturbide’s takeover in
Mexico, it was men who continued to adhere to the military traditions of Bourbon Spain
who embedded those same traditions into the corporate culture of the nascent Mexican
Army.
A further parallel between the Spanish armies of the Napoleonic Wars and the
Mexican Army of 1846 that supports a Bourbon correlation with the Mexican defeat of
1847 is the descriptions of the Spanish Bourbon officer corps made by contemporaries. In
an 1809 letter to Viscount Castlereagh, the Duke of Wellington gave a caustic assessment
of the leadership of the Spanish Army:
Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish Army; and it is extraordinary
that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has
15
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adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of
the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be
so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say that
they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and
assembling again in a state of nature.17
Contemporaries of the Mexican Army might have similarly assessed the capabilities
of the Mexican generals that faced Scott and Taylor in 1846. Sure enough, on the eve of
war in April of 1846, one British diplomat commented on the Mexican officer corps as
being “the worst to be found in any part of the world … ignorant, incapable, and
insubordinate … and their personal courage, I fear, is of a very negative character.”18 It is
perhaps fitting that one aged general who served Santa Anna during the battle of
Chapultepec had been captured by the French while serving as a nineteen-year old
subaltern during the Spanish disaster at Somosierra in 1808.19
Although the defects of the Spanish Bourbon military system were laid bare by
Napoleon in 1808, the Mexican offshoot of this tradition reveled in victory prior to 1836.
From 1810-1821, realista armies repeatedly defeated insurgent forces and it was from a
position of strength that Iturbide negotiated with Guerrero at Acatempán.20 Against
poorly armed and organized militias of insurgents led by amateur soldiers, the realista
officers could manage victory by employing massed infantry volleys as units of firepower
and launching heavy cavalry in headlong charges against enemy infantry. The Mexican
army could not succeed facing a modern military machine capable of using artillery as
primary rather than supplemental units of firepower and using cavalry to harass the
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enemy and reconnoiter the ground rather than actually launch frontal charges against
enemy lines.
The Mexican misfortune that occurred during the Texas Campaign of 1836 was
perceived by army officers as attributable to the personal shortcomings of Santa Anna
rather than as evidence of the obsoleteness that plagued their military establishment.
Thus, although commanders and units were re-shuffled, the Mexican military structure
remained unchanged.21 By 1846, Mexican generals well-schooled in the military tradition
begotten by their realista background were eager to get at the Americans and only a few
prognosticated disaster. Little did they know, that as they drew up their forces in
Matamoros, across the Río Grande they were about to encounter an enemy whose own
military experiences had prepared it sufficiently to re-enact the French victories in Spain
of 1808.
A further symptom of the illness contracted at Acatempán was the incorporation into
the royalist army of insurgent officers whose political views were obviously different
from the mainstream conservative officers of Iturbide’s army. A major element of a
functioning military establishment is one in which the leadership cadre exhibits a certain
level of social/political homogeneity and coherence. Simply put, this ensures that
everyone will pull in the same direction during a crisis. The problem for Mexico was that
even after the monarchist scheme failed and Iturbide toppled, the conservative elements
that took power were unable to expel from their midst officers of a more liberal
persuasion already embedded in the Army. The balance of power between liberals and
conservatives was left unresolved and perennial civil war continued as liberal and
conservative politicians enlisted officers of similar political persuasions and vied for
21
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power even in the face of American invasion. The situation was further complicated as
officers defected from one side to the other and acclimatized themselves politically in
order to best exploit any given situation for their personal gain.22
The incorporation of the federalist officers into the regular army following the
adoption of Iturbide’s Plan de Iguala in 1821 also promoted the fostering of regionalism.
As previously mentioned, certain Mexican states became noteworthy as hotbeds of
specific political activities and the advent of warlordism or caciquismo quickly
manifested itself as leaders emerged in any given region. This is not to say that
regionalism was a new development. In Spain, the bedrock of the military establishment
was the existence of a dual-force system composed of the regular army and the provincial
militias. As would subsequently be the case in Mexico, the Spanish militias were subject
to their provincial governments and would muster to the national colors only at the
beckoning of the local governor in response to a royal decree. Following the political
fracture of Spain in the wake of the French invasion, many provincial militias failed to
muster in defense of the junta that replaced the vacant Spanish crown. This was the
antecedent of what occurred in Mexico in 1847, when divisive regional politics would
circumvent a national response to the American invasion.23 From a military perspective,
all of the obstacles to an effective national defense that emerged from Mexican
regionalism correlated well with the Spanish Bourbon military system and had in fact
already been felt in Spain, 1808-1814.
As had been the case in Spain, by 1846, regionalism was so prevalent that certain
Mexican states refused to deliver their militia quotas (known as activo troops) to the
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national cause because doing so signified abetting a domestic political enemy. As the
struggle wore on, some generals managed to rally the governments of their respective
states to the opposing faction’s side in the name of patriotism, but many of the more
powerful states such as Durango and Zacatecas, failed to field even one soldier against
the Americans for fear of depleting their power. Having determined the war to be a
hopeless endeavor, many generals and state governors sought to preserve their forces for
the fratricidal struggle that would continue once the Americans left. In this atmosphere of
chaos, it is no wonder that neither a national polity nor the legitimacy of popular will
based on ideals of public welfare and patriotic principles surfaced. Even the generals
themselves seem to have lost sight of any collective vision for what Mexico might have
been and seemingly thrust about trying to maintain their own positions of power within
the tumultuous gambit that was the Mexican political atmosphere.24
Thus, the call to arms of spring 1846 fostered a response as heterogeneous as could be
expected from as politically diverse a group as the Mexican general officer corps. On the
one hand, many generals, either because they were supportive of the Paredes regime or
were patriotic and genuinely supported the Mexican nation-state, were enthusiastic about
the opportunity to finally teach the hated gringos a lesson. On the other hand, many in the
federalist camp recently deposed by the centralists were apprehensive or even lethargic
about the coming struggle. Some elected to ride north of their own accord at the head of
whatever troops they could rally to their side, while others sought to avoid direct
involvement and lingered in the capital awaiting their chance to seize power.25
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Chapter 2: May-September 1846: From the Battle of Palo Alto to the Capitulation of
Monterrey

Beginning in 1845, the Mexican War Ministry effected a reorganization of the twentytwo existing commandancies-general that had military jurisdiction throughout the
country. It was the first sweeping reorganization in more than twenty years. Ultimately,
as viewed in Table 1, there would be five territorial divisions and four commandanciesgeneral to cover all of Mexico’s states and territories. The territorial divisions were
formed for the dual purpose of affecting a more mutually supportive force-structure and
monitoring the recruitment process of state-sanctioned levies. The territorial divisions
were designed to work in congruence with local governments and ensure their
cooperation in times of crisis. The commandancies-general were martial-law based
structures formed in areas where the population was virtually at war with the central
government. In fact, in the spring of 1846, Mexican troops were trying to reassert
government control in an all but independent Yucatán.26

Table 1. The Military Reorganization of 1845
The Territorial Divisions:
1st Division: México, Michoacán, and Querétaro
2nd Division: Oaxaca, Puebla, Tabasco, and Veracruz
3rd Division: Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas
4th Division: Coahuila y Texas, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas
5th Division: Chihuahua, Durango, and New Mexico
The Commandancies-General:
1. Sinaloa and Sonora
3. Alta y Baja California

2. Yucatán
3. Chiapas

Source: Adams, The War in Mexico, p. 129
26

Reed, The Caste War of the Yucatán, pp. 6-11.

21

The Mexican force given the task of quelling American aggression at the outbreak of
war was the much laurelled Army of the North with its headquarters in Matamoros.
Having quelled the separatist rebellion of the Republic of the Río Grande in 1840, the
army had recently recently launched a successful foray into Texas in 1842 that was
withdrawn due to logistical considerations. Although the army had as its overall goal the
eventual retaking of Texas, the tenouous nature of the army’s supply line over
inhospitable territory devastated by Indian raids and the need for troops elsewhere in the
republic obliged the central government to deploy the army defensively.27
Upon the arch-conservative centralist Paredes’ ascension to power, command of this
army was assigned to Major-General Mariano Arista, a stocky red-haired veteran of
forty-four years, who had begun his military career at the age of fifteen as a cadet in the
royalist militia regiment of his native state, San Luis Potosí. A moderado federalist who
hailed from the aristocratic classes of Northern Mexico, Arista had demonstrated
continued opposition to both the centralist and puro federalist causes during his 25-year
career and had ample combat experience, including command of the Army of the North
during the campaign against the Republic of the Río Grande in 1840.28 His appointment
was welcomed by many moderado northerners whose political backing was required by
Paredes in order for him to consolidate his power in that key sector of the republic.
Nevertheless, the arrival of Arista ruffled the command structure of the army in that the
incumbent commander, Major-General Pedro de Ampudia felt slighted, and although he
was retained as deputy army-commander, he did not forgive the relegation and
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maintained a deep antipathy for his chief that did absolutely nothing to abet the Mexican
war effort.29 The composition of the Army of the North can be found in Table 2.
Command of the army at this time was a curious mix of centralist appointees and
federalist leftovers from Herrera’s presidency of 1844-1845. The highly reputed artillery
commander, Brigadier-General Tomás Requena, was a staunch federalist of impeccable
record who had recently been promoted to general rank during the presidency of Herrera
and assigned to the Army of the North as the threat of war with the United States loomed.
Following Paredes’ ascension, Requena was wisely retained in command, although he
lost patience with constant changes of government after the battle of Monterrey in
September 1846.30
Table 2. Command Structure of the Army of the North, May 1846
Commander-in-Chief: General de División Mariano Arista
Deputy Commander: General de Brigada Pedro de Ampudia
Artillery Commander: General de Brigada Tomás Requena
1st Brigade: General de Brigada Pedro de Ampudia (also deputy commander)
2nd Brigade: General Graduado Manuel García
3rd Brigade: General de Brigada Francisco Mejía
4th Brigade: General Graduado Romulo Díaz de La Vega
Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Anastasio Torrejón
Irregular Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Antonio Canales
Totals: 3,758 men
Source: Adams, The War in Mexico, p. 24

The only other federalist general in the army was the headstrong Antonio Canales, a
northern warlord of dubious martial value whose support was tenuous in light of his
tendency to switch sides if he saw his grasp on local power undermined. A colorful and
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eccentric character who believed in divination and often conducted his affairs based upon
horoscope readings, Canales had co-led the failed separatist rebellion of the fabled
“Republic of the Rio Grande” in 1840 in conjunction with ardent secessionist Antonio
Zapata. Following Zapata’s execution and his army’s destruction at the hands of Arista’s
Army of the North, Canales barely survived by switching sides at the last moment and
delivering his Texian auxiliaries to Arista as prisoners of war, an act for which he was
awarded promotion to the rank of general by Santa Anna, but for which he would remain
thereafter a hunted man amongst the Texans. At best, his support would mean the rallying
of his constituents, the northern rancheros to the Mexican cause while at worst his
enmity might mean active collaboration with the enemy. The War Ministry chose the
former and courted Canales’ favor with an appointment to command the irregular cavalry
assigned to the army. A crafty and cunning man, dubbed the “Chaparral Fox” by the
Texans, whose military experience was limited to Indian fighting, Canales was a political
general who had never held an officially recognized commission prior to his appointment
by Santa Anna.31
Brigadier-General Francisco Mejía was perhaps the most apolitical of Arista’s
subordinates. A small, pockmarked man, distinguished both by his spectacles and his
habit of constantly smoking a pipe, Mejía was a career soldier whose record was marked
by utmost dedication to his assignments. Although not regarded by the government as
suitable for high-level command, perhaps because he lacked political motivation, he
could be relied upon to perform solidly as a faithful subordinate. At fifty-five years of age
and of brittle health, Mejia was the oldest of Arista’s commanders. Due to a protracted
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illness, Mejía would remain in command of the Matamoros garrison and miss the battles
of Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero.32
The redoubtable cavalry commander, Anastasio Torrejón, was a centralist political
appointee who owed his position to his support for Paredes’ ouster of Herrera’s
moderado regime. Considered a dependable and solid combat commander, Torrejón’s
performance in the border battles would leave much to be desired, although his reputation
would remain intact due to the scapegoating of Arista. A dashing cavalryman of fortyfour years, he fancied himself the Murat of the Mexican Army, and his combat
performance would reflect much of that commander’s conflicting qualities of reckless
bravery and woeful incompetence. So eager was he to see action in the conflict that, prior
to his appointment as cavalry commander, he had led his cavalry brigade north from its
cuartel in Mexico City to Matamoros, where he incorporated his command into the army
on his own authority.33
Perhaps the best educated of Arista’s subordinates, Brigadier-General Rómulo Díaz de
La Vega hailed from the elite Cuerpo de Ingenieros and was considered an able and
professional commander of centralist political leanings who was recalled to command the
4th Infantry Brigade in the Army of the North after several years as commandant of the
Military College in Mexico City.34
Although highly considered by the War Ministry, the forty-one year old Cuban-born
centralist Pedro de Ampudia brought a penchant for cruelty to his office that did not sit
well with the civilian leadership of Matamoros and did much to undermine popular
support for his elevation to army command. As a result, he was replaced by Arista, and
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upon the Mexican Army’s move northward in search of a confrontation with the
Americans, he was tasked with reducing Fort Brown, whereby he did not play an active
role in the subsequent disasters for which the unfortunate Arista bore responsibility. The
scion of a Spanish military family that moved to Mexico City when he was an infant,
Ampudia had won laurels as an undefeated commander while serving in brigade
command during Major-General Adrián Woll’s 1842 campaign against Texas.35
The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero did much to destroy the reputation of
the Mexican field command and dealt the Mexican military leadership a mortal blow
from which it never recovered during the course of the war. Although the Mexican defeat
is often attributed to Arista’s overconfidence and underestimation of the Americans’
capabilities, it was his unfamiliarity with the tactics his enemy employed that precipitated
the disaster. As a successful thirty-year veteran of numerous campaigns against domestic
enemies, it is reasonable that Arista would have great confidence in his abilities. It was
his ignorance of modern methods of war that cost him the battle. Although warned by
Requena regarding both the latter’s accurate impressions of the American artillery and his
own artillery’s lack of ammunition and trained gun teams, Arista’s skepticism regarding
American artillery capability and his belief in the lance and bayonet resulted in his rash
handling of the battle. Conforming to realista military doctrine, Arista and his generals
continued their adherence to Frederickian methods that emphasized usage of the bayonet
and lance in slugfests that did not take into account the firepower capability of the enemy.
In that vein, Arista deployed his troops poorly within range of the American guns and
exposed them to unnecessary punishment by enemy firepower. Despite passionate
entreaties from Díaz de La Vega to allow his troops to break ranks and frontally assault
35
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the American positions in true Frederickian fashion, Arista’s indecision rooted in his
panicked unfamiliarity with the tactics demonstrated by his adversary wasted the valor of
his troops and limited the punishment inflicted upon the enemy since it is questionable
whether his infantry could have persevered in the face of such attrition.36
The mishandling of the cavalry by Torrejón and Canales also contributed much to the
Mexican disaster. Of course, nothing was to be expected of Canales who was instructed
to play second fiddle to Torrejón, but the latter’s handling of his men’s advance on the
American flanks can only be attributed to command/control failure. Apparently, Torrejón
did not concur with Arista’s battle plan from the outset and the measure of his resolve
was severely shaken by a disagreeable episode with his chief, who failed to consider any
ideas that were not his own. Nevertheless assigned by Arista with the key task of
overseeing the envelopment of the American flanks, the piqued Torrejon’s diminished
confidence was tragically reflected in his hesitant and piece-meal conduct of cavalry
operations that condemned the infantry to stand in the midst of American shelling.37
The outcome of the battle of Resaca del Guerrero on the next day was a foregone
conclusion due to Arista’s continued underestimation of his opponent and adherence to
the same basic tactical premise notwithstanding failure at Palo Alto and the recognition
by his army that they faced an entirely new mode of warfare. Apparently, the previous
day’s events had stunned the Mexican soldiery of all ranks, from private to general.
Having withstood a barrage unlike any most of them had ever seen during the Mexican
factional conflicts of the previous 25 years, the Mexican officers emerged with a sense of
amateurish inferiority that shook them to their core. Canales, for one, lost his candor
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upon the first cannon shots that announced the opening of battle of Resaca del Guerrero
and fled for the rear with his rancheros. Likewise, the rest of the Mexican troops had no
inclination to stand for another butchering like the one they had endured previously.
Having lost all confidence in his chief, Torrejón also quit the field almost immediately
and made his way across the Rio Grande in the company of a few dragoons. Brevet
Brigadier-General Manuel García, described by one source as “a fine man and brave
officer,” was killed in action while in temporary command of Mejía’s brigade.38 The
gallant Díaz de La Vega likewise refused to give ground and was captured during Captain
May’s storming of the Mexican batteries. Having failed to rally his panicked soldiery,
Arista himself fled the field and made his way across the river in haste, abandoning his
private baggage and correspondence to the enemy.39
After subsequently lifting the siege of Fort Brown and consolidating Ampudia’s
brigade with his own remnants, Arista successfully reunited the Army of the North in
Matamoros and then oversaw its withdrawal to the more defensible city of Linares
seventy miles to the north, where he was notified of his removal and forced to relinquish
command of the army to General Mejía. During the withdrawal, Generals Requena,
Torrejón, and Canales remained with the army, while Ampudia was summoned to
Mexico City to provide the War Ministry with a formal account of events.40
Although they were certainly a brave lot and full of bravado at the onset of the
campaign (of the eight generals who served in the campaign, one had been killed and one
captured), the Mexican leadership seems to have lost its nerve in the aftermath of the
thrashing at Palo Alto, where their confidence in the traditional methods with which they
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were accustomed was fully questioned and the army’s deficiencies in command and
equipment were laid bare. Perhaps many believed that if the Americans could so easily
thrash a highly regarded commander such as Arista, which among them would stand a
chance?
The change in government resulting from Paredes’ ouster by the federalist MajorGeneral José Mariano Salas with the backing of the puros led by the rabid Valentín
Gómez Farías resulted in the reappointment of Ampudia to command the Army of the
North. Since Arista’s removal, the army had been conducted first to Saltillo and then to
Monterrey by General Mejía, where it awaited the orders of its new commander, who
remained as unpopular as ever amongst the civilian leadership of Nuevo León.
Apparently, Mejía took ill following the withdrawal to Linares and it was actually
Requena who oversaw the army’s removal to Monterrey. In addition to replacing its
commander, the War Ministry, still presided over by Major-General José María Tornel y
Mendivil, opted to bolster the strength of the army by sending with him three brigades to
be integrated into its ranks. The ministry’s reasons for not naming Mejía or the gifted
Requena army chief remain unclear, although it probably had something to do with
Ampudia’s reputation as an undefeated commander with much of experience both in
serving the Army of the North and fighting the Americans. Upon Ampudia’s resumption
of command, the primary units of the army and its commanders were reorganized as is
outlined in Table 3.
Contrary to what one might expect, Ampudia’s appointment to command did not
generate a wholesale restructuring of strategy or tactics. A veteran of the Río Grande
Campaign, Ampudia seemed to be as dismayed by the superiority of the American
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military machine as any of his generals. A vocal detractor of Arista’s performance at Palo
Alto and Resaca del Guerrero, upon his ascension to command, Ampudia was disposed to
seize the initiative and engage the Americans somewhere north of Monterrey.

Table 3. The Army of the North, Fall 1846
Commander-in-Chief: General de División Pedro de Ampudia
Chief of Staff & Deputy Commander: General Graduado José María García Conde
Artillery Commander: General de Brigada Tomás Requena
Cavalry Commander: General de Brigada Anastasio Torrejón
1st Brigade: General Graduado Simeón Ramírez
2nd Brigade: General de Brigada Francisco Mejía
3rd Brigade: Colonel José López Uraga
4th Brigade: Colonel Nicolás Mendoza
1st Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Anastasio Torrejón
2nd Cavalry Brigade: General Graduado Manuel Romero
Totals: 7,303 men
Source: Adams, The War in Mexico, p. 30

With that intention, Ampudia and his generals, accompanied by Torrejón’s cavalry,
ventured out of Monterrey and conducted a reconnaissance of the ground as far as Marín,
where Ampudia convened a military council to decide the army’s course of action. The
results were predictable. Acutely aware of the army’s deficiency in firepower and
knowledge of how to use it, Ampudia’s commanders had no stomach for facing the
Americans on open ground and advised him to remain in Monterrey, where the enemy
might be slowed by the attrition of urban warfare. Apparently, the generals’ lack of
confidence drained Ampudia’s enthusiasm for coming to grips with the Americans and he
opted for their recommendation to make a stand in the city itself. Shortly thereafter, a
presidential recommendation to abandon Monterrey and retire the army to San Luis
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Potosí arrived, but Ampudia chose to ignore it and continued his preparations for the
city’s defense. It would appear that having libeled Arista, the prideful Ampudia did not
wish to relinquish command of the army without having a “go” at the Americans in his
own right, but was also afraid of losing a pitched battle. Therefore, despite considerable
inferiority in firepower and gun-crew quality, he opted with his commanders’
recommendation to play it as safe as possible by obliging the Americans to attack his
entrenched forces in a difficult urban environment.41 As expected, the mammoth task of
fortifying the city went to the redoubtable General Requena, who was responsible for
erecting the fortifications at Cerro Del Obispado which were to cost the Americans dearly
upon their investment of the city. As before, the lack of firepower was so apparent in the
Mexican fortifications that it practically made the coming contest a foregone conclusion.
The morale of the soldiery improved upon the arrival of fresh units from Mexico City,
but this was tempered by the rapidly deteriorating logistical situation, as the central
government failed to raise the money with which to purchase the supplies it had
originally intended to accompany the reinforcements. For the time being, the Mexican
Army would be living off the land.42
Of Ampudia’s generals, Ramírez, García Conde, and Romero were the new arrivals
and Nicolás Mendoza the newly promoted commander of Díaz de La Vega’s brigade.
Manuel Romero, a forty-six year old veteran of the centralist cause who had supported
Paredes’ takeover of the government from Herrera, had been sent north at the head of a
cavalry brigade to bolster that badly depleted arm of the shattered Army of the North.
Apparently, Romero had been sent north in part to remove him as a nuisance in the
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capital. He was known to be a prone centralist plotter and his presence in the Mexico City
garrison probably made the puros nervous.43
The appointment of General Simeón Ramírez was a similar story. An ardent centralist
who had supported Paredes’ bid for power the previous year, the forty-three year old
native of Texcoco was a veteran of Santa Anna’s campaign against Zacatecas in 1835 and
a supporter of the Santa Anna/Paredes pronouncement against Bustamante’s regime in
1841. A capable staff officer with a talent for engineering, Ramírez was practically
untried in direct command of larger formations, and like Romero, his fellow brigade
commander, he had no experience fighting the Americans.44
The deputy commander and chief of staff, José María García Conde, was highly
regarded as an energetic and self-motivated officer, with a long career in staff and
administrative posts. The forty-five year old native of Mexico City was apolitical and had
unusual technical expertise. A talented artillerist in his own right, García Conde was
delegated the oversight of the fortification of Tenería Hill and Purísima Bridge.45
Brevet Brigadier-General Nicolás Mendoza was a forty-eight year old native of
Guadalajara and a veteran of the 1836 campaign against Texas who had spent his career
in the Army of the North and had worked his way up to regimental command at the
outset of the war with the United States. After service at Palo Alto and Resaca del
Guerrero, Mendoza had been promoted to the rank of general graduado and was given
command of Díaz de La Vega’s brigade.46
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Like that of their troops, the performance of the Mexican commanders at the battle of
Monterrey was generally good, but the uncharacteristic timorousness of the commanderin-chief enabled the Americans to capture the city without undergoing the campaign of
attrition originally envisioned. After having successfully defended the majority of the
city’s fortifications and repelled an American gesture against the southern reaches of the
city, Ampudia ordered evacuations of key positions that preceded American gains which
gradually made the Mexican troops’ hold on the city untenable. Thus after three days of
fighting, Ampudia called a truce with the recommendation of a council of his
subordinates who cautioned that having relinquished key positions, it would be better to
secure favorable terms from the Americans while there was still time to salvage the army
rather than continue the struggle and risk a crushing defeat. Along with the civilian
governor of Nuevo León, Requena and García Conde served on the peace commission
that indeed secured generous terms from Taylor which allowed the Mexican Army to
relinquish the city without relinquishing their arms, thus providing the Mexican forces
the ability to fight another day.47
During the course of the fighting, the majority of the commanders rendered solid
service, with García Conde and Requena starring in the defense. García Conde was
particularly distinguished in repulsing a sudden American gesture from the relatively
unprotected southern reaches of the city. Mejía was particularly distinguished in the
defense of the Purísima Bridge with a mere 300 soldiers and his own family who lived
nearby was obliged to take refuge in the home of a neighbor due to the incessant enemy
bombardment.

47

Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, pp. 98-102.

33

Mediocre performance was personified in the behavior of the lack-luster Torrejón,
who had been feverishly ill only a few days before, and his customary mismanagement of
the cavalry. Having been assigned the task of imposing attrition upon the American
advance, his troopers spent more time plundering the neighboring countryside for
desperately needed supplies and nearly lost the contest for the southern reaches of the city
had it not been for the saving grace of García Conde. If the army had been supplied by
the central government, it stands to reason that Torrejón’s cavalry would have lent itself
to better use.48
The northern campaign up until September 1846 thoroughly proved the obsolescence
of the tactical premise employed by the Mexican generals and following the battle of Palo
Alto, they remained unsure about how to confront the unfamiliar methods employed by
the Americans. Most unfortunate was the Mexican High Command’s reshuffling of
defeated commanders in the wake of the battle of Resaca del Guerrero, whereby the
implementation of lessons learned was hampered by the transfer of “experienced”
officers and their replacement by others who were unfamiliar with the tactics the enemy
brought to bear. It would seem that the proverbial cannonade of Palo Alto would continue
to ring in the ears of Mexican generals for many battles to come.
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Chapter 3: Climax of the Northern Campaign: The Return of Santa Anna and the Battle
of La Angostura

The return of Santa Anna had drastic implications for the command organization of
the army. Before his arrival, the Mexican war effort had lacked uniformity and the army
remained volatile in terms of its involvement in the conflict between centralist and
federalist leaders who could not reach a consensus on how to prosecute the war. Santa
Anna’s arrival changed this. Once he arrived in partnership with Valentín Gómez Farías,
the Mexican war effort was consolidated as a puro federalist enterprise. The irony
actually lay in the fact that although Gómez Farías recognized Santa Anna’s potential to
unify the country and effectively organize its defense, he may have ill-considered the
effect his return would have on many who could not forget and would not forgive his
atrocious performance in Texas nor the rampant corruption of his latest term in office as
president. Thus, Santa Anna’s return split officers and the ranks of the army not along the
factions of centralism and federalism, but along the lines of controversy raging over the
man himself.49
Upon learning that Santa Anna had been assigned personal command of the army in
its upcoming campaign against the Americans, convulsions of discontent rocked the
ranks of the Army of the North’s command cadre in San Luis Potosí. Previously, in the
time lag between Santa Anna’s return and his official appointment to army command,
San Luis Potosí had been flooded by generals who had marched there of their own accord
with any troops at their immediate disposal hoping for a coveted appointment in the army
that was due to be reorganized by Santa Anna’s administration. When it became apparent
49
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that Santa Anna would take personal command, he and his savvy war minister, Tornel,
moved both to effectively prepare the army for an immediate campaign and to isolate
opposing elements in the army’s command cadre. Naturally, Santa Anna did not deem all
of the generals and units convened at San Luis Potosí fit for the army he envisioned.
Santa Anna did not wish to have to watch his back lest a jealous commander rob him of
victory in the field or, worse, conspire to usurp command of the army and, in the event of
a reverse, return him to Mexico City in an iron cage. From Santa Anna’s point of view, it
was in the best interest of all involved that the men he would appoint to command his
army be both wholly subservient and unequivocally dedicated to the cause of national
defense.50
Upon Santa Anna’s arrival, several key commanders, including the gifted Requena,
effectively resigned from the army in protest over the appointment of a man they
considered to be completely incapable of exercising command. They opted to remain in
San Luis Potosí and formed a club they named the Red Comet Society, which would exist
thereafter in the periphery of the Mexican Army until the last days of the war, drawing
into its ranks disaffected officers who came to lament service under Santa Anna. For his
part, Santa Anna remained wary of the organization, but chose to ignore it, remaining
true to the task at hand.51
In an effort presumably meant to both increase efficiency and consolidate his
leadership of the army, Santa Anna removed almost all of the commanders who had
served in the previous campaigns against the Americans. Furthermore, Santa Anna
picked and chose at will from the assortment of generals gathered at San Luis Potosí in an
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effort to isolate potential dissidents and hand them military appointments as far away
from the action as possible. It was a foregone conclusion that many generals who did not
like their appointments would join the Red Comets and conspire against Santa Anna from
without. Perhaps the foremost in this category was Major-General Gabriel Valencia, the
former commandant of the Mexico City garrison who had led a contingent to San Luis
Potosí in the hopes of gaining for himself one of the key commands it not command of
the entire army. He was gravely disappointed upon learning that he had been relegated to
observing American supply lines in garrison command of the isolated northern presidio
of Tula. This affront to Valencia’s aspirations would prove to be particularly costly to
Santa Anna.52
In addition to using the troops assembled at San Luis Potosí, Santa Anna levied preagreed state militia contingents (activos) and summoned regular forces from all over
Mexico to join him for the coming campaign. In addition, the army was paid for by
forced loans from the church, government funds, and Santa Anna’s own personal fortune.
Basically, Santa Anna’s strategy consisted of building the most formidable army possible
with which to await Taylor’s seemingly inevitable march south. He favored building an
army that would be ultimately favored not only by an overwhelming disparity in
numbers, but in artillery & cavalry as well. Thus, Santa Anna requisitioned artillery
pieces even from the most remote outposts of the republic. Although, the gun-crews
remained poorly trained due to a fatal shortage of specialists in that arm, Santa Anna
believed the disparity in other areas would more than make up for those deficiencies.
Furthermore, in spite of rumors that the Americans were intent upon opening a second
front in the Valley of Mexico, Santa Anna confidently depleted the ranks of the Armies
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of the South and East in favor of a successful northern campaign that would deter
American intentions on Mexico City.53
After a confirmation that Scott had taken Veracruz on March 27, 1847 and the
Americans had gained a foothold in the Valley of Mexico, Santa Anna came to the
disappointing realization that Taylor would not be moving south of Saltillo. In response,
Santa Anna resolved to march the army three hundred miles north in order to confront the
enemy and obtain an expected victory that would relieve the pressure on Mexico City by
exposing Texas to the prospect of invasion and obliging Scott to support Taylor’s forces.
In short, Santa Anna was willing to gamble everything on this one grand stroke that he
hoped would dramatically shift the strategic balance of the war and erase all the
American successes of the previous several months. Unfortunately, because the rugged
three hundred mile journey between Saltillo and San Luis Potosí was one that Santa Anna
expected Taylor to make, he had destroyed any provisional stations existing along that
route and the Mexican Army would thus be obliged to pass through a gauntlet originally
laid out for the enemy.54
Another glaring deficiency in Santa Anna’s plan was the unwillingness of many states
to support the national cause he now personified. Mostly federalist state governors who
held sway over powerful militia elements in Zacatecas and Durango, to name only two,
were unwilling to forgive Santa Anna’s transgressions and refused to participate in the
defense of the country as long as he remained at the head. It is interesting to ponder the
probability that had those two states alone chosen to send their required quota of troops to
San Luis Potosí, the disparity in numbers and resources between the American and
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Mexican armies would have been so great that the battle La Angostura might well have
ended differently. It should be noted that while the activo units maintained their unit
identity, they were brigaded together with regular units under the command of regular
general officers. The command organization of the army that resulted from Santa Anna’s
restructuring is described in Table 4.
Table 4. The Army of the North, February 1847
Commander-in-Chief: General de División Antonio López de Santa Anna
Chief of Staff: General de Brigada Manuel Micheltorena
Commander of Artillery: General Graduado Antonio Corona
Commander of Engineers: General de División Ignacio Mora y Villamil
1st Infantry Division: General de Brigada Francisco Pacheco (4,618 men)
1st Brigade: General de Brigada Francisco Mejía
2nd Brigade: General Graduado José López Uraga
2nd Infantry Division: General de Brigada Manuel María Lombardini (4,029 men)
3rd Brigade: General Graduado José María García Conde
4th Brigade: General de Brigada Francisco Pérez
3rd Infantry Division: General de Brigada José María Ortega (2,970 men)
5th Brigade: General de Brigada Ángel Guzmán
6th Brigade: General de Brigada Andrés Terrés
7th Brigade: General de Brigada Anastasio Parrodi
1st Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada José Vicente Miñón (1302 men)
2nd Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Julián Juvera (974 men)
3rd Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Anastasio Torrejón (706 men)
4th Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Manuel Andrade (335 men)
Unattached Units:
Light Infantry Brigade: General de Brigada Pedro de Ampudia (unknown)
Zapadores Brigade: General Graduado Santiago Blanco (311 men)
1st Observational Division (Cavalry): General de Brigada José Urrea (2,121 men)
2nd Observational Division (Infantry): General de Brigada Ciriaco Vázquez (1,655
men)
Totals: 18,183 men or Infantry (13,432), Cavalry (4,338), and Artillery (413).
Sources: Adams, The War in Mexico, p. 41 & Alcaraz, Apuntes, p. 70-71
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The generals who led the army at this stage were a varied set of men chosen by Santa
Anna for a combination of military ability and personal loyalty. In reference to his
subordinates, Santa Anna seemingly sought a comfortable middle ground that would both
maximize military efficiency and give him political peace of mind. It must be noted that
in this instance, Santa Anna seems to have implemented a lesson learned from his
experiences in Texas ten years before. In this case, he did not grossly underestimate the
martial ability of his opponents by appointing unqualified political lackeys to important
field commands. Interestingly enough, Vicente Filisola, Martín Perfecto de Cós, and
Antonio Gaona were all still very much alive and well at this time, but had been relegated
by Santa Anna’s War Ministry to obscure posts on the fringes of the republic. By
contrast, the only distinguished Mexican general of the Texas Campaign, BrigadierGeneral José Urrea, had been awarded command of the 1st Observational Division in the
reorganized army.55
Of the twenty-two generals holding field command in the army, it must be noted that
only four were veterans of the previous campaigns against the Americans. Although
Santa Anna maintained a large number of generals at his disposal as members of his
personal entourage, including most of the veterans of the previous campaigns, he clearly
took martial quality to account in the consideration of officers for key command
positions. In reference to the general staff of the army, Santa Anna appointed the skillful
Brigadier-General Manuel Micheltorena to act as chief of staff. An artillerist by trade, the
former governor of California had built his career upon years of administrative
experience that qualified him for service as chief of staff to Santa Anna with whom he
had maintained an amiable relationship over the course of many years. Not much can be
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said of the youthful 38-year old Brevet Brigadier-General Antonio Corona other than he
was the next best thing to Requena and an ardent santanista who had cultivated a
favorable relationship with his patron while serving as artillery chief in the army with
which Santa Anna toppled the Bustamante regime in 1841. Although the second oldest
general in the army at fifty-five, the venerable goateed Brigadier-General Ignacio Mora y
Villamil was a strictly professional officer of minimal political intensity who had spent
most of his distinguished career in the engineers either in command of the War College at
Chapultepec or overseeing the construction of marine fortifications.56
An important development in the formation of the general staff was the elimination of
the post of cavalry commander and the placement of the army’s four cavalry brigades at
the direct disposal of the commander-in-chief. This development may very well have
been the effect of lessons learned from previous campaigns against the Americans where
the efforts of the cavalry had been wasted due to a lack of integration in the command
structure as expressed by the existence of an unnecessary command layer and its inability
to act in concert with the strategic vision of the commander-in-chief. The disunity of
command as personified by Torrejón’s mismanagement of the cavalry during the battles
of Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero was not desired by Santa Anna to be re-enacted and
Torrejón was relegated to brigade command where his actions could be watched and
Santa Anna’s control over the army remain uncompromised.57
The 1st Infantry Division was led by the ardent centralist, Major-General Francisco
Pacheco, who at 51 years of age had amassed a breadth of experience serving the
centralist cause in the Yucatán and in various internal squabbles for presidential power.
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After supporting Paredes’ coup against Herrera, Pacheco had arrived in San Luis Potosí
as commander of the activo troops of his native Guanajuato in the Bajío contingent led by
General Valencia. Perceived by Santa Anna to be a more potentially reliable subordinate
than his superior, Pacheco had been elevated to command the division that was formed
from the nucleus of Valencia’s troops, much to Valencia’s chagrin. The two brigadiers
assigned to this division were the dependable Mejía and the newly promoted José López
Uraga, a thirty-six year old former colonel of the 3rd Light Infantry who had been
thoroughly tested throughout the Rio Grande Campaign and had distinguished himself in
brigade command at the battle of Monterrey.58
The 2nd Infantry Division was led by the forty-five year old Major-General Manuel
María Lombradini, a man of rather limited military capability, but with a solid reputation
as a subordinate field commander having served under Santa Anna in Texas. An
unquestionably brave, but rather impetuous officer of as many ideological persuasions as
Santa Anna, Lombardini was particularly skillful in navigating the turbulent political
waters of that era. Justin Smith rather scathingly referred to Lombardini as a “strutting
lackey who strove to conceal behind his swarthy face, a heavy mustache and goatee, and
a ceaseless volubility, the poverty of his intellect.”59
The two brigadiers assigned to Lombardini as brigade commanders were the gifted
García Conde of Monterrey fame and the newly appointed thirty-eight year old native of
Tulancingo, Brigadier-General Francisco Pérez, who had built his career fighting
separatists in the Yucatán. Having been sent to bolster the garrison of the Veracruz prior
to the American landing, Pérez had been instrumental in garnering support for Santa
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Anna’s landing at Veracruz. Thereafter, Pérez had served Santa Anna diligently in
organizing the troops at San Luis Potosí and was rewarded for his effort with brigade
command. He could be best described as an ardent santanista.60
The 3rd Infantry Division was led by fifty-four year old Brigadier-General José María
Ortega, who had spent nearly thirty-five years in the artillery and amassed a dense service
record which included the campaign that resulted in the execution of Vicente Guerrero in
1831, service in Texas in 1836, and service in the santanista army which overthrew
Bustamante in 1841. Upon the outbreak of war, he had been serving as commandantgeneral of San Luis Potosí and had been assigned by Santa Anna with maintaining army
cohesion in the aftermath of the battle of Monterrey. A diligent and laborious
subordinate, Ortega had greatly distinguished himself in abetting Santa Anna’s effort at
restructuring the army and had even housed Santa Anna and his entourage at his personal
residence during his stay in San Luis Potosí.61
Although originally slated for command by fifty-one year old Brigadier-General
Ángel Guzmán, command of the 3rd Division soon passed for unknown reasons into the
hands of Ortega, whom Santa Anna must have perceived to be a better fit. In any event,
the forty-seven year old Guzmán was assigned command of one of Ortega’s three
brigades. An arch-centralist in the vein of former President Paredes, Guzmán had spent
most of his thirty-four year career in the present-day state of Guerrero opposing the
federalist overtures of the powerful southern cacique, Major-General Juan Álvarez. Upon
Santa Anna’s return to power, Guzmán had pronounced in his favor and marched north to
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San Luis Potosí with a contingent of troops from Tixtla where he awaited his chief’s
arrival and was subsequently awarded for his fealty with brigade command.62
The other two brigadier-generals in Ortega’s division were Andrés Terrés y Masaguér
and Anastasio Parrodi. Terrés was a seventy year old veteran of both the Spanish
Bourbon Army and Iturbide’s Ejército Trigarante. A native of Barcelona, Spain, Terrés
had demonstrated either santanista or centralist political inclinations throughout his
career and had cultivated an amiable relationship with Santa Anna, having supported his
ouster of Bustamante in 1841. As a colonel in 1846, Terrés had served at Matamoros, but
had been recalled to Mexico City prior to the opening of hostilities. Upon learning of
Santa Anna’s return, Terrés had organized a contingent of 1,500 troops and marched to
San Luis Potosí, where he was rewarded for his contribution with a promotion to brigade
command. Parrodi, a forty-one year old native of Havana, Cuba, had been serving as
commandant-general of Tamaulipas when he was recalled by Santa Anna to bring the
forces of that state to San Luis Potosí, an order with which he hesitatingly complied
despite protests from the civilian authorities in the face of an imminent American landing
at Tampico. An ardent santanista who had supported both his chief’s bid for power in
1841 and his recent return, Parrodi was well regarded as a solid subordinate, although his
performance at Tampico left an impression of indecisiveness.63
The independent units unattached to any of the divisions were the Light Infantry
Brigade, the Zapadores Brigade, and the two Divisiones de Observación. The Light
Infantry Brigade was assigned to the recently disgraced Ampudia, who was rehabilitated
after suffering a severe admonishment at the hands of Santa Anna for having disregarded
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his orders to evacuate Monterrey and converge upon San Luis Potosí. The elite
Zapadores Brigade was led by the newly promoted Santiago Blanco, who at thirty-two
years of age was the youngest general in the Mexican Army. A rather gifted engineer
who had lent his support to Gómez Farías’ pronouncement against Paredes’ regime,
Blanco was serving as commandant of the Mexican Corps of Engineers upon the
outbreak of war and was summoned to San Luis Potosí in order to reorganize the
engineer arm of the Army of the North, upon the successful completion of which he was
rewarded by Santa Anna with command of the zapadores.64
The two observational divisions, which were to operate against the American supply
lines in the periphery of the main effort, were entrusted to Brigadier-Generals José Urrea
and Ciriaco Vázquez. The fifty-year old Urrea held a solid reputation due to his service in
Texas and although eager to meet the Americans in combat, he was relegated to
command the observational division due to his political volubility. An ardent federalist,
renowned in the past for his powers of conspiracy, Urrea was quite possibly perceived by
the supreme commander as undependable at the head of a higher formation. That was
unfortunate because Urrea’s talents made him a much better fit for divisional command
than the likes of Lombardini, Ortega, or Pacheco. Vázquez will be discussed in the
chapter regarding Cerro Gordo, where he played a more critical role.65
Much like the infantry, the army’s four cavalry brigades were awarded to men who
were both militarily qualified and politically acceptable. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was
entrusted to forty-four year old Brigadier-General José Vicente Miñón, a native of Cadiz,
Spain, who had demonstrated ardent centralist inclinations and had been promoted to the
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rank of general due to distinguished service in Texas, where he served in deputy
command of an assault column at the Alamo. Having joined the puros and conspired with
Gómez Farías to overthrow the government of Herrera in 1845 as well as endorsed their
pronouncement against Paredes, Miñón was incorporated into the army with the
recommendation of his new found, if unlikely, puro patrons.66
The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was entrusted to another decorated santanista veteran of the
Texas Campaign of 1836, sixty-three year old Brigadier-General Julián Juvera. A former
governor of the state of Querétao, Juvera had remained unemployed upon the outbreak of
war, but had been awarded brigade command upon leading a contingent of troops to San
Luis Potosí. Leadership of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Brigades was awarded respectively to
Brigadier-Generals Anastasio Torrejón and Manuel Andrade. Torrejón’s appointment is
not surprising due to that commander’s gift for scapegoating others. Only a few months
before, Torrejón had secured his position in the army by supporting the Gómez Farías
coalition against the Paredes government and then endorsing Santa Anna’s return to
power. The forty-seven year old Andrade was an ardent santanista with firm centralist
convictions who had marched to the sound of the guns and integrated himself into the
army at San Luis Potosí, being rewarded for his efforts with appointment to brigade
command.67
The battle performance of the command cadre assembled and appointed by Santa
Anna was generally good. It appeared that the army had never been in better shape. Santa
Anna’s efforts had seemingly paid off in that his army was better-led and better-armed
and thus, of better quality. Despite the morale shattering hazardous march north, Santa
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Anna’s troops arrived with the resolve to deal the enemy a mortal blow. In the end, it was
logistical considerations that drove Santa Anna to surrender the battlefield after a hard
fought draw.68 One cannot help but consider that Santa Anna’s very march north had
condemned the army to defeat so far from its logistical base. It would appear as though
his cause would have been better served had he chosen to confront Scott and not Taylor
with the formidable force he had created.
Regarding the command cadre’s performance at La Angostura there were many
instances of unquestionable skill and bravery as well as a few of ineptitude that might
have enabled Santa Anna to achieve victory. The divisional commanders’ performance
was satisfactory, but was hampered both by the commanders’ unfamiliarity with handling
large units in the field and the troops’ hasty haphazard training. Due to the bloated size of
the army and the harsh timetable required by the rapidly unfolding turn of events, training
had to be relegated as a secondary objective for Santa Anna, and thus the troops’ combat
readiness proved inadequate, especially amongst the activo troops, many of whom had
not even fired a shot prior to the battle due to logistical concerns regarding the safeguard
of ammunition for the battle itself. Likewise, the generals slated to command them at the
divisional and brigade-level did not have the training required to lead such large units.69
Seemingly, the army that fought at La Angostura was the only instance during the war in
which a Mexican Army was actually organized according to the contemporary French
standard maintained by most professional armies, including the United States. The
generals’ unfamiliarity with handling combined arms units of that size only underlines
the low level of command/control experience garnered by most of them during Mexico’s
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independence wars which were characterized by guerilla actions or conventional war of
the type exercised by the Spanish realista armies, of which most of Santa Anna’s
generals were the product.
Although playing a personally conspicuous role in the battle, bravely directing his
troops in the line of fire, General Francisco Pacheco was unable to maintain control of his
troops in the initial attack or to deter a headlong retreat that disordered the layout of Santa
Anna’s strike plan. Ortega performed well and was one of the few to merit Santa Anna’s
limited praise following the battle. Lombardini was unhorsed with a severe leg wound too
early in the battle to be able to determine a serious critique of his ability, but his
successor, General Francisco Pérez handled the division so skillfully thereafter that he
merited a battlefield promotion to the rank of brigadier general. Seemingly, the individual
brigade commanders performed on par with their direct superiors while Micheltorena and
Corona of the general staff handled the artillery with a skill that belied the inexperience
and poor training of their gun crews. Ampudia’s command of the Light Infantry Brigade
was satisfactory and his support of Pacheco’ attack around the American left flank after
the disintegration of Bowles’ 2nd Indiana Infantry Regiment was opportune despite the
attack’s failure due to the Mexican artillery’s inability to silence the American batteries.
Blanco performed well in engaging the American right flank and his troops succeeded in
keeping a portion of the U.S. forces occupied there while Lombardini, Pacheco, and
Ortega struck the American left. During Pacheco’s second drive on the American center,
Blanco joined his zapadores in the attack and managed to capture three artillery pieces
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before being forced to withdraw by the superiority of the American guns. For his role,
Blanco earned a battlefield promotion from Santa Anna to the rank of brigadier-general.70
Although the inexperienced infantry performed well beyond what was expected, the
cavalry arm lost the battle. At the start, Santa Anna decreed that the four cavalry brigades
play the following roles: (1) Miñón was assigned to move around the American position,
harass their supply lines, and remain watchful for the decisive moment when the infantry
would roll up the American left so that he could converge on their rear and cut off their
line of retreat. Meanwhile, Juvera (2), Torrejón (3), and Andrade (4) were ordered to
support the infantry’s assault and exploit any advantage with a concentric attack meant to
roll up the American rear positions just as the infantry were crushing the main battle line.
In practice, the cavalry operations lacked coordination and thus fell short of Santa
Anna’s expectations. At the critical moment when the Mexican infantry succeeded in
caving in the American left flank, Juvera immediately seized the initiative and rallied the
cavalry for a headlong assault on the hinge of the American position at the Hacienda de
Buena Vista. While Torrejón moved in direct support of Juvera, Andrade failed to join
the attack in time and committed his brigade piece-meal, whereby his attacking troopers
arrived on scene only in time to be intermingled with the fleeing mass of Juvera’s
cavalrymen, who were repulsed by the American guns. Although it is certain that the
cavalry suffered from the same privations as the infantry in terms of training, sources
suggest that Andrade’s actions were no accident and that he was actually motivated by
disgust with Santa Anna at having been relegated to brigade command.71
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Luckily for Andrade, his poor performance was overshadowed by the ineptitude of
Miñón, who failed to support Juvera’s attack on Buena Vista with a concentric attack of
his own on the rear of that position. While Juvera had launched his headlong assault,
Miñón hovered a few miles to the northwest, having chosen to withdraw from the battle
after his diversionary attack on Saltillo was repulsed with loss. Had Miñón and Andrade
been better organized, the Americans might have been forced to cave their frontal defense
in favor of saving their supply lines, in which event the Mexicans might have actually
succeeded in rolling up the entire American position. Upon his return to San Luis Potosí,
Santa Anna had Miñón arrested while a court of inquiry was assigned to look into his
performance in the battle. Andrade, by contrast, remained untouched despite accusations
leveled against him by his fellow brigade commanders, Juvera and Torrejón. On the
periphery of the main battle, Urrea performed admirably in command of the
observational division at Tula, but would have probably been a much better utilized asset
in divisional command on the field at La Angostura. Overall, the battle of La Angostura
demonstrates a high point in the development of Mexican military operations and is
revealing of what could be accomplished when a politically homogenous officer corps
was formed and combined-arms tactics utilized on the field of battle.
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Chapter 4: Lessons Unlearned: The Polkos Revolt and the Battle of Cerro Gordo

Following the battle of La Angostura, Santa Anna withdrew his decimated army to
San Luis Potosí, but hastened to abandon its remnants and headed for Mexico City with a
few choice battalions of veteran troops to address the Polkos Revolt. Having lost more
than half of the 18,000 men with which he started the campaign, Santa Anna was obliged
to leave the bulk of those remaining forces keeping an eye on Taylor at San Luis Potosí
and to scrounge up the resources with which to form another army to confront Scott’s
invasion from Veracruz. The Polkos Revolt is noteworthy not just because it presented a
major distraction in the middle of the war, but also because the army itself played no
small role in fomenting it.
The Polkos Revolt was the violent expression of widespread malcontent with the
anticlerical policies enacted by interim-president Valentín Gómez Farías while Santa
Anna was in the north. It might be noted that the coalition that Gómez Farías formed
which swept the Santa Anna and the puros into power was an uneasy grouping of leaders
from all three major political factions: centralists, puro federalists, and moderado
federalists. Basically, the coalition was formed with the intention of consolidating the
dissident factions in support of a coherent and consistent policy to successfully prosecute
the war with the United States. The common thread shared by each of the individual
elements that supported the coalition was a passionate belligerence towards the United
States and the belief that Mexico could win the war. Amongst the key conspirators in this
coalition was Brigadier-General Joaquín Rangel, commander of Mexico City’s powerful
garrison. Once the coalition had seized power and unseated Paredes, Gómez Farías
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allowed Major-General José Mariano Salas, a moderado federalist, to hold the reigns of
government as interim president with the understanding that he would relinquish power
upon Santa Anna’s return. However, when the moment came to hand over the reigns of
government, Salas initially refused and only complied when Brigadier-General Joaquín
Rangel, the commander of the Mexico City garrison, played the veritable swingman and
refused to support him. Thus, Santa Anna was able to once more attain power, although
he almost immediately handed the reins of government to Gómez Farías in order to take
command of the army in the field.72
During his interim presidency, Gómez Farías began to enact liberal policies that
alienated many moderados and centralists who had initially supported him. Having
determined the perfect opportunity to topple the puros, the dissident elements that would
soon become known as the polkos, coalesced to conspire to usurp Gómez Frías. Amongst
the general officers that allied themselves with this movement were the grudging Salas
and Brevet Brigadier-General Matías de la Peña y Barragán, an arch-conservative
member of Mexico City’s aristocracy and commander of its National Guard Brigade who
took command of the movement’s military arm. After being ordered by the wary Gómez
Farías to march to the aid of Veracruz and being assured the cooperation of the Mexico
City garrison by Rangel, Peña y Barragán sensed his moment had come and launched his
attack in the streets of the capital on the forces that remained loyal to Gómez Farías.
When apprised of the dangerous situation unfolding in the capital, Santa Anna rushed to
the scene in a way not unlike Napoleon’s abandonment of his army in Russia in order to
thwart a rebellion in Paris. Encouraged by messages received from Santa Anna that
confirmed his support of the puros, santanista Generals Valentín Canalizo and Joaquín
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Rangel chose to support Gómez Farías for the time being and turned their forces against
the insurgents by whom they had actually been bribed to oppose the puros! Thus, the
polkos revolt began to go wrong for the insurgents, but in an abrupt reversal, upon
reaching the capital, Santa Anna withdrew his support for the puros and actually assisted
the moderado takeover that ensued.73
Having been successfully wooed by the moderados to support their cause against the
puros, Santa Anna immediately took advantage of the benefits of their support and put
the Church loans and government funding secured to good use in outfitting another army
with which to face the Americans. Although the end of the Polkos Revolt signaled a
lucrative reconciliation with the Church and the return of some form of stability to the
government with the moderados firmly entrenched in power, Santa Anna had timely
consolidated his political position as he was faced with Scott’s invasion, Veracruz having
capitulated after a brief siege by U.S. forces. Thus, after publicly displaying the trophies
that consisted of the captured standards and artillery pieces of his proclaimed victory at
La Angostura with which he won over the crowds of the capital, Santa Anna left
moderado federalist and santanista Brigadier-General Pedro María Anaya in the interim
presidency and returned to the field to face the Americans.74
It is interesting to consider the astonishing heights to which Santa Anna’s confidence
and ego rose as he was deemed a hero both for supposedly obtaining victory at La
Angostura and staving off the violence of the Polkos Revolt. Supremely confident in his
abilities, Santa Anna gathered all forces to him with the rousing words, “Mexicanos,
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Veracruz calls for vengeance. Follow me and wash out the stain of her dishonor!”75
Despite his soaring confidence, it was unfortunate for his country that Santa Anna would
be reminded on the field of battle that he was far from invincible.
At the core of the rapidly assembled forces with which Santa Anna intended to
confront Scott’s invasion were the dilapidated ranks of the Army of the East, whose units
had been considerably thinned only months before to strengthen the northern campaign.
After learning of the fall of Veracruz, Santa Anna had assigned Major-General Valentín
Canalizo, the man he left in command of the Army of the East, to gather all forces at his
disposal and await his arrival before initiating operations against the invaders. After
receiving the remnants of the paroled Veracruz garrison, Canalizo did his best to strip the
countryside of every garrison he could find before traveling to Mexico City in order to
seek personal advantage in the anticipated outcome of the Polkos Revolt.76
In addition to the troops Canalizo managed to scrape together, Santa Anna ordered
Brigadier-General Ciriaco Vázquez to march to Canalizo’s aid from Tula with his 1,700
man-brigade that had been designated one of the observational divisions during the
northern campaign. A poor excuse of an artillery train was organized from about a dozen
eight pound guns stripped from the ramparts of the fortress of San Carlos de Perote.
Finally, Santa Anna himself brought three brigades hastily assembled from select units of
the Mexico City regular garrison and national guards.77
Hoping to keep the Americans bottled up in the unhealthy lowlands, Santa Anna
decided to block the American advance along the National Highway at a pass where the
byway was dominated on either side of the hills and where his right flank was protected
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by a stream called the Río del Plan. Having placed his main force of 1,900 men and
almost thirty guns on three steep bluffs overlooking the highway, Santa Anna assigned a
token force of 100 men and two artillery pieces to guard his left flank on a steep hill
called El Telégrafo. He followed up the main position with a nearby reserve of about
1,500 cavalry and 2,000 infantry. Despite the protests of his engineer chief, LieutenantColonel Manuel Robles Pezuela, Santa Anna considered his left fully protected by a
dense seemingly impassible ravine that he “sneeringly” characterized as a place where
“not even a rabbit could pass through.”78 The Army of the East deployed to confront the
American invasion at Cerro Gordo consisted of the primary units and commanders listed
on Table 5.
Table 5. The Army of the East, April 1847
Commander-in-Chief: General de División Antonio López de Santa Anna
Chief of Staff: General de Brigada Lino José Alcorta
Commander of Engineers: Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Robles Pezuela
1st Brigade: General de Brigada Luis Pinzón
2nd Brigade: General de Brigada José María Jarero
3rd Brigade: General de Brigada Romulo Díaz de La Vega
4th Brigade: General de Brigada Ciriaco Vázquez
5th Brigade: General de Brigada Pedro de Ampudia
*6th Brigade: General Graduado Manuel Arteaga
Reserve Cavalry: General de División Valentín Canalizo
*made up of activo units from Puebla, this brigade arrived late on the battlefield the
day of the action.
Totals: 10,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry
Source: Adams, The War in Mexico, p. 87.

The army arrayed against Scott in April 1846 was a collection of ad hoc units gathered
together in desperation as the only serious opposition to the American advance. Some of
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the units were regulars or national guardsmen from Mexico City, others were veterans of
the recent northern campaign, but actually the majority were local units salvaged from the
Veracruz capitulation or activo battalions mustered on behalf of the state of Veracruz. It
is important to note that other units were still en route at the time of the battle.79
Much like the army itself, the generals slated to command were an ad hoc collection
of officers hastily gathered by Santa Anna in Mexico City or already stationed locally at
the outset of the campaign. Most importantly, it is vital to comprehend that Santa Anna
did not have the time to bide his preparations as at San Luis Potosí and was in search of a
hasty victory in order to cement his hold on the presidential chair. 80 Furthermore, the
rapid advance of the Americans demanded from Santa Anna a timely response, lest he
relinquish more territory before giving battle.
Upon deployment to their respective positions, the various brigades comprising the
army were split into several columns and organized according to the descriptive titles of
extreme right, center right, right, and left flank, reserve, and cavalry reserve. The main
position on the right flank was situated on three bluffs overlooking the highway with
artillery entrenched at the summit. A frontal assault on the main Mexican position would
be costly. Nevertheless, there were severe strategic errors committed by the Mexicans in
their preparation for this battle which harkened to their Spanish Bourbon past. In fact
there was retrogression in the tactical premise used in preparation for the battle of Cerro
Gordo, given the more careful preparations made prior to the battle of La Angostura.
The use of titles such as “right,” “center,” and “left” were common to the
organizational structure of the Bourbon armies and it is not surprising that the Mexican
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High Command would employ a directionally-based organizational structure into its
defensive planning. What is surprising is that the tactical expertise gained at La
Angostura was ignored at Cerro Gordo. Perhaps there is a correlation between the
dismissal of the lessons learned at La Angostura and the fact that none of the generals
entrusted to command at Cerro Gordo were veterans of that battle, save for the
commander-in-chief. It is also significant that the various brigades comprising the Army
of the East were not grouped into combined arms divisions as at La Angostura. The
brigades defending the positions at Cerro Gordo were entrenched in a linear fashion
without the capability of mutual support due to the ruggedness of the ground separating
the Mexican strongholds from each other. The deployment of strengthened interior lines
which act as the strategic reserve of a defensive position from which reinforcements can
be sent to points of distress along the line of battle were also absent with respect to the
Mexican far left on El Telégrafo. Moreover, the cavalry reserve was practically
immobilized given the terrain, which impeded the movement of horses due to the thick
brush and steep inclines. It is noteworthy that the defensive position proposed by Santa
Anna’s chief of engineers, Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Robles Pezuela at Corral Falso, a
little farther southeast along the National Highway, would have facilitated better use of
the cavalry and the incorporation of solid interior lines. The command of the cavalry
reserve was also once again entrusted to a commander in chief of cavalry, thus recreating that unnecessary command layer that had impeded Mexican operations at the
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero.81
The main Mexican position on the right flank was entrusted to the command of
generals Luis Pinzón and José María Jarero. In contrast to the origins of many of his
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colleagues, Pinzón was a fifty-six year old veteran of the insurgent cause and was noted
both for his ardent republicanism and fervent federalist outlook. Reputedly the mulatto
son of a wealthy Spaniard who had settled in Mazatlán, Pinzón had been an intimate
friend and comrade of the deceased General Vicente Guerrero. Having spent much of his
career resisting centralist incursions in the tropical environs of Nayarit and present-day
Guerrero, Pinzón was renowned as a daring guerilla commander, but had little experience
with conventional warfare.82
The career of forty-six year old José María Jarero mirrored that of his chief. Having
started as a general with a defeat at the hands of federalist insurgents at the battle of
Chilpancingo in 1833, Jarero had rehabilitated himself by rendering exemplary service
under Santa Anna at Tampico in 1839. A fervent santanista, Jarero had backed Gómez
Farías’ bid for power against Paredes while acting as commandant-general of the
Department of México. Perceiving him to be a sincere supporter, Santa Anna had
summoned Jarero to accompany him in the defense of their native state despite his poor
record of independent command.83
The immediate reserve allocated to support the positions of Pinzón and Jarero was
entrusted to Brigadier-General Rómulo Díaz de La Vega, who had been recently
exchanged following his capture at Resaca del Guerrero and had been en route to put
himself at the disposal of the government in Mexico City when notified of his
appointment by Santa Anna’s staff. The main reserve, which was collected behind the hill
of Cerro Gordo on the south side of the Highway, was assigned to General Pedro de
Ampudia, who had accompanied his chief from La Angostura.
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The cavalry reserve, assigned to the command of Major-General Valentín Canalizo,
was ordered to cover the Mexican left flank despite the incompatibility of the terrain
which would render coordinated cavalry maneuvers difficult if not impossible. A fiftythree year old native of Monterrey, Nuevo León, Canalizo was an ardent santanista
whose ascendancy mirrored every zig-zag in Santa Anna’s career. Having attained the
rank of major-general by virtue of his armed support of Santa Anna’s overthrow of
Bustamante in 1841, the arch-conservative Canalizo had served Santa Anna twice as
interim president, and was viewed as such a menace by subsequent moderado and
centralist regimes, that in 1845 he had been exiled to Cadiz, Spain. Recalled by Santa
Anna to serve as minister of war in the cabinet of interim-president Gómez Farías,
Canalizo had prevented the army from going over to the insurgents during the Polkos
Revolt and was rewarded with the appointment of second-in-command of the Army of
the East.84
The vital left flank, so neglected by Santa Anna, was entrusted to an old friend and
fellow veracruzano, fifty-three year old Brigadier-General Ciriaco Vázquez. Apparently
Vázquez and Santa Anna were lifelong friends who had met as teen-aged cadets in the
royalist Veracruz militia regiment. An ardent santanista in the vein of Canalizo, Vázquez
was a veteran of both the 1822 war against Spain and the 1839 Pastry War against the
French. Deemed to be too close to Santa Anna for comfort, Vázquez had remained
unemployed by the federalist and centralist regimes of Herrera and Paredes, but had
pronounced from Veracruz in favor of Santa Anna’s return in August 1846, being
rewarded for his customary fealty with the command of one of the observational
divisions assigned to operate in the periphery of the Army of the North. Having been
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summoned to bolster the ranks of the Army of the East, Vázquez complied with his
chief’s orders and successfully brought his troops the three hundred miles from Tula to
the defense of his native state. An excellent battlefield commander, Vázquez was one of
Santa Anna’s most loyal subordinates entrusted with holding the left flank “at any price,”
a task that Santa Anna probably did not consider beyond his friend’s considerable
abilities despite the meager resources allotted him.85
The performance of the Mexican Army at Cerro Gordo was lackluster. The rapidly
assembled recruits were ill-trained and ill-equipped to meet the American onslaught, but
Santa Anna’s calculations regarding the right flank rang true. On the evening before the
main battle, Pinzón and Jarero held on to their positions and rained fire down on the
attacking Americans, who were ultimately repulsed. The American envelopment of the
left flank was what completely unhinged the entire Mexican position and precipitated the
collapse of the army.86
Despite American gestures against the left on the evening before the main battle,
Santa Anna’s interior lines failed to adequately reinforce Vázquez’s troops and thus, on
the following morning, when the Americans launched their unexpected mass attack on
the left, they simply overwhelmed Vázquez and proceeded to roll up the rest of the
Mexican positions from west to east. The gallant Vázquez was killed in action by a bullet
in the head as the Americans stormed the summit of Telégrafo and was last seen waving
his sword in a vain attempt to rally his panicked soldiery. Following the battle, Vázquez’s
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corpse was seen with his uniform stripped of its insignia and without boots, lying amidst
the bodies of his fellow countrymen. 87
Having vehemently argued against Santa Anna’s disposition of both the left flank and
the cavalry, Canalizo was unable to coordinate his support of the left because of the
terrain and his lancers were simply brushed aside by the weight of the American attack.
Having witnessed the total disintegration of his command, the distraught Canalizo
wheeled his horse towards Jalapa and fled the battlefield. As the Americans converged
upon the base camp and cut the Mexican line of retreat, Ampudia tried to rally his men,
but was ultimately carried along by the fleeing soldiery. Recognizing the hopelessness of
their position due to the appearance of American forces at their rear, Pinzón and Jarero
relented and surrendered their commands before they were overrun. While attempting to
rally the Mexican artillery to meet the American attack, Díaz de La Vega was captured
for the second time in the war, while the newly arrived activo brigade of Brevet
Brigadier-General Manuel Arteaga was utterly dispersed upon contact with the American
tidal wave. After having spent great effort in attempting to rally his troops, Santa Anna
himself was obliged to abandon the field and flee towards Xalapa by rough paths that cut
through the dense underbrush on the south side of the National Highway.88
I argue that no amount of tactical competency on the part of Santa Anna’s
subordinates could have changed the outcome. The defeat at Cerro Gordo can only be
attributed to the faulty disposition of the left flank as selected by Santa Anna. This
seemingly glaring omission is another example of a doctrinal error made by a Mexican
general that correlates that group’s Spanish Bourbon military heritage with its battlefield
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performance. The nature of Frederickian combat theory with its emphasis on frontal
assaults and firepower by infantry volley was clearly ingrained in Santa Anna’s tactical
plan for the battle, which was successfully played out on the first day. In that vein, it is
not surprising that he would have been disingenuous with the opinions of his relatively
inexperienced engineer-in-chief who was twenty years his junior. That the American
engineers would be capable of cutting a path through the dense vegetation around his left
was disregarded with some justification. Nothing like this had ever happened to Santa
Anna, neither in Texas nor during his northern campaign. Throughout its past, the
Mexican Army had utilized the engineer arm in the construction of works and
fortifications, but never had Mexican engineers been tasked with cutting a path around an
enemy’s flank in order to unhinge his position, especially when the generals they worked
for insisted upon a reliance on the cold steel of the lance and bayonet to unseat the
enemy.89
Furthermore, Santa Anna’s disbelief in the possibility of an American overturning of
his left flank and its subsequent occurrence is reminiscent of what happened to the
Spanish Army at Somosierra in 1808, when Napoleon succeeded in unhinging a strong
defensive position situated along the crest of a highway by launching a flanking attack
over rough terrain that resulted in a rout of the Spanish army not unlike what was
inflicted on the Mexicans at Cerro Gordo. Strikingly reminiscent of what happened to
Santa Anna after the battle, when he sought refuge in a nearby village parrish and the
priest refused to grant him lodging or a fresh mount, the Spanish commander at
Somosierra escaped the battlefield by rough paths and in apparent solitude. The only
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difference is that when he was caught by some of his men, also fugitives from the battle,
he was lynched from a tree.90
The individual performance of the Mexican generals involved in the battle was good
when viewed in the context of the hopelessness of their situation as determined by the
commander-in-chief who had decreed his army’s disposition without the counsel of his
subordinates or an appropriate estimation of his opponents’ abilities. The ferocity of the
combat and the valor with which the Mexican generals conducted themselves is well
represented by the fact that of the nine generals assigned to combat command during the
battle, five were captured and one was killed in action.91 Taken as a whole, the events of
February-April 1847 demonstrate the extent to which a lack of political homogeneity and
the use of outmoded tactics could result in reversals for the Mexican general officer
corps. Whereas the Polkos Revolt reveals the extent to which political infighting
hampered the Mexican war effort, the battle of Cerro Gordo demonstrates that the use of
Frederickian tactics led to the unraveling of the Mexican position.
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Chapter 5: Mexico City Interlude: The Reluctant Rebuilding of an Army

The destruction of the Army of the East at Cerro Gordo is probably the most
devastating defeat ever suffered by Mexican arms with the possible exception of the
battle of San Jacinto. So many hopes and aspirations had been devastated in one fell
swoop that Santa Anna was sunk into the deepest despair in the aftermath of the battle.
Having promised to win a great victory, the reversal placed him in a precarious position.
Strangely, his return to Mexico City did not stir any intrigue as both the political and
military leadership came to realize that the gringos would indeed soon come to trample
the ancient Aztec capital and that the battle for the heart of their nation would soon
unfold.92
The sobering effect of the battle of Cerro Gordo determined that either the Mexican
army would have to lay aside its internal political differences or suffer inevitable defeat.
There were no longer enough troops or generals left who could be counted upon to be
completely politically and tactically acceptable to Santa Anna. From here on, Santa Anna
would have to work with the potential rivals that he had avoided incorporating into his
army at San Luis Potosí and Cerro Gordo. Now, in the depths of desperation, Santa Anna
and his war minister, General Tornel, realized that if they intended to defend the capital
effectively, they would have to join all forces available and muster the cooperation of
previously perceived undesirables such as major-generals Gabriel Valencia and Juan
Álvarez. Thus, Santa Anna reluctantly sent emissaries to San Luis Potosí and Acapulco
inviting Valencia and Álvarez to join him for the coming struggle against the Americans.
It is interesting to note that perhaps the only reason rival caudillos such as Valencia and
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Álvarez did not march on the capital to usurp power at that moment was because they
both may have feared the public backlash such an action would incur in the face of
foreign invasion and the danger of being visibly responsible for the defeat that would
follow. It might serve well to explain the politics that had thus far effected the nonparticipation of Valencia and Álvarez, men who led substantial forces that might have
abetted the Mexican war effort long before Cerro Gordo.93
In August 1847, the forty-eight year old Major-General Gabriel Valencia found
himself in command of the much reduced 4,000-man Army of the North. Described by
contemporaries as a heavyset, bull-necked man of average height and build, with small
side whiskers and a heavy black mustache, Justin Smith characterized him as “destitute of
every principle of honor and honesty” with a “hard cruel look about his cold blue eyes.”94
Ambitious and headstrong, Valencia exhibited a certain charismatic panache and enjoyed
an extremely popular following amongst the common soldiers. Having risen to the rank
of general by the age of 32 in 1831, Valencia had played a major role in Mexico’s
factional wars and was known to be every bit as much a political chameleon as Santa
Anna. What made him absolutely unacceptable to Santa Anna was the memory of his
opposition in 1844, when he and other generals including Álvarez, had launched a coup
against his centralist regime that unseated him in favor of the moderados. In the wake of
Santa Anna’s return, War Minister Tornel had worked his best to keep Valencia away
from both the front lines, where he posed a threat to Santa Anna’s person; and Mexico
City, where he posed a threat to Santa Anna’s regime. The trick for Tornel and Santa
Anna was to definitely keep Valencia occupied, but in a lesser position where he could
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pose no threat to the regime. Thus, with the thought of relegating him to a secondary
theater where he could neither steal the victory from his grasp nor the presidential chair
out from under him, Santa Anna placed Valencia in command of the garrison at Tula,
three hundred miles to the northwest of the estimated location of the main action.
Assigned to harass the precarious enemy supply lines across Nuevo León, Valencia
smoldered in Tula until the war minister’s discovery of his complicity in a dissident
conspiracy hatched by the Red Comet Society which prompted the sudden removal of
Valencia in favor of placing him in command of the dilapidated Army of the North at San
Luis Potosí. Both Santa Anna’s and Tornel’s reasoning at this time reflected their belief
that Valencia could not turn the Army of the North against the government because of the
continued presence of several santanista generals within the ranks. Also, Santa Anna
estimated that the victory he was sure to obtain would seal his hold on power and nullify
Valencia’s dissident overtures. Therefore, upon the army’s return to San Luis Potosí,
Valencia was detailed from Tula to take command and instructed to remain there as a
counterweight against any potential moves against that city by Taylor’s forces.
In the weeks following the utter disaster at Cerro Gordo, Santa Anna and Tornel soon
realized that opposing Scott’s invasion in strength would require summoning the Army of
the North to the Valley of México. Furthermore, in an army where generals respected no
hierarchy and were akin to warlords temporarily allied in the pursuit of some common
goal, Valencia could no longer be removed from command without Santa Anna having to
bear the brunt of accusations of nepotism that might very well engender the animosity of
that chief who might very well march against him. In Santa Anna’s estimation it was
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better to summon Valencia to the capital to fight alongside him than to suffer the
consequences of trying to remove him from command.95
In the summer of 1847, the 3,000-man strong Army of the South was led by the
venerable southern caudillo, Major-General Juan Álvarez. At fifty-five, Álvarez was the
scion of a wealthy Spaniard and his indigenous concubine. He was lucky enough to
obtain an inheritance during his childhood by way of his father’s death which enabled
him to pursue a haphazard education. Scathingly described by Justin Smith as an
“ignorant mulatto from the wilds, who understood only half-savage partisan fighting,”
Álvarez rallied to the banner of insurrection against the Spaniards at age eighteen and
thereafter supported the liberal Guerrero, whose cause he continued to champion long
after Guerrero’s execution in 1831.96 A staunch federalist who enjoyed the utmost
confidence of the Indian masses of his home region, Álvarez was not highly regarded as a
professional soldier, having gained the lion’s share of his experience conducting guerrilla
campaigns against the centralists. Having played an uncharacteristically minimal role in
the initial political turmoil that led to Santa Anna’s return, Álvarez lent his support to
Santa Anna upon the latter’s election to the presidency and issued various proclamations
advocating the unison of all Mexicans before the face of foreign invasion regardless of
political persuasion. In that vein, following the battle of Cerro Gordo, Álvarez led the
forces at his disposal to the capital where he placed himself at the disposal of his former
rival. Completely mistrusted by Santa Anna, who could not forgive him for the role he
had played in his ouster in 1844, Álvarez was assigned the secondary role of harassing
Scott’s advance on Puebla with 2,000 cavalrymen. Again, Santa Anna found it hard to
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accommodate Álvarez’s desire for a place in the army and sought solace in distancing the
general to a secondary role where he might busy himself without stirring up trouble. In an
ironic turn of events brought on by his own obstinacy, Santa Anna found himself
seconded by the same two men who had engineered his downfall only three years
before.97
The army that was reformed by Santa Anna to face the final American assault on the
capital was a mere skeleton, both morally and physically, of what the Army of the North
had been merely six months before. Although artillery and ammunition was somewhat
more plentiful due to its availability from the Mexico City ramparts, the gun crews
needed to operate them were practically non-existent. Likewise, training suffered
amongst all service branches as Santa Anna rushed to prepare his troops to make an
abrupt about-face against the invader. The morale of the infantry was weak due to the
continuous losses incurred by the Mexican army which lent credence to the view that the
gringos were invincible. The only troops that retained their confidence on the eve of
battle were the Mexico City National Guard units who marched to their positions on the
outskirts of the city at the pinnacle of the Mexican defenses on a steep hill called El
Peñón amidst the grandeur of a military parade complete with martial music and
fluttering banners.98
Santa Anna’s strategy reflected the fact that his army lacked the morale and physical
strength with which to mount an aggressive campaign against Scott. Initially, Santa Anna
spread his forces across the defensive landscape of the city’s garitas and causeways,
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ignoring Napoleon’s maxim that “he who defends all defends nothing.” 99 Forced to alter
his defensive posture upon Scott’s undertaking to attack the city from its vulnerable
southern flank, Santa Anna evacuated the units stationed at El Peñón and spread them
opposite Scott’s advance on the southern front.100 The composition of the Mexican Army
in August 1847 is presented in Table 6.
Table 6. The Mexican Army, Early August 1847
Commander-in-Chief: General de División Antonio López de Santa Anna
Chief of Staff & Minister of War: General de Brigada Lino José Alcorta
Aides-de-Camp: Gen. de Brigada José Ignacio Basadre & Gen. Grad. Benito Zenea
Artillery/Engineers: General de División Ignacio Mora y Villamil
I. Army of the East (Reconstituted): General de División Manuel María Lombardini
Deputy Commander: General de División Manuel Rincón








1st Brigade: General de Brigada Andrés Terrés y Maságuer
2nd Brigade: General de Brigada Mariano Martínez de Lejarza
3rd Brigade: General de Brigada Joaquín Rangel
4th Brigade: General de Brigada Simeón Ramírez
5th Brigade: General de Brigada Francisco Pérez
6th Brigade: General de Brigada Antonio Léon
Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Benito Quijano

II. Mexico City National Guard Forces (El Peñón): Gral. De División José Joaquín de
Herrera
 1st Brigade: General de Brigada Pedro María Anaya
 2nd Brigade: Colonel Anastasio Zerecero
 3rd Brigade: General Graduado Matías de la Peña y Barragán
 4th Brigade: General de Brigada Ignacio Martínez Pinillos
III. Army of the North: General de División Gabriel Valencia
Artillery: General Graduado Antonio Corona
1st Division: General de Brigada Francisco Mejía
 1st Brigade: General Graduado Nicolás Mendoza
 Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Manuel Romero
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Table 6. (cont.)
2nd Division: General de Brigada Anastasio Parrodi
 1st Brigade: General Graduado José María González de Mendoza
 2nd Brigade: General de Brigada José María García
3rd Division: General de Brigada José Mariano Salas
 1st Brigade: General de Brigada Santiago Blanco
 Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Anastasio Torrejón
IV. Army of the South (Cavalry Reserve): General de División Juan Álvarez
Chief of Staff: General de Brigada Tomás Moreno






1st Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Manuel Andrade
2nd Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Julián Juvera
3rd Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Ángel Guzmán
4th Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Ángel Pérez Palacios
5th Cavalry Brigade: General de Brigada Antonio José Jáuregui

V. Miscellaneous Forces
Forces at Chapultepec Castle: General de División Nicolás Bravo
Second-in-Command: General de Brigada José Mariano Monterde
Totals: Exact numbers unknown, estimated at 15-20,000 men of all arms.
Source: Adams, The War in Mexico, p. 94

The generals appointed to command the haphazard forces assembled by Santa Anna
were a reflection of what little there was on hand. In early August 1847, Santa Anna took
personal command of the Army of the East and allocated the best equipment available to
these troops with which he intended to primarily defend the capital. As at San Luis
Potosí, Santa Anna picked his most trusted subordinates both politically and tactically
speaking to command the brigades that made up this army. Amongst them were the
newly promoted Generals Terrés and Pérez, who had distinguished themselves at La
Angostura and accompanied Santa Anna to the capital in the wake of the Polkos Revolt.
Another veteran assigned to brigade command was Brigadier-General Simeón Ramírez
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who had remained ever loyal to Santa Anna and rendered service as a staff officer both at
La Angostura and Cerro Gordo. The other four brigade commanders in the army were byproducts of the delicate political atmosphere in the capital who had remained steadfastly
loyal to Santa Anna above all else during the Polkos Revolt.
The forty-four year old Brigadier-General Joaquín Rangel was a veritable santanista
who had maintained the ciudadela’s loyalty to Santa Anna during the troubles with the
polkos and served in deputy command of the reserve at Cerro Gordo. Described by one
source as “tall and light complected, with a prominent forehead, long nose, gray eyes, and
blonde moustache,” Rangel was highly respected as a professional within the army and
actually promulgated a defensive measure for the vulnerable southern approaches to the
capital culminating at Churubusco Bridge which was duly adopted by his chief.101
Personally summoned to the Valley of Mexico by Santa Anna from repose in
Chihuahua, the thirty-nine year old Brigadier-General Mariano Martínez de Lejarza was a
staunch santanista who had served brief terms as interim governor of both Chihuahua
and New Mexico during the 1830s. The cavalry brigade commander, Brigadier-General
Benito Quijano, was a long-time member of Santa Anna’s staff who had demonstrated
sufficient dedication to Santa Anna over the span of his thirty-five year career as to merit
a field command.102
Perhaps the most surprising addition to Santa Anna’s array of field commanders in the
Army of the East was the fifty-one year old Oaxaca native, Brigadier-General Antonio
León. An ardent federalist who had supported Gómez Farías’ presidency, León was a
moving force behind his native state’s dissident pronouncement following the removal of
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the puros from power. Interestingly enough, despite Oaxaca’s protest at the displacement
of the puros, León pledged his state’s dedication to the Mexican national cause and
promptly organized his state’s activo forces and marched to Santa Anna’s aid at Cerro
Gordo at the head of a brigade. Although he arrived too late to prevent disaster, Santa
Anna nevertheless integrated his forces into the reformed Army of the East and retained
León in brigade command. A former two-time governor of his native state and ardent
supporter of Santa Anna’s prewar pro-federalist pronouncements, León was probably the
best example of an impartial patriot general who served admirably despite being at odds
with the government he served. Widely recognized as a model officer, León was highly
regarded even by Santa Anna himself who referred to him as “the courageous León” in
his official correspondence.103
The generals assigned to command the National Guard brigades dispersed throughout
the Mexican defenses following the evacuation of El Peñón were for the most part
moderado federalists who had secured command following the elevation of their political
party to power following the Polkos Revolt. A notable member of this group was the
fifty-three year old Brigadier-General Pedro María Anaya, an ardent santanista who had
served recently as interim president. The forty-seven year old Brevet Brigadier-General
Matías de la Peña y Barragán was a former leader of the Polkos Revolt who was
maintained in the reserve because of his clearly perceived political volubility. The
commander of the 4th Brigade, Brigadier-General Ignacio Martínez Pinillos was a fiftythree year old native of Oaxaca who was residing in repose in Mexico City when recalled
to active duty.
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Previously regarded by the war ministry as an entity within which to dump politically
unacceptable elements, the Army of the North was led by General Gabriel Valencia to the
Valley of Mexico upon Santa Anna’s summons. For the most part, the army’s primary
unit commanders were veterans of the Buena Vista Campaign who had remained with the
colors at San Luis Potosí following Santa Anna’s departure in late February. One notable
exception was the commander of the 3rd Division, Major-General José Mariano Salas.
The seasoned fifty-year old moderado veteran of Mexico’s factional conflicts had been
banished to San Luis Potosí as punishment for his active support of the Polkos Revolt
against Gómez Farías and by extension, Santa Anna. Previously regarded as a staunch
santanista, Salas’ previous refusal to accede the presidency to the puros following Santa
Anna’s return confirmed his political volubility in Santa Anna’s eyes and he was
condemned to banishment at San Luis Potosí, where he smoldered until thrust into the
arms of the like-minded Valencia, also recently arrived from Tula. Eager to see action
against the Americans, Salas was a moving force behind Valencia’s self-serving search
for victory and played a prominent role in supporting Valencia’s selection of a position
independent of Santa Anna’s at Rancho de Padierna. The two newly promoted brigadiers
in General Anastasio Parrodi’s 3rd Infantry Division, Brevet Brigadier-Generals José
María González de Mendoza and José María García were both rather youthful officers of
santanista political persuasion whose recent conduct in the field during the Buera Vista
Campaign merited their elevation to higher command.104
The generals assigned to command in the Army of the South were an interesting mix
of officers who were either Álvarez’s original appointees or santanistas recently assigned
to command by the war ministry as their units were integrated into this army made up of
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cavalry units. Andrade, Juvera, Jáuregui, and Guzmán were all santanista veterans of the
Santa Anna’s northern campaign who were assigned to serve under Álvarez with the
intention of watching his movements and acting as a political counterweight with which
to maintain the army’s loyalty. Only Brigadier-Generals Ángel Pérez Palacios and Tomás
Moreno, the army chief of staff, were Álvarez appointees who had accompanied him
from Acapulco to assist Santa Anna’s defense of the capital. It is interesting to observe
Álvarez’s movements during the campaign, as it seems that although he was initially full
of bravado, his spirits seemed to wane and his performance at Molino del Rey gave the
impression of a lethargic amateur that he most certainly was not. Perhaps the command
structure imposed on his army by Santa Anna and its relegation to act as a strategic
reserve shook his resolve as he came to the realization that Santa Anna no longer had any
confidence in him.105
The commanders of the reserve units assigned to command the respective garrisons at
El Peñón and Chapultepec Castle were Major Generals José Joaquín de Herrera and
Nicolás Bravo. Both former presidents of Mexico, Herrera and Bravo shared a strong
moderado political persuasion and had been recalled to command by Santa Anna on the
eve of battle in the hopes of occupying their ambitious minds with employment. While
Herrera was destined to play a lackluster role in command of the forces remaining at El
Peñón, the sixty-one year old Bravo would gain everlasting fame in command of the
fortress of Chapultepec. Bravo’s deputy was the commandant of the War College,
Brigadier-General José Mariano Monterde a scholarly old engineer officer of a rather
apolitical nature who had spent much of his thirty-five career in academia.106
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The commander of the fortified area at the vital Churubusco crossing was entrusted to
the distinguished, white-haired, Major-General Manuel Rincón, a sixty-three year old
moderado federalist who had begun his career as an insurgent fighter in his native
Veracruz. A veteran of Santa Anna’s campaigns against the French at Tampico and the
Spanish at Veracruz, Rincón had retired from active service in 1840, but had been
recalled from retirement by Santa Anna to command the vital Churubusco bridgehead, a
post which the passionate old patriot accepted with considerable zeal.107

107

Churubusco en la acción military del 20 de agosto de 1847, pp. 9-12.

75

Chapter 6: Of Ambition and Ammunition: The Battles for Mexico City

The performance of the Mexican generals in the Mexico City Campaign laid bare the
considerable deficiencies of the army’s ineffective command structure. The lack of
centralized command condemned Santa Anna to rely on subordinates who did not
necessarily recognize his dominance nor always concur with his orders. Despite a
disparity in numbers that seemingly worked to his advantage, the fact that Santa Anna
could only be sure that troops under his immediate command would accede to his orders
nullified the problem for the Americans and practically ensured that they would be able
to confront the Mexican forces arrayed against them in a piece-meal fashion that would
level the odds. Thus, a combination of disunity of command and faulty tactical
disposition stacked the cards against Santa Anna even before the campaign
commenced.108
The destruction of the Mexican Army of the North at the battle of Padierna is
customarily attributed to the rivalries characteristic of the Mexican high command. When
Valencia disobeyed Santa Anna’s orders to join him at Churubusco and placed himself
out on a limb, he believed he could oblige his chief to join him in a favorable battle
against the Americans that he could claim credit for winning. However, rather than
exploit the opportunity afforded him to destroy a large part of the American forces who
were trying to find a way around Valencia’s well entrenched position at Rancho de
Padierna, Santa Anna merely allowed Valencia to be destroyed piece-meal, an action that
can only be attributed to either Santa Anna’s customary slow reflexes on the battlefield or
a desire to promulgate the elimination of a rival who had disobeyed his orders and must
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pay the price. During the day before the battle, the Mexican troops under Valencia had
performed well and the artillery directed by Blanco had even gained an advantage over
the American batteries. However, the following morning, once it became known that the
Americans had turned the position and that reinforcements were not coming from Santa
Anna, the Mexican forces collapsed before the American onslaught.
Although the deep-seated conflict between Valencia and Santa Anna certainly eased
the task for the Americans, I argue that the failure of the Mexican Army of the North at
the battle of Contreras is sufficiently explained by the Mexican reliance on linear tactics
inherited from their Spanish Bourbon heritage. Throughout the action, the American
forces exerted a fluidity that allowed them to maintain the initiative by making concentric
probing attacks on the static Mexican positions. The use of the engineer arm to hack a
path around the flank of Valencia’s troops in order to strike him from the rear at dawn on
September 8th recreated the scenario that had occurred at Cerro Gordo, whereby Valencia
was caught by surprise. Apparently, Valencia had hoped that the Americans would hurl
themselves in a frontal assault against his impregnable position at Rancho de Padierna.
Such a gesture had been made by an impetuous American general on the evening of
September 7th. That attack had failed miserably and caused the Americans great loss. For
the first time during the war, American batteries were silenced by Mexican gun crews. It
seemed as though Valencia’s operational plan had succeeded. However, as Mexican
sentries were wakened by the work of American axes during the night, it became
apparent to Valencia that the Americans had cut a path around his left flank and were
disposed to strike him from the rear. Thereafter, the battle was a re-enactment of Cerro
Gordo. It stands to reason that if Valencia would have exhibited the same freedom of
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movement and reinforcement, he could have avoided a rout and mounted a more effective
if not successful resistance. Interestingly enough, none of Valencia’s subordinates were
veterans of the Cerro Gordo fiasco and one of his divisional generals had not even been
engaged against the Americans.109
For their part, Valencia’s generals concerned themselves with rallying their panicstricken troops, but were ultimately carried away by the American onslaught that
overtook their position from both front and rear. Blanco, Mejía, Mendoza, and Salas were
all wounded and captured while defending the guns at Rancho de Padierna, meanwhile
the 3rd Infantry Division’s command cadre was decimated on the battle’s rear axis, where
the division commander Parrodi and both of his brigadiers, González de Mendoza and
García, fell into the hands of the enemy. Only Valencia and his redoubtable cavalry
generals Romero and Torrejón managed to escape, the latter individually by rough paths
that led him to the safety of the village of San Gerónimo, where he laid low for awhile to
avoid Santa Anna’s wrath. Torrejón later secured command of a cavalry brigade in
Álvarez’s Army of the South.110
Following his uncanny escape from the battlefield, Valencia managed to avoid
detection by a vengeful Santa Anna and made it as far as Toluca where he managed to
involve himself in yet another anti-santanista conspiracy in conjunction with generals
Pedro de Ampudia, Valentín Canalizo, and Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, who had all lost
confidence in Santa Anna following the disaster at Cerro Gordo and elected to remove
themselves from his service. After publishing a manifesto exonerating him of all blame
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for the disaster at Contreras, Valencia fell into the hands of the enemy and subsequently
died in the capital of an apoplectic attack just after the American takeover of the city.111
The Mexican generals’ performance at the subsequent twin battles of Churubusco and
Chapultepec was gallant and courageous, but an ordnance officer’s supposed
misunderstanding of Santa Anna’s orders for the deployment of an ammunition dump
near the San Mateo Convent resulted in an early exhaustion of ammunition. Forced to
gradually relinquish their position in light of the Intendance Service’s failure to deploy
reinforcements and additional ammunition to the threatened sector, Generals Rincón and
Anaya distinguished themselves to a great extent and it was upon his capture by
American troops that Anaya uttered the famous phrase in response to General Twiggs
inquiry regarding the location of the artillery park, “General, if there was any
ammunition, you would not be here.”112 In addition, Generals Rangel and Pérez
performed admirably while covering the Mexican retreat and even Santa Anna exposed
himself repeatedly while exhorting his troops to hold their positions. As at Cerro Gordo,
it was a lack of solid interior lines that forced the Mexicans to give way. In light of a very
effective military deception campaign enacted by the Americans, Santa Anna was forced
to deploy his troops in spread-out non-mutually supportive positions that disallowed him
from shifting his forces to the locations of American attacks. It was tragic for the
Mexicans that while Rincón’s troops at Churubusco were running out of ammunition and
withdrawing under daunting pressure, thousands of their fellows maintained their
positions to the north and south without receiving timely orders to assist. Santa Anna
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himself appeared on scene too late and in feverish annoyance at the American attack in
an unexpected location.113
The subsequent battle of Molino del Rey on September 9th was a striking example of
both the great quality of the Mexican forces when well led from superbly fortified
defensive positions and the great deficiency in the Mexican use of cavalry. Having
divined the American intention of attacking the mill, on the eve of battle, Santa Anna
convened the generals assigned to the defense of this sector and outlined for them the
following operational plan: After the infantry brigades of León, Rangel, Pérez, and
Ramírez repulsed the initial American attack on the fortified strongholds at the Molino
del Rey and the Casa Mata, which were linked by a stone wall, Álvarez’s 4,000 strong
cavalry reserve would swoop down on the enemy and roll up their forces from the right
flank.114
The following day, the plan had an extremely favorable start as the Mexican infantry
succeeded in repulsing the initial American onslaught as planned. In this instance, the
Americans played into the Mexicans’ hands and launched a frontal assault that enabled
the Mexican generals to carry out Santa Anna’s plan for a linear frontal defense of their
position. The result was complete success. The American assault force composed of 500
men lost 11 of its 14 officers in a matter of minutes and was repulsed. Supporting assaults
on the Casa Mata were also held in check by the Mexicans until a lack of ammunition
and the effectiveness of American artillery forced them to retire. It is significant that the
Mexican generals maintained discipline within the ranks and withdrew their forces in
good order as they continuously decimated the Americans’ ranks. It is also significant
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that the Americans did not use their artillery from the outset and only opened fire after
the first assault wave had been repulsed and the value of the Mexican defensive position
accurately appreciated.115
For his part, Álvarez failed to coordinate his attack in time and his cavalry brigades
were launched towards the American position early, and from the wrong direction, and in
a piece-meal fashion that allowed the Americans to react quickly and deploy their
artillery. Thus, after the cavalry was routed and their flanks secured, the Americans kept
up the artillery pressure on the fortified lines held by the infantry until they were forced
to relinquish their positions due to exhaustion of ammunition.116
Enraged at the negative turnout of the battle, Santa Anna sent an aide to Álvarez and
demanded to know why his attack had failed. Álvarez responded by presenting himself
before Santa Anna and explaining that the attack had been sabotaged by General Andrade
who as commander of the lead brigade assigned to open the attack had refused to
acknowledge Álvarez’s seniority at the critical moment and blatantly refused to charge
over the stipulated ground. Although Juvera and Guzmán confirmed Álvarez’s account
and Andrade was placed under arrest, the commander-in-chief did not fully accept this
explanation and harbored resentment against Álvarez for having lost the battle.117
In contrast to Álvarez, Generals León, Rangel and Pérez all played distinguished roles
in the defense and were constantly in the thick of the fight, encouraging their men and
directing their fire. In the end it was left up to Rangel to oversee the troops’ withdrawal,
as León was killed in action by a bullet to the chest and Pérez was carried from the field
with a severe leg wound. The only check to the infantry generals’ performance was the
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inexplicable disappearance of Ramírez from the field of battle. Later it was discovered
that the general had apparently lost his nerve due to the perceived shortage of
ammunition and abandoned his troops prior to the commencement of hostilities.118
The fact that the Mexican defense was not seriously hampered by the panic of one of
its general officers lends credence to my argument that a faulty command structure and
the use of outmoded tactics are sufficient for explaining the defeat of the Mexican forces
rather than the morality of its generals. At Molino del Rey, the Mexican forces came as
close as they ever would to checking the American investment of the capital and it was
because their generals had finally devised an operational plan that took advantage of
American errors. All of the generals who served in the fortified positions at Molino del
Rey and the Casa Mata were veterans of earlier campaigns against the Americans and
two had distinguished themselves at La Angostura. In the final count, as the opening
success of Mexican arms demonstrates, it was not the cravenness of Ramírez that cost
them the battle, but American firepower and a lack of ammunition. By the same token,
the willingness of the Americans to launch a frontal assault against prepared defenses and
the Mexican disposition of solid interior lines that enabled mutual support between Pérez,
Rangel and León initially evened the odds for the Mexicans and nearly won them the
day.119
The subsequent battle for Chapultepec and the garitas was a foregone conclusion after
the fall of the Molino del Rey. Following the American investment of the Molino del
Rey, Santa Anna was confused by Scott’s deceptive gestures on other sectors of the front
and failed to bring his numerical superiority to bear at the decisive moment, thereby
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violating Napoleon’s maxim regarding “getting to the field of battle with the most men in
the least time.”120 Perceiving the American gesture on Chapultepec to be a diversionary
strike, Santa Anna failed to bolster the castle’s defenses and General Bravo was forced to
do what he could with the mere couple hundred men assigned to his command.121
Although Santa Anna was finally forced to acknowledge his mistake once the
American attack got under way, he was unable to send ample reinforcements in time to
affect the battle’s outcome. For his part, General Bravo conducted himself like the gallant
old soldier he was and was injured by falling masonry when an American cannonball
struck a rampart he was standing on while directing his troops’ fire. Regaining his
composure, Bravo rejoined the front-line and continued to wave his bejeweled sword
over his head while encouraging his men until he was wounded and captured along with
his deputy, General Monterde.122 One general assigned to assist in the fortress’ defense at
the last minute, the forty-seven year old Brigadier-General Juan Nepomuceno Pérez, was
killed in action during the hand-to-hand combat that ensued once the Americans gained
the works and overwhelmed the defenders. It is worthy of note that Bravo had rightly
recognized the nature of the American threat on his front and had tried to impress his
concerns to Santa Anna, but to no avail.123
Following the loss of Chapultepec, as the Americans launched themselves headlong
against the gates of Mexico City, Santa Anna rushed to send reinforcements to repel the
invaders’ advance along the causeways that culminated in the garitas of Belén and San
Cosme. Having originally believed the main attack would be made against the Garita de

120

Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 161-177.
Departamento del Districto Federal, El Asalto al Chapultepec y los Niños Heroes, pp. 47-79.
122
El Asalto al Castillo de Chapultepec, p. 26.
123
Trueba, Nicolás Bravo, el mexicano que perdonó, p. 86.
121

83

San Antonio, where General Ignacio Martínez Pinillos had been afforded considerable
resources, it took considerable skill and energy for Santa Anna to redeploy his forces to
the threatened areas in the mass confusion that reigned within the Mexican lines.
Previously having left General Terrés in command of a makeshift force of 200 troops and
three artillery pieces guarding the Garita de Belén with instructions to hold the gate at all
costs should the Americans attempt to access the capital from that direction, the timorous
Terrés inexplicably abandoned his position in the face of the American onslaught and
ordered his troops to seek refuge in the heavily fortified Ciudadela about 100 yards to the
north. In the meantime, upon hearing the guns thundering at the Belén Gate, Santa Anna
rushed from the Garita de San Antonio to halt the American onslaught with a handful of
troops and came upon a sight that he was loath to believe: the Americans had already
breached the entrance and were flooding past. Demanding to know why he had not been
notified of the American attack, Santa Anna was met by several junior officers of Terrés'
command who had marched to the sound of the guns from nearby positions claiming that
they had been initially ordered to withdraw by Terrés himself. Infuriated, Santa Anna
sought out Terrés and came upon the disconcerted general in the Ciudadela, taking refuge
in a doorway behind the line of fire. At this sight, Santa Anna became white with rage
and leapt upon the hapless general, tearing the epaulets from his uniform and striking him
across the face with his riding crop.124 Stripped of his rank and placed under arrest,
Terrés was in the process of being removed from the field when he fell into the hands of
the Americans. Regardless, Santa Anna had brought too little too late to the battle.
Despite acquitting himself with the utmost bravery while trying to rally the garita’s
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defenders, he was obliged to order a withdrawal which forced him to ultimately
relinquish the city.125
Despite the loss of the Belén Gate, Santa Anna’s troops fared much better in holding
the Garita de San Cosme, where Generals Rangel and Peñy y Barragán where entrusted
with its defense. Having been badly mauled while defending Chapultepec, the remnants
of Rangel’s brigade had been deployed to San Cósme where they soon found themselves
heavily engaged by American forces intent upon breaking through to the capital. Here,
Rangel distinguished himself once more, “fighting like a lion” against the American
advance down the Belén causeway.126 Forced to relinquish his initial position, Rangel
rallied his command at Santo Tomás and with the aid of disparate forces under the
command of General Torrejón, launched a determined counterattack that succeeded in
momentarily halting the American assault. Forced to withdraw to the ramparts of the
main gate, Rangel succeeded in rallying a few elements of his fleeing command and
organized a desperate defense in conjunction with General Peña y Barragán.
Courageously exposing himself to enemy fire, Rangel was finally struck down and
carried from the field bleeding profusely from a severe leg wound. Thereafter, when a
dwindling ammunition supply finally forced his troops to withdraw, the incapacitated
Rangel was carried along and he subsequently accompanied the army’s late-night
evacuation of the capital. With the loss of the capital, the war’s major actions passed into
history and Santa Anna was forced from command by a new government headed by men
intent upon attaining peace at any cost.127 Overall, the battles for Mexico City represented
both a high and a low point in Mexican military development during the war. Whereas
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the annihlation of the Army of the North at the battle of Contreras demonstrates the
combined effects of political heterogeneity and the use of outmoded tactics, the tactical
success at Molino del Rey demonstrates the potential of Mexican generals to react
effectively when confronted with a tactical premise with which they were familiar.

86

Conclusion

The reasons for the failure of the Mexican generals to halt the American invasion of
their country are many and deeply rooted in the army’s maintenance of an obsolete
military tradition that led to the implementation of a faulty organizational structure and
obsolete tactics. Seemingly, the Mexican general officer corps underwent various periods
of morale fluctuations having to do with the shock they experienced when confronted and
suddenly vanquished by a new and vastly superior military system. Beginning with an
utter loss of confidence following Arista’s disastrous Río Grande Campaign, morale was
lifted by the moderate success of La Angostura and then dashed once more by the
reversal at Cerro Gordo. By the time the army faced the Americans once more at the
gates of Mexico City, the generals in command were for the most part either seasoned
veterans of La Angostura or newly arrived elements whose confidence had not been
tainted by previous defeat. However, by the war’s close when the Mexican general
officer corps came to be dominated by a few capable men like Rangel and Pérez who no
longer heard the cannons of Palo Alto ringing in their ears, the quality of the forces they
commanded had correspondingly diminished in terms of training and experience.
Furthermore, the political divisiveness of the nation in general was reflected in the
continued ideological divisions among the generals. As the war progressed, political
divisiveness increased as the polemics surrounding Santa Anna himself were manifested
on the battlefield.
Despite the shortcomings of Santa Anna’s subordinates, most accounts of this war lay
the primary responsibility for Mexico’s defeat at the feet of the mercurial commander-in-
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chief who was ironically the only man amongst his peers willing to gamble his career by
leading the war against the invader. For a man who liked to be regarded as the “Napoleon
of the West,” it is striking that Santa Anna did not grasp that great captain’s military
maxims and instead emulated the mistakes made by Napoleon’s adversaries of 1805 and
1806.
Although Santa Anna is assigned primary responsibility for his country’s defeat, the
ambivalent and passive aggressive attitude of many of his subordinates nevertheless
implicates them as well. For every instance where one may consider the consequences of
a different course of action by Santa Anna, such as his decision to retire from the hard
fought draw at La Angostura, his dismissal of Robles Pezuela’s advice at Cerro Gordo,
his failure to support Valencia at Padierna, and his disregard of Bravo’s entreaties at
Chapultepec, one can point to instances where Santa Anna’s subordinates let him down,
such as Miñón’s failure to coordinate his troops’ attack at La Angostura, Canalizo’s
handling of the reserve at Cerro Gordo, Valencia’s disobedience at Padierna, Álvarez’s
lack of control over the cavalry at Molino del Rey, and Terrés’s timorousness at the
Garita de Belén.
However, I have argued that the inept actions of Santa Anna and his subordinates
reflect a deeper fundamental institutional malady within the Mexican command: the
manifestation of deficiencies inherited from the Spanish Bourbon military system. A
careful observation of the deficiencies in organizational structure and tactics employed by
the Mexican High Command suffices to explain defeat. Past analyses that have focused
on the ineptitude and moral shortcomings of the generals to explain defeat may have been
attractive to American authors or Mexican detractors of Santa Anna, but the more
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fundamental considerations presented in this thesis are required to form a more accurate
perception of the war.
Although the Mexican generals fancied themselves heirs of the French Revolutionary
and Napoleonic military system, they were actually scions of a severely outdated military
system that had been brought low by Napoleon forty years before. There is certainly a
correlation between the poor showing of the Spanish generals who led Spain’s war of
independence against France 1808-1815, and the poor performance of the Mexican
generals during the Mexican War, 1846-1848, for they were heirs to the same military
tradition.
One Mexican historian has suggested that the Mexican generals of 1847 were men
who did not grasp the nature of the conflict. Their collective mindset was simply not
attuned to the realistic conditions that would be incurred in a war against the United
States. Having been brought up in the archaic colonial military system of Bourbon Spain,
they harbored a medieval sense of warfare perpetuated by eighteenth-century models that
had been laid to rest by the innovations of Napoleonic warfare introduced by French
Grande Armeé at Austerlitz, Jena, and Tudela. The Mexican generals had never
confronted a modern army like that of the United States. Moreover, the implementation
of the lessons learned on the battlefield was prevented by a combination of political
infighting, resource scarcity, the rapid pace of the war, and a hesitation by the generals to
adopt weapons and methods they did not fully understand. Furthermore, often regarding
their men as cannon fodder, the Mexican generals could not hope to gain much in way of
the confidence of their troops who all too often resented their commanders’
imperiousness and the harsh discipline of the military establishment in general.
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Notwithstanding their shortcomings, on the whole, the Mexican generals were a
brave lot, many of whom laid down their lives in the defense of their country. Of the 72
generals engaged against the American forces on all fronts, including those not covered
in this work, 40% became battlefield casualties: 17 were captured, three wounded, four
wounded and captured, and five killed in action. The fate of men like Vázquez, León,
Frontera, Pérez, and García can attest to the fact that the Mexican generals led from the
front and often paid the ultimate price. Although often overlooked on both sides of the
border, the Mexican generals of 1846-1847 remain an interesting set of men whose
actions in wartime reflected the political and social convulsions of their nation in
peacetime. It may be remarked of Mexico’s armies of 1847, that they were armies made
to be defeated and that the valor of her generals was but valor made to be wrought
asunder.
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ANAYA, Pedro María, General de Brigada, was born in Huichapán, Hidalgo on May 20,
1794, the son of Pedro José Anaya and María Antonia de Álvarez. At the age of
seventeen years, he embarked upon a military career as a cadet in the royalist “Tres
Villas” Infantry Regiment. After extensive campaigning against the insurgents, Anaya
was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and transferred to the Compañía Alta Fuera de
Huichapan in July 1815.
After promotion to the rank of captain in the “Sierra Gorda” Dragoon Regiment and
further campaigning against the insurgents in the realista forces of General Domingo
Luaces, he endorsed independence and pronounced in favor of Iturbide’s Plan de Iguala,
serving as a major of infantry in the campaigns of Toluca, Lerma, and Cuernavaca.
Following the investment of Mexico City, Anaya was amongst the first to enter the
capital at the head of the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the Line under the command of General
Vicente Filisola on September 27, 1821. After endorsing Santa Anna’s Plan de Casa
Mata in 1823, Anaya again served under Filisola in a successful campaign that
momentarily deterred Guatemala’s separation from Mexico.
Promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1828, Anaya served under Santa Anna
against the Spanish the following year at the siege of Tampico, where he commanded the
army’s cavalry corps. Rewarded by Santa Anna with promotion to the rank of colonel in
early 1831, Anaya served as a delegate to the National Congress, before being dismissed
from the service during the centralist presidency of General Anastasio Bustamante, who
regarded Anaya as potentially unreliable because of the latter’s close association with
Santa Anna. In September 1832, Anaya pronounced against Bustamante in support of
Santa Anna’s coup and was rewarded for his loyalty with promotion to the rank of
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brigadier general in October 1833. Appointed postmaster-general by Santa Anna, Anaya
was subsequently dismissed during the interim presidency of puro federalist Valentín
Gómez-Farías. Restored to rank once again by Santa Anna in May 1834, Anaya served in
the Texas Campaign of 1836 as quartermaster-general of the column commanded by
General Filisola. Dismissed once again following Santa Anna’s downfall in the wake of
the disaster at San Jacinto, Anaya was eventually granted a pension in 1841 and made an
honorary member of the Batallón de Inválidos.
Recalled to the service during General José Joaquín de Herrera’s moderado regime,
Anaya served as minister of war from August-December 1845, before being dismissed
yet again upon General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s seizure of power in April 1846.
Elected to serve as a deputy in the National Congress shortly after the outbreak of war
with the United States, Anaya signed his name to the anti-clerical appropriation bill of
Gómez-Farías in February 1847, but subsequently reneged on the decision and threw his
weight behind the reactionary Polkos Revolt in March.
Upon Santa Anna’s abolition of the office of vice-president (which resulted in the
dismissal of Gómez-Farías), the general-in-chief elevated his trusted friend, Anaya, to the
interim presidency on April 1, 1847 and departed to confront the Americans bearing
down upon the Valley of Mexico via Veracruz. Upon Santa Anna’s return to the capital
on May 30th, Anaya relinquished his post as chief executive and took command of
Mexico City’s perimeter defenses. In early August, Anaya was placed in command of
Mexico City’s National Guard Brigade, composed of the “Independencia,” “Bravos,”
“Tlalpa,” and “Guadalupe Victoria” National Guard Battalions, in General Manuel María
Lombardini’s Army of the East, deployed to defend the fortified position at El Peñón. In
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anticipation of an American assault against the southern approaches to the city, Anaya
was transferred with his brigade to occupy a key position on the Churubusco defensive
line at the San Mateo Convent on August 19th and just prior to the battle, his command
was supplemented with the elite “San Patricio” Battalion and its crack artillery section.
During the battle of August 20th, Anaya conducted himself admirably as second-incommand to General Manuel Rincón and was to be seen at the head of his national
guardsmen, conducting their fire and offering encouragement at every instant. According
to one source, at some point in the battle, Anaya mounted a rampart on horseback and
personally directed the fire of the San Patricios’ artillery before a tremendous explosion,
caused by a direct hit on a nearby gun, unhorsed him, killing five gunners and causing the
brave general temporary blindness when dust from the explosion entered his eyes.
Regaining his composure, Anaya remained at the head of his men, sword drawn, until a
lack of ammunition forced his troops’ withdrawal. Even as the enemy gained the
position, Anaya refused to budge and was taken prisoner by the Americans. Brought
before General Twiggs, Anaya was admonished by the former to surrender the supposed
stockpile of ammunition he was suspected of harboring in the convent. In reply, Anaya
uttered the famous phrase, “General, si hubiera parque, usted no estaría aqui. (General,
if I had any ammunition, you would not be here.)”
Paroled upon the termination of hostilities, Anaya presented himself before the reconvened national government at Querétaro and again served as interim president, from
November 11-28, 1847, when he relinquished power in favor of the pro-peace party
headed by Lic. Manuel de La Peña y Peña. Appointed minister of war by La Peña on June
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2, 1848, he defended the latter’s presidency against a failed pro-war rebellion just prior to
the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Thereafter, Anaya briefly served as commandant-general of México (1849), before
being appointed postmaster-general during the moderado regime of General José Joaquín
de Herrera, 1850-1852. During the subsequent presidency of General Mariano Arista,
Anaya was again appointed minister of war and served in that capacity from September
22, 1852-January 5, 1853, when he was again dismissed from the service during the
liberal presidency of Ceballos. Upon Santa Anna’s return to power in 1853, Anaya was
yet again restored to rank and assigned postmaster-general, position in which he served
until his death from the effects of chronic pneumonia, at the age of 59, near the capital, in
the village of Atzcapotzalco, on March 21, 1854.

ANDRADE, Manuel, General de Brigada, was born in Tacubaya, México in 1800. He
initiated his military career by enlisting as a cadet in the Royal Tulancingo Cavalry
Squadron on February 20, 1814. After extensive campaigning against the insurgents,
Andrade pronounced in favor of independence and was incorporated into Iturbide's
Ejército del Trigarante, but subsequently supported Santa Anna's anti-monarchical Plan
de Casa Mata in April 1823. Later, during Santa Anna's rebellion against Bustamante in
1832, Andrade actively supported the santanistas in Puebla and upon their victory, was
rewarded with promotion to the rank of brigadier general on November 28, 1832.
After Santa Anna's return from exile, Andrade was incorporated into the reformed
Army of the North at San Luis Potosí in October 1847 and was given command of the
3rd Cavalry Brigade, composed of the Activo Cavalry Regiment of Michoacán and the
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“Lanceros Presidiales” Cavalry Regiment. In this capacity, he rendered decidedly
undistinguished service at La Angostura, where he was accused of failing to cooperate
with his superiors and botching an assault against the American center of operations at
the Hacienda de Buena Vista during a critical moment in the battle. Brought before Santa
Anna following the battle, Andrade fiercely refuted the allegations of his colleagues and
pinned the blame for the cavalry’s failure on General Vicente Miñón’s actions at Saltillo,
thereby avoiding censure for the time being.
After the army’s subsequent withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Andrade was transferred
and given command of a cavalry brigade in General Juan Álvarez's Army of the South,
which was assigned to cover operations in the Valley of Mexico and harass Scott’s
advance from Puebla. After failing to inflict any degree of attrition on the American
advance towards the capital, Andrade's brigade was posted with the rest of Álvarez's four
thousand-strong cavalry division east of the entrenched position at El Molino del Rey.
Concurrent with Santa Anna's plan, Álvarez was ordered to launch his attack in support
of the defenders when given the signal that the American attack was waning. His task
was to roll up the American withdrawal with his cavalry and convert the repulse into a
rout. In anticipation of the coming action, Álvarez deployed his four brigades in battle
formation and assigned Andrade's formation to lead the assault. However, when the time
came to counterattack the American troops during the battle of September 8th, Andrade
refused to charge over the stipulated ground on the basis that it was too moist to support
the weight of a massed cavalry attack. Upon realizing that his lead formation was not
committed to the attack, Álvarez dispatched his chief of staff, General Tomás Moreno, to
find out what was happening. When Moreno came upon Andrade and demanded to know
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why he was not commencing, the latter refused to commit his troops on the basis of bad
ground, but also on the basis of his perceived superiority over the mestizo Álvarez whom
he felt should have been subordinated to his command. Another factor which may have
deterred Andrade was his feeling that "Santa Anna had overlooked his achievements at
Angostura and therefore, concluded to keep himself and his men out of danger." When
Andrade finally concurred, he merely launched a haphazard assault over another stretch
of ground contrary to that stipulated, but of his own choosing, whereupon his troopers
were easily repulsed by American artillery which commenced to roll up the division,
sending Álvarez's entire formation whirling for the rear in utter disorder. Furious with his
subordinate, Álvarez promptly reported the entire incident to Santa Anna, who leveled
charges of treason against Andrade and had him removed from command and arrested,
despite suspecting the federalist Álvarez to be the primary culprit and harboring
resentment against him.
After the war, with the downfall of Santa Anna, Andrade was formally acquitted of all
charges and was (ironically, perhaps) appointed in 1851 by President Mariano Arista to
head a multi-body senior commission intended to make recommendations for the
improvement of the officer corps and investigate the feasibility of a pre-war reform plan
put forth by General Pedro García Conde in 1845. Upon Santa Anna’s return to power,
Andrade was promoted to the rank of major general on September 10, 1854 and
following the Revolution of Ayutla, served as prefecto and subprefecto of Zacatlán,
Puebla, 1856-1858. Not taking part in the War of The Reform or the French Intervention,
Andrade died in Mexico City, at the age of 69 years, on April 2, 1869, and is buried in
the Panteón de San Fernando.
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BLANCO, Santiago, General Graduado, was born in Campeche on February 9, 1815, the
son of Lic. Cipriano Blanco and the former Salvadora Duque de Estrada. Upon admission
as a cadet to the Military College in Mexico City, Blanco initiated his military career at
the tender age of twelve years, on May 17, 1827. A member of the first graduating class,
Blanco taught mathematics at the college until 1832, when as a lieutenant of artillery, he
received his baptism by fire in defense of Bustamante's centralist regime against a coup
staged by Generals Antonio López de Santa Anna and Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga.
Promoted thereafter to the rank of captain of engineers, Blanco was tasked with the
fortification of his native Campeche and remained in the Yucatán for two years, 18351836. In 1839, Blanco served as chief of staff of a punitive expedition led by General
Joaquín Rivas y Zayas against the Yucatecan separatist rebels led by Captain Santiago
Imán. In this capacity, Blanco rendered distinguished service in the defense of
Campeche, which was eventually forced to surrender by the rebels after being subjected
to a near yearlong siege on May 16, 1840.
Upon his return from the Yucatán, Blanco was promoted to the rank of lieutenantcolonel on December 18, 1840 and was sent to serve on the General Staff of the Army of
the North, where he remained as aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief of the army,
General Pedro de Ampudia, during the Mier Expedition against Texas in December 1842.
Rewarded for his service with promotion to the rank of colonel of engineers on January
20, 1843, Blanco was briefly assigned to serve as secretary of the commandancy-general
of Tamaulipas, before being summoned to supervise the fortification of Tampico in 1845.
Upon the outbreak of war with the United States, Blanco found himself elevated to the
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post of interim commander-in-chief of the Mexico's Corps of Engineers, where he
remained until May 14, 1846. Summoned in September to reorganize the engineer
battalion assigned to the Army of the North at San Luis Potosí in the wake of the fall of
Monterrey, Blanco was promoted by Santa Anna to the rank of general graduado on
November 17, 1846. At the battle of La Angostura, Santa Anna entrusted the youthful
Blanco to command a special detachment, designated a veritable 4th Division, composed
of the Regular Engineer Battalion, the Fijo de México Battalion, the Guardacosta de
Tampico Battalion, and the Compañía Fija de Tampico, which was assigned to attack the
American right and feint movement in that direction in order alleviate pressure from the
main assault against the American left. In that capacity, Blanco performed admirably
during the battle of February 23rd, where his determined attack against the narrows of La
Angostura forced the withdrawal and redeployment of a battery. Thereafter, Blanco
joined Lombardini's division in a headlong assault against the American center, which
forced a momentary American withdrawal towards their main position at the Hacienda de
Buena Vista and enabled Blanco's elite zapadores to capture three artillery pieces.
Following the army's withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Blanco was promoted by Santa
Anna to the rank of brigadier general, on March 31, 1847, in recognition of his
outstanding service at La Angostura and awarded command of the 4th Infantry Brigade,
composed of the Activo Battalion of Aguascalientes, the Mixto de Santa Anna Battalion,
and the Zapadores Battalion.
In this capacity, Blanco and his command followed the rest of the Army of the North
to Santa Anna's aid in the Valley of Mexico in July, taking up position at El Rancho de
Padierna at the behest of the army commander, General Gabriel Valencia. During the
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disaster of August 20th, Blanco skillfully directed the artillery fire which slowed the
American frontal advance across the lava field known as El Pedregal and was to be seen
desperately trying to animate the panicked soldiery with waves of his sword. Despite his
efforts, however, the Mexican position collapsed entirely and Blanco fell wounded and
was captured by the Americans.
Following his parole upon the advent of peace in January 1848, Blanco was elevated
once more to the post of interim commander-in-chief of the Corps of Engineers until
September when he was appointed to serve on a special commission of military
statisticians. From 1850-1851, Blanco served as a deputy in the national congress from
his native Yucatán and from January 9-February 3, 1853, he served as minister of war in
the cabinet of President Ceballos. During Santa Anna's final presidential term, Blanco
served as segundo cabo in the commandancy-general of México and director of the
Colegio Militar. Appointed to Santa Anna’s cabinet as secretary of war on January 10,
1854, Blanco was promoted by Santa Anna to the rank of major general on August 10th.
Upon the outbreak of the Revolution of Ayutla, Blanco was appointed minister of war
and was sent to pacify the state of Guerrero at the head of a division. One month later, in
April 1855, Blanco carried over the campaign against General Ignacio Comonfort’s rebel
forces in Michoacán and remained undefeated in the field even as Santa Anna’s days in
office were numbered. Upon Santa Anna’s abdication, Blanco returned his forces to the
capital intact and transferred command to General Leonardo Márquez, placing himself at
the disposal of the war ministry. Thereafter, the triumphant liberals expelled Blanco from
the army and stripped him of his rank, actions for which Blanco never forgave Juárez.
Upon the resurgence of reactionary opposition in the War of the Reform, Blanco was
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restored to rank during the presidency of General Miguel Miramón on February 18, 1858,
but was once again dismissed upon the liberal triumph in 1860.
Following the fall of Puebla to the French in May 1863, Blanco placed himself at the
disposal of Maximilian’s imperial war ministry and was restored to rank and privilege on
July 19th. Although he did not actively serve in the conflict, the liberals remained intent
on exacting revenge on the old soldier for collaborating with the French and upon the
investment of the capital by General Porfirio Díaz’s forces, the republicans arrested
Blanco and he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment,
although this was eventually commuted to house arrest in Tacubaya, where Blanco
requested he be incarcerated in order to be close to his ailing mother. After his release,
Blanco returned to his native Campeche and served for many years as delegate to the
national congress from the Yucatan even unto his death in Mexico City, at the age of 67
years, on January 19, 1883.

CANALES, Antonio, General de Brigada, was born in Monterrey, Nuevo León in 1802,
the son of José Antonio Canales Treviño and Josefa Rosillo. In 1829, at the age of 27
years, Canales earned a law degree from the prestigious Seminario de Monterrey and
subsequently served a term in the Tamaulipas Chamber of Deputies in 1834. Having
joined the state’s militia at a young age, Canales gained military experience participating
in various punitive expeditions against Comanche and Lipan Apache raiders.
In 1834, Canales joined in liberal opposition to Santa Anna's centralist move against
the Constitution of 1824 and as commander of federalist forces in Tamaulipas, he sent
envoys to appraise Texian, Tejano, and Indian sentiments. When he discovered that the
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Texians' intentions were to secede from Mexico, he practiced neutrality in the face of
Santa Anna’s approach while fostering the idea of an independent border republic.
Observing the Texian bid for independence pay off, Canales sensed his moment
approaching and in 1839, he visited the Texian towns of San Antonio, Austin, and
Lipantitlán with the intention of enlisting men to his cause. Offering substantial bounties
to any Texian who joined him, Canales endorsed the formation of a Texian Auxiliary
Corps, composed of 270 officers and men who allied with him in preparation for a
campaign against the central government.
In January 1840, Canales joined forces in Laredo with fellow separatist leader Antonio
Zapata and declared the independence of a separate Republic of the Río Grande, which
included the present-day states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, and a portion of
Texas which lay below the Nueces River. Appointed secretary of war and commander in
chief of the fledgling republic’s armed forces, Canales opposed the Mexican Army of the
North under the command of General Mariano Arista, but was ultimately defeated at
Monterrey and forced to retreat to the Río Grande. Following the execution of President
Zapata and a contingent of allied Texian troops at Santa Rita de Morelos, Coahuila, on
March 29, 1840, Canales capitulated to Arista’s forces and forsook his Texian allies, a
move for which he received a commission from Santa Anna appointing him to the rank of
brigadier general on January 12, 1843. Having become a mortal enemy of the Texians via
his perceived treachery, Canales continued to promote border violence against Texas and
led punitive campaigns against Corpus Christi and Lipantitlán. Along with General Pedro
de Ampudia, Canales played an instrumental role in containing a Texian filibuster at Mier
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in 1842. Two years later, Canales was briefly dismissed from the army for abandonment
of his post but was subsequently reinstated.
Upon the outbreak of war with the United States, Canales incorporated himself into
the Army of the North at Matamoros and was given command of an irregular cavalry
brigade, composed of the “Villas del Norte” Mounted Auxiliary Battalion and various
independent companies of mounted rancheros. Accompanying the army’s march north to
confront Taylor, Canales and his 425-man brigade were lightly engaged at the battle of
Palo Alto on May 8, 1846, where they charged a considerable distance into the scattered
chaparral on the Mexican left with the intention of threatening Taylor’s supply line. The
following day, Canales’ brigade, with a pair of light artillery pieces, was assigned to
protect the army’s left flank and watch a crossroad that led to the rear of the Mexican
position at Resaca del Guerrero. When the Mexican position crumbled beneath the
withering fire of the famous American “flying” artillery, Canales was unable to stop the
flood of refugees seeking safety and was forced to withdraw across the Río Grance.
Covering the army’s subsequent withdrawal to Monterrey, Canales harassed the
American pursuit and was badly mauled by their leading elements in a skirmish at
Cerralvo in mid-April. Somewhat discouraged by a lack of artillery and increased
desertion amongst his men, Canales reverted to the defensive and did little to oppose the
American advance on Monterrey in September. Remaining in command of the irregular
cavalry, Canales participated in the battle of Monterrey, September 21-23, 1846 and
subsequently covered the army’s withdrawal to San Luis Potosí.
Upon the Santa Anna’s reorganization of the army, Canales was retained in command
of the irregular cavalry and in that capacity assisted the army’s march north, acting as

103

part of the advance guard which screened the army’s movements. Attached to General
Anastasio Torrejón’s 3rd Cavalry Brigade, Canales’ irregulars participated in the battle of
La Angostura on February 23, 1847, where they joined in an assault which succeeded in
turning the U.S. left and gained the American rear in strength until halted by the superior
firepower of Taylor's redeployed batteries. Following the army’s return to San Luis
Potosí, Canales’ command was disbanded and the general returned to his home state,
where he spent the rest of the war conducting guerrilla operations against Taylor’s supply
lines in conjunction with the forces of General José Urrea. Having survived several
attempts on his life by Texians personally seeking reprisal for his actions during the
rebellion of 1840, Canales remained in command of irregular troops in Tamaulipas until
the end of the war.
Upon the termination of hostilities, he settled into the life of a politician, serving
several terms as a deputy in the National Congress and one term as governor of
Tamaulipas in 1851. The following year, he donned the uniform once more and defended
the central government against a local rebellion sponsored by Texian filibusters.
Subsequently retiring from the army, Canales died of a sudden illness in the town of
Miquihana, at the age of fifty years, in 1852. He left a widow, María del Refugio Molano,
with whom he had five children. Two of his sons, Servando and Antonio Canales Jr.,
played leading roles in opposing the French Intervention in Tamaulipas and later served
several terms as governors of the state. Dubbed the “Chaparral Fox” by his Texian
adversaries for his wiliness and cunning, the moustachioed Canales was a most colorful
character who believed in divination and would govern many of his actions by having his
horoscope read.
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CANALIZO, Valentín, General de División, was born in Monterrey, Nuevo León, on
January 14, 1794. He embarked upon a military career as a cadet at the age of seventeen
years in the royalist Infantry Regiment of Celaya in August 1811. After extensive service
against the insurgents, Canalizo adhered to Iturbide's Plan de Iguala and was integrated
into his Army of the Three Guarantees as a lieutenant-colonel on March 2, 1821. Two
years later, Canalizo pronounced in favor of Santa Anna's anti-monarchical Plan de Casa
Mata in 1823 and then opposed Guerrero's federalist presidency in 1829, rising up in
favor of General Anastasio Bustamante. Sent to subdue Oaxaca in Bustamante's stead
with the rank of colonel, he then participated in the pacification of the entire Costa Chica
region, being present and serving in the military junta that condemned ex-president
General Vicente Guerrero to death on February 14, 1831.
Promoted to the rank of brigadier general in May 1831, Bustamante assigned Canalizo
to head the commandancy-general of Oaxaca, where he remained until pronouncing
against the interim presidency of arch-federalist Valentín Gómez-Farías. Raising the cry
of "¡Religión y Fueros!" Canalizo attacked Oaxaca, demanding Gómez-Farías resignation
in favor of Santa Anna. Upon the latter's return to power, Canalizo was made prefect of
Cuernavaca and in May 1835, he defended Santa Anna's regime against a federalist
insurrection in southern Mexico led by General Juan Álvarez, whereby he was appointed
second-in-command of a santanista force that liberated Acapulco and suppressed the
rebellion. Following the successful termination of the campaign against Álvarez,
Canalizo reported for duty in Matamoros in April 1836, but was too late to take part in
the Texas campaign. After brief service in Tampico, Canalizo served the central
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government against the separatist forces of Longinos Montenegro and General Antonio
Canales in Tamaulipas and successfully conducted operations against the rebels at
Tampico, Monterrey, and Monclova. Following his capture of Nuevo León, Canalizo
aided General Mariano Arista in pursuing the remaining rebel forces of General Canales,
whose subsequent capture brought an end to the campaign.
In September 1841, Canalizo defended the Bustamante’s regime against the rebel
forces of General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in Guadalajara, but subsequently endorsed
Santa Anna's seizure of power in early 1842, being promoted by his grateful chief to the
rank of major general in late 1841 and ascending to the governorship and commandancygeneral of the Department of the Valley of México. Supporting Santa Anna's dictatorship,
Canalizo twice served Santa Anna as interim president, from October 4, 1843-June 4,
1844, and from September 21-December 6, 1844. Facing the outbreak of a nation-wide
federalist rebellion at the end of his latter term, Canalizo was arrested by rebel troops at
the National Palace on October 25, 1845 and exiled to Cadiz, Spain, where he languished
even upon the outbreak of war with the United States.
Upon Santa Anna's return to power in October 1846, Canalizo was recalled from exile
and made minister of war in the interim presidency of Gómez-Farías. Appalled by the
anti-clerical appropriation bill introduced by the federalists, the arch-conservative
Canalizo pronounced against Gómez-Farías and threw his weight behind the reactionary
Polkos Revolt of March 1847, which resulted in Santa Anna's renunciation of his vicepresident and the repudiation of the offending bill. Appointed second-in-command of the
Army of the East facing the American invasion from Veracruz, Canalizo was assigned to
fortify defensible points along the National Highway from Veracruz to Corral Falso and
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mobilize the citizenry to oppose the invaders. Failing to generate support from the
masses, in mid-April Canalizo consolidated all available troops and joined Santa Anna,
who gave him command of the cavalry reserve in the army deployed to block the
American advance down the National Highway near Jalapa, at Cerro Gordo. During the
battle of April 18, 1847, Canalizo's 2,000 lancers were positioned in direct support of the
infantry defending El Telégrafo and were instructed to defend that position to the last
should the Mexican defense begin to falter. When the Americans gained the position and
unexpectedly turned the Mexican flank, flooding towards the National Highway and
threatening to cut off the Mexican line of retreat, Canalizo’s lancers failed to check this
move and merely shared in the rout as the panicked soldiery abandoned their positions
and fled in fright. Canalizo, who had been skeptical of the army’s chances in the first
place due to his dissatisfaction with Santa Anna’s deployment of troops on El Telégrafo
and the lack of maneuverable ground for his cavalry, attempted to effect an orderly
withdrawal, but fled the battlefield upon realizing that his efforts were of no use in
stemming the tide of refugees intent only upon seeking safety.
After rejoining his chief at Orizaba, Canalizo was appointed commandant-general of
Puebla and assigned to the task of mobilizing what troops he could to oppose the
American advance upon that city. Somewhat cowed by his experience at Cerro Gordo,
Canalizo withdrew upon first sight of the Americans at the village of San Martín and
offered no resistance during their advance on Puebla. Having lost confidence in his
chief’s ability to win, Canalizo was merely posted to the reserve upon rejoining Santa
Anna in the capital. Thereafter, on his own initiative, Canalizo assisted in the defense of
the Garita de San Cósme on September 15th, but was awarded no official appointment by
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Santa Anna. Following the termination of hostilities, Canalizo left the army and retired to
private life, dying in Mexico City, a widower, unnoticed and in abject poverty, at the age
of 66, on February 20, 1860. His wife, Josefa Benita Dávila, with whom he had several
children, preceded him in death in January 1844.

CORONA, Antonio, General de Brigada, was born in 1808 to a wealthy aristocratic
family in Guadalajara, Jalisco. After receiving his preliminary education in France,
Corona entered military service as a subaltern in the Activo Militia Battalion of Jalisco in
1831, at the age of 22 years. After nearly ten years' service and specialization in the
artillery, Corona was promoted to the rank of colonel of artillery on August 31, 1839.
During the August 1841 Santa Anna/Paredes uprising against Bustamante’s centralist
regime, Corona served the santanistas as a senior artillery officer and remained in favor
with the triumphant Paredes regime.
On the eve of war with the United States, Corona was appointed by Paredes to
command the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, guarding the harbor at Veracruz. Thereafter,
upon Santa Anna's return from exile, Corona was appointed to the rank of general
graduado and given overall command of the artillery in the reorganized Army of the
North at San Luis Potosí. Apparently, his appointment was facilitated by the resignation
of former federalist artillery chief, General Tomás Requena, who denounced his position
in protest over Santa Anna's appointment to supreme command. As artillery chief,
Corona rendered distinguished service at the battle La Angostura on February 23, 1847,
where he ably directed his batteries despite disagreeing with the general battle plan put
forth by other officers of Santa Anna’s staff. Thereafter, Corona accompanied the army
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during its withdrawal to San Luis Potosi and was promoted to the rank of brigadier
general on March 31, 1847, in recognition of his service at La Angostura. After
languishing in San Luis Potosí for some months, Corona was recalled to active service
when the Army of the North was summoned to aid Santa Anna's defense of Mexico City
in the wake of his disaster at Cerro Gordo.
Arriving in the Valley of Mexico with the army under the command of General
Gabriel Valencia on July 30, 1847, Corona supervised the positioning of the army's
artillery at El Rancho de Padierna and directed the repulse of an American probe against
that position on the evening of August 19th. During the disaster of the following day,
Corona was captured by American troops while attempting to rally his gunners, many of
whom it was rumored, were chained to their pieces in order to prevent them from
abandoning the field.
Paroled following the armistice, Corona was not recalled to serve in the postwar army
by the federalists, but was subsequently restored to rank and appointed governor and
commandant-general of the state Veracruz by Santa Anna following the latter's return to
power in 1853. Remaining in command at Veracruz until 1854, Corona continued to
serve on the Supreme War Council until Santa Anna was removed from power in 1856.
Thereafter, Corona fought with the conservatives during the War of The Reform and
exerted much energy in perpetuating conservative power in his native Jalisco. During
General Miguel Miramón's brief presidency, Corona was promoted to the rank of major
general, on April 11, 1859, and served as minister of war, from April 1859-December
1860. Following Miramón’s decisive defeat at the battle of San Juan del Río, on
December 22, 1860, Corona accompanied him into exile in France, where he busied
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himself in conservative schemes to abet a monarchy in Mexico until he died in the city of
Nice, at the age of 55, on February 8, 1863.

GAONA, Antonio, General de Brigada, was born in Havana, Cuba, in 1793. He initiated
his military career as a cadet in the "Nueva España" Infantry Regiment in 1803 and went
to Mexico with the realistas, where he participated in fourteen actions against the
insurgents before supporting independence and pronouncing in favor of Iturbide's Plan de
Iguala in 1821. Two years later, Gaona supported Santa Anna's anti-monarchical Plan de
Casa Mata and was promoted to the rank of colonel upon Iturbide's abdication. After
supporting Santa Anna's coup against Bustamante in 1832, Gaona was rewarded with
promotion to the rank of brigadier general on April 30, 1832.
During Santa Anna's campaign against Texas in 1836, Gaona commanded the 1st
Infantry Brigade, which reached The Alamo shortly after the siege had been completed.
Thereafter, Santa Anna tasked Gaona with conducting a follow-up operation against
Nacogdoches with 725 men by way of Bastrop and the Old San Antonio Road. In light of
Santa Anna's pursuit of Houston's forces, the orders were canceled on April 15th and
Gaona was redirected to proceed from Bastrop to join Santa Anna at San Felipe.
Apparently, Gaona lost his way between Bastrop and San Felipe and his command did
not participate in the battle of San Jacinto on April 21st, whereupon Gaona returned his
troops to San Antonio de Béjar and withdrew with the rest of the army to Matamoros.
Following Santa Anna's downfall, Gaona was appointed commandant of the garrison
at the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, guarding the Veracruz harbor, and bore the
ignominious responsibility of capitulating to the French under Admiral Jean Baudoin
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following a brief bombardment in 1839. Although arrested for having capitulated, a
military tribunal found Gaona's actions to be consistent with the tenuous reality of the
military situation and he was acquitted of all charges.
After serving as commandant-general of Puebla in late 1846, Gaona was appointed by
Santa Anna to command the fortress of San Carlos de Perote and tasked with fortifying
that jurisdiction's line of defense in conjunction with the main army's position at Cerro
Gordo. In the chaos that followed Santa Anna's disaster at Cerro Gordo, Gaona found
himself defending Perote with a mere 23 gunners and scarcely any powder with which to
serve the guns. In view of the hopelessness of the situation, Gaona evacuated Perote on
General Valentín Canalizo's orders on April 19th and made his way to Mexico City,
where Santa Anna assigned him to command an infantry detachment in General José
Joaquín de Herrera's Army of the Center, protecting the southern approaches to the
capital at Mexicalzingo. Following the battle of Molino de Rey, Gaona was assigned to
second General Ignacio Martínez Pinillos in command of the defenses at the Garita de
Candelaria, but his troops saw little action the following day, as the primary American
thrust was leveled against the northern causeways into the city, at the Belén and San
Cósme Gates beyond the Castle of Chapultepec. After accompanying the army's
withdrawal to the Villa de Guadalupe Hidalgo, Gaona resigned his command due to
illness and died in the capital during the American occupation, at the age of 55 years, in
June 1848.

GARCÍA CONDE, José María, General Graduado, was born in Mexico City in 1801. He
began his military career at the age of thirteen years, on April 26, 1814, as a cadet in the
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Provincial Regiment of Zacatecas. After extensive service against the insurgents during
which he was wounded once and participated in two sieges and six battles, García Conde
endorsed independence via Iturbide's Plan de Iguala and was integrated into the royalist
Ejército del Trigarante as a lieutenant of infantry in 1821. After adhering to Santa Anna's
anti-monarchical Plan de Casa Mata in 1823, García Conde served primarily as a staff
officer, initially as an aide-de-camp to various generals and then as a secretary in the
commandancy-generals of México and Puebla, 1833-1836. Promoted to the rank of
colonel on June 12, 1843, García Conde continued service in administrative positions in
the capital until awarded promotion to the rank of general graduado in 1846, on the eve
of war with the United States.
After the Army of the North's withdrawl to Monterrey following the battles of Palo
Alto and Resaca del Guerrero, García Conde was sent north in July 1846 to take
command as chief of staff of the army. In that capacity, García Conde assisted the
commander-in-chief, General Pedro Ampudia, in the fortification of the city and presided
over the positioning of the artillery at Tenería Hill, the Purísima Bridge, and the Bishop's
Palace. During the initial American investment of the city, when Taylor threatened the
Mexican army's line of retreat along the Camino de Saltillo with a diversionary attack
around the southern flank of the Mexican position, García Conde headed a relief force
composed of two artillery pieces and the Activo battalion of Aguascalientes which aided
General Anastasio Torrejón's cavalry in repelling this effort. Thereafter, García Conde
supervised the defense of the high ground at Cerro del Obispado, but was eventually
forced to withdraw on September 22nd. Two days later, when all hope for continued
resistance evaporated with the fall of Tenería Hill and the Purísima bridge, García Conde
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was appointed to serve as member of a three-man peace commission that secured a
favorable surrender which enabled the Mexican army to march out of Monterrey
somewhat intact.
Upon the Army of the North's reorganization by Santa Anna at San Luis Potosí in the
waning months of 1846, García Conde was appointed to command the 1st Infantry
Brigade in General Manuel María Lombardini's 2nd Infantry Division, composed of the
Activo Battalion of Jalisco and the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Line Infantry Regiments. In this
capacity, García Conde rendered distinguished service at the battle of La Angostura, on
February 23, 1847, where he led his brigade in Lombardini's drive against the American
left and contributed to the destruction of the 1st Illinois Infantry Regiment before being
repulsed by the superior firepower of the American artillery. Following the army's retreat
to San Luis Potosí, García Conde was recalled to the capital and served during the rest of
the war as a chief of staff in the various armies defending the Valley of Mexico.
Upon the cessation of hostilities, García Conde served for a time in the War Ministry
and was appointed to head the commandancy-general of México, 1852-1853. Following
the triumph of the anti-santanista Revolution of Ayutla, García Conde joined forces with
the liberals and was appointed governor and commandant-general of Puebla on
September 19, 1857, in recognition of his prior service as commandant of the guarnición
at Puebla in quelling a reactionary rebellion proclaiming "¡Religión y Fueros!" headed by
Colonel Joaquín Orihuela of the Puebla Garrison. Serving as governor of the state until
December 1858, García Conde was appointed war minister by the liberal President
Ignacio Comonfort and in that capacity, confronted General Felix Zuloaga's reactionary
Revolution of Tacubaya. Following Comonfort's downfall, García Conde resigned his
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position as war minister on January 20, 1858 and retired to private life. Settling thereafter
in his native Mexico City, García Conde did not participate in the War of the Reform or
the French Intervention and died in the capital surrounded by his family at the age of 76
years, on January 19, 1878.

GARCÍA CONDE, Pedro, General de Brigada, was born in Arizpe, Sonora, on February
8, 1806, the son of Alejo García Conde and María Teresa Vidal. At the tender age of
eleven years, he embarked upon a military career as a cadet in the Compañia Presidial de
San Carlos de Cerro Gordo on November 29, 1817. After promotion to the rank of
lieutenant, García Conde adhered to the independence movement on August 26, 1821 and
was integrated into Iturbide's Ejército del Trigarante as a lieutenant in the 9th Cavalry
Regiment of the Line. From 1822-1825, García Conde served on the General Staff and
was immersed in studies in the capital, at the prestigious Seminario de Minería. On July
7, 1828, García Conde was promoted to the rank of captain of engineers and served on
the faculty of the Military College as professor of mathematics until 1831. From 18291831, García Conde also served on the Superior Council of the Corps of Engineers and
oversaw a survey of Guerrero's coastline together with the construction of a highway in
the Valley of Mexico, between the villages of Chalco and Tenango del Aire.
In 1832, García Conde defended Bustamante's presidency against the Santa
Anna/Paredes coup of that year and served as chief of engineers at the battle of El
Gallinero, being promoted thereafter by Bustamante to the rank of lieutenant-colonel on
September 18, 1832 and assigned to organize the defense of San Luis Potosí against the
santanistas. From 1834-1835, García Conde carried out a survey of the state of
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Chihuahua, which resulted in the publication of his monumental work, "Ensayo Histórico
y Estadística del Estado de Chihuahua." In 1835, García Conde defended the santanista
regime against the federalist rebels in Zacatecas and served as chief of engineers at the
battle of Guadalupe, on May 11th, being promoted by Santa Anna to the rank of colonel
on July 25th. Assigned to head Chihuahua's Inspectorate of Rural Militias from June
1835-August 1836, García Conde was then appointed commandant of the Colegio Militar
in Mexico City, where he served for ten years until September 1, 1846. During General
José Urrea's July 1840 federalist rebellion in the capital, García Conde defended
Bustamante's regime once more and was awarded promotion to the rank of general
graduado on October 15, 1840. Subsequently, García Conde supported Santa Anna's
Plan de Regeneración and participated in the ouster of Bustamante, being promoted by
Santa Anna to the rank of brigadier general on October 23, 1841.
After serving as commander-in-chief of the Corps of Engineers, January 1, 1841December 31, 1843, García Conde was appointed minister of war during the moderado
presidency of General José Joaquín de Herrera. Removed from the position upon General
Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s seizure of power in January 1846, García Conde briefly
served as segundo cabo in the commandancy-general of Guanajuato before being sent in
October to aid in preparing the defense of Chihuahua against a potential American
invasion.
Arriving in Chihuahua on October 31st, García Conde devoted himself to organizing
the state's militia forces in conjunction with Governor Ángel Trías Álvarez and the
resident commandant-general, Brigadier General José Antonio Heredia. Upon learning of
Doniphan's approach, García Conde prepared a seemingly impregnable defensive
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position, 15-18 miles north of Chihuahua, along the Sacramento River, complete with
cannon redoubts stationed above a dry streambed with its flanks protected by steep
ravines. Given command of the cavalry, composed of a force of 1,200 lancers, during the
battle of February 28, 1847, García Conde attempted to check an unexpected American
flanking movement with his cavalry, but was repulsed with heavy losses by the superior
firepower of Doniphan's artillery, which sent the lancers reeling back in utter disorder.
With their position flanked, the Mexican troops abandoned their redoubts and the battle
degenerated into a rout, whereby Heredia's 1,500-strong infantry column was rolled up
within fifteen minutes, despite the best efforts of García Conde to rally the troops sword
in hand. Blamed for the loss of the battle by Heredia, García Conde issued a public
manifesto rectifying his part in the battle and retired to the city of Durango following the
American capture of Chihuahua on March 2nd, where he remained unemployed for the
remainder of the conflict.
Following the war, García Conde regained favor in the pro-peace moderado regime of
Manuel de La Peña y Peña and was appointed to head the commission assigned to survey
the border established by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in January 1848. Apparently,
García Conde was in the midst of completing this task when he died suddenly in Arizpe,
at the age of 45, on December 19, 1851.

GARCÍA, José María, General Graduado, was born in Mexico City on November 6,
1815. After initiating his military career as a cadet in the cavalry in 1829, García
specialized as a staff officer and served in administrative offices, rising to the rank of
colonel by 1846, when he was appointed commandant-general of Tlaxcala in reward for
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supporting General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s coup against the moderado
government of General José Joaquín de Herrera.
Upon the onset of war with the United States, García was placed at the head of a
cavalry detachment in a punitive expedition sent to suppress a separatist revolt in the
Yucatán in March 1847. Following a positive conclusion to the campaign, García was
promoted to the rank of general graduado, on May 31, 1847, and in July, was summoned
to assist in the defense of the capital against the Americans. Appointed chief of staff in
the Army of the North, García assisted his commander, General Gabriel Valencia, in the
selection of El Rancho de Padierna as an ideal defensive position against the Americans
threatening the Mexican position at San Ángel and the bridge at Churubusco. During the
action of August 19th, García oversaw the defense of the Mexican position against
Pillow's attack and successfully maintained his defenses intact. The following day,
however, when the Americans unexpectedly fell upon them from the rear and precipitated
the disintegration of the entire army, García attempted to lead a counterattack with
elements of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade from the direction of La Loma del Pelón, but was
repulsed by enemy artillery. Unhorsed, García was attempting to rally the fleeing troops,
sword in hand, when he was toppled with a severe leg wound and taken prisoner together
with the commander of the 4th Infantry Brigade, General Santiago Blanco.
Following his parole upon the advent of peace in January 1848, García was retained in
the war ministry and in addition to being promoted to the rank of brigadier general on
December 25, 1851, was awarded a shield of honor (escudo de honor) for heroism at the
battle of Padierna. Known thereafter as “El Cojo García” because of his wound, García
was appointed honorary commander of the Cuerpo de Inválidos upon Santa Anna's return
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to power in 1853. Although he did not actively support the Revolution of Ayutla, García
demonstrated a sufficiently liberal outlook as to be perceived by them as politically
reliable and upon their triumph he was appointed to head the governorship and
commandancy-general of Oaxaca on August 29, 1855. Persuaded by conservative
conspirators to support a reactionary rebellion against General Ignacio Comonfort's
liberal presidency, García pronounced in support of the failed revolt and was obliged to
relinquish the governorship as a result, on January 10, 1856. A short time later, García
pronounced in support of General Felix Zuloaga’s reactionary Plan de Tacubaya and
sided with the conservatives during the War of the Reform, serving as Zuloaga’s Minister
of War and Marine, from July 10, 1858-February 2, 1859.
Following the liberal triumph in 1860, García withdrew from the service for a time,
but was restored to rank by the imperialists following the ascension of Maximilian to the
throne. Thereafter, García endorsed the monarchy and was appointed commandantgeneral of the military district of Guadalajara by Maximilian in 1865. Retiring from the
army shortly thereafter, Garcia was arrested nevertheless for complicity in the monarchy
following the liberal triumph in 1867. Following his subsequent release, García retired to
private life and died nearly twenty years later, in the village of Atcapotzalco near the
capital, at the age of 68, on April 17, 1884.

GONZÁLEZ de Mendoza, José María, General Graduado, was born in Puebla in 1809.
After pursuing his collegiate studies at Puebla's prestigious Colegio Carolino (where he
graduated in the same class as future liberal leaders José María Lafragua and Ignacio
Comonfort), González initiated his military career as a lieutenant in the Activo Militia
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Battalion of Puebla on February 28, 1829. Specializing in the cavalry, González won
promotion to the rank of colonel by 1846 and found himself at the head of the Mounted
Cazadores Regiment upon the onset of war with the United States.
During Santa Anna's reorganization of the Army of the North at San Luis Potosí
following the American investment of Monterrey, González's regiment was incorporated
into General José Vicente Miñón's 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was assigned to act as the
army's advance guard and screen its march north. Arriving on the parched foothills north
of the Hacienda de Buena Vista on February 22, 1847, González's command was ordered
as part of Miñón's brigade to feint eastward towards Saltillo, behind the American
position, and threaten Taylor's supply and communication lines. The following day, while
Santa Anna's main army was engaged a few miles east at La Angostura, Miñón attacked
the Americans at Saltillo, but was easily repulsed by American batteries hastily brought
up to disperse the threat. During the army's subsequent withdrawal to San Luis Potosí,
González was appointed to the rank of general graduado and given interim command of
the remnants of the 1st Cavalry Brigade upon Miñón's arrest at Matehuala by Santa Anna
for incompetence during the battle of La Angostura.
Thereafter, González languished at San Luis Potosí until the Army of the North was
recalled to Santa Anna's aid in defending the Valley of Mexico following the disastrous
engagement at Cerro Gordo. Upon the army's deployment on the outskirts of the capital
on July 29th, González served as member of a three-man reconnaissance team assigned to
survey the army's initial defensive position at San Ángel. Following the team's appraisal
that the position could be turned by the Americans, the commander-in-chief, General
Gabriel Valencia, ordered the army's removal to a perceived better position at El Rancho
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de Padierna, thereby precipitating the disaster of August 20th, whereby the Army of the
North was virtually annihilated. On the eve of battle, González was given command of
the 1st Infantry Brigade (composed of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the Line, the Fijo
Battalion of México, and the Activo Battalion of San Luis Potosí) in General Anastasio
Parrodi's division comprising the rear guard positioned in support of El Rancho de
Padierna at the base of La Loma del Pelón. During the subsequent battle, González
distinguished himself in attempting to rally the panicked soldiery, but was captured by
the Americans while attempting to organize a counterattack with the remnants of the
reserve.
Subsequently paroled upon the termination of hostilities in January 1848, González
served as a diputado from his native Puebla in the moderado-dominated congress of
1848-1851. Upon Santa Anna's return to power, González was appointed prefect of
Puebla and following the Revolution of Ayutla, he continued to serve successive
conservative governments on the General Staff until his resignation from the military
following Miramón's exile in 1860.
At the onset of the French invasion, González tendered his sword to the republican
cause and was appointed chief of staff in General Ignacio Zaragoza's Ejército del Oriente
on December 6, 1861. In this capacity, González served at the famous battle of Puebla,
May 5, 1862, and was subsequently appointed governor and commandant-general of the
Federal District in light of the short-lived republican triumph. During the renewed siege
of Puebla the following year, González again served as chief of staff in the Army of the
East and was captured during the French investment of the city on May 29, 1863.
Refusing to sign the terms of parole offered by the French, González was shipped to Paris
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as a prisoner of war, where he lingered until being allowed to re-enter Mexico after
signing an agreement with his captors to never again raise arms against the imperial
regime of Maximilian. Following the Republican triumph in 1867, González retired from
active military service and became a well known patron of education and the arts in
Mexico City. González died in his native Puebla, at the age of 66 years, on April 11,
1875.

GUZMÁN, Luis Ángel, General Graduado, was born in Chapa de Mota, Michoacán in
1795. He initiated his military career at the age of nineteen years in 1814 as a cavalryman
in the Realista Cavalry Company of Jilotepec. After extensive service against the
insurgents in Puebla, Hidalgo, Guerrero, and Michoacán, Guzmán adhered to the
independence movement in 1821 and was integrated into Iturbide’s Ejército del
Trigarante as a captain of cavalry. In 1823, Guzmán remained faithful to the emperor and
actively opposed Santa Anna’s anti-monarchical Plan de Casa Mata. Allying himself
with the conservative elements of his day, Guzmán supported General Anastasio
Bustamante’s centralist regime against Santa Anna’s coup of 1832 and was promoted to
the rank of lieutenant-colonel for his efforts. From 1833-1838, Guzmán opposed
federalist rebellions led by General Juan Álvarez in Guerrero and Michoacán, thereby
establishing himself as a bitter rival of the federalist movement in the south.
In 1841, Guzmán deserted Bustamante’s regime and pronounced in favor of Santa
Anna’s federalist-inspired Plan de Regeneración, being promoted by a grateful Santa
Anna to the rank of general graduado on March 2, 1842. Appointed prefecto of
Tacámbaro (an important town in the present-day state of Guerrero), Guzmán was
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accused of graft and corruption in 1845 and forcibly removed from his post by the local
population. Allowed to peacefully retire by the moderado regime of General José Joaquín
de Herrera rather than face charges, Guzmán subsequently pronounced in favor of
General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s arch-conservative coup of August 1846 and did
much to secure the latter’s acceptance in the south, where he successfully kept the
federalist Álvarez at bay, utilizing the greatest subterfuge to elude the wily caudillo and
keep him misinformed as to happenings in the capital.
Upon the outbreak of war with the United States, Guzmán remained in southern
Mexico as commandant of the garrison at Tixtla, but upon Santa Anna’s return from the
exile, he pronounced in his favor and traveled with a small contingent of troops to join
the refitted Army of the North at San Luis Potosí. Well received by Santa Anna, Guzmán
was initially appointed to command the 3rd Infantry Division, but for reasons that remain
unclear, was subsequently transferred to command the 4th Infantry Brigade, composed of
the 4th Line Infantry Battalion and the Activo Battalions of México and Lagos de Moreno.
In that capacity, Guzmán marched north with the army and rendered solid service at the
battle of La Angostura, where his command was involved in a drive against the American
center which momentarily breached the position and nearly allowed the Mexican forces
to invest the Hacienda de Buena Vista.
Returning with Santa Anna to the capital following the army’s withdrawal to San Luis
Potosí, Guzmán was given command of a cavalry brigade in General Juan Álvarez’s
Army of the South, which was tasked with harassing the American advance on the capital
following the disaster at Cerro Gordo. It is ironic that Guzmán was selected to serve
under his old rival and the appointment seems to reflect an attempt by Santa Anna to
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check any potential deviancy on Álvarez’s part by injecting santanistas into his local
command structure. During the battle of Molino del Rey, on September 7th, Guzmán was
amongst Álvarez’s subordinates in the Army of the South who rendered distinguished
service and complied with the latter’s orders to launch a pre-planned countercharge
against the waning American assault. Although the attack failed, Guzmán’s actions in the
battle were applauded by his superiors and he was retained in command. During the
battle of September 15th, Guzmán volunteered his command to reinforce the defenders of
Chapultepec, but his troopers’ efforts to alleviate pressure on the castle garrison proved in
vain and all gestures against the vulnerable American right flank were dispersed by
enemy artillery fire. Following the army’s evacuation of the capital, Guzmán reported for
duty in the army reassembled at the Villa de Guadalupe Hidalgo and was retained in
command of a cavalry brigade.
Converted to moderate political beliefs following the termination of hostilities,
Guzmán defended the pro-peace moderado regime of General José Joaquín de Herrera
against a pro-war coup led by General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in February 1849.
While campaigning against the rebels in Guanajuato, Guzmán faced an unexpected
predicament when a battalion commander in his brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Leonardo
Márquez, suddenly pronounced in favor of the rebellion and arrested his commander.
Liberated by nearby relief forces, Guzmán continued to serve against the rebels in the
Sierra Gorda region until the successful termination of the campaign in October, when he
was assigned to command the garrison at Tacámbaro. The following year, Guzmán died
in Tacámbaro during a severe cholera epidemic, at the age of 55 years, on February 24,
1851.
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JARERO y Ruiz, José María, General de Brigada, was born in Xalapa, Veracruz, on
April 19, 1801. He began his military career at the age of fourteen years, as a cadet in the
royalist “Urbana” Infantry Regiment of Xalapa on January 1, 1816. After extensive
service against the insurgents, Jarero was incorporated into Iturbide's Ejército del
Trigarante in 1821 and was amongst the first of the liberating forces to enter Mexico City
under the command of Major General Vicente Filisola.
Having attained the rank of colonel, Jarero was assigned command of the garrison at
Orizaba in 1831 and rallied to Santa Anna during his subsequent rebellion against the
centralist regime of General Anastasio Bustamante. Given command of a brigade in the
rebel forces assembled in Veracruz, Jarero took part in the Orizaba campaign of 1832 and
was appointed membership in Santa Anna's peace commission to negotiate terms with
Bustamante. For his service in the ouster of Bustamante, Jarero was assigned command
of the garrison at Perote and promoted to the rank of brigadier general on November 28,
1832. Placed by Santa Anna at the head of an expeditionary force tasked with quelling a
federalist uprising in Guerrero, Jarero met with defeat at the battle of Chilpancingo in
November of 1833, for which he was court martialed and imprisoned for a time.
Released upon Santa Anna's downfall in the wake of the Texas disaster, Jarero
returned to service under his former chief in the campaign against the French at Tampico
in 1839 and was appointed commandant of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa following the
French withdrawal. Regaining favor once more for supporting the Paredes/Santa Anna
coup against Bustamante in 1840, Jarero was appointed to head the commandancygeneral of Aguascalientes in 1841 and then became governor and commandant-general of
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Jalisco, from 1842 until March 23, 1843, when he was transferred once more to
command the garrison at the Castle of Perote.
At the start of the war with the United States, Jarero found himself at the head of the
commandancy-general of Sonora, but was recalled to the capital in August 1846 to take
command of the Department of México. Assigned to command a brigade in the Army of
The East, facing Scott's invasion by way of Veracruz, Jarero was appointed by Santa
Anna to command the Mexican far right wing in his army blocking the enemy’s advance
along the National Highway. Apparently, Jarero’s position was well entrenched and
consisted of log and earthen works constructed at the base of the National Highway at the
top of a steep ravine beyond the southeast reaches of La Atalaya about a half mile east of
the main camp at the village of Cerro Gordo. During the battle of April 18, 1846, Jarero's
1,100 men and 23 artillery pieces successfully maintained their position, but when the
American forces flanked the Mexican left and stormed the summit of El Telégrafo,
threatening the Mexican route of escape, Jarero panicked and was compelled to surrender
his largely intact force. Denounced by Santa Anna for his timorous behavior, Jarero
marched off into American captivity with his troops, never again to see action in the war
with the United States.
Following his parole and Santa Anna's exile, Jarero was appointed commandantgeneral of the new interim seat of government at Querétaro in January of 1848.
Thereafter, he was appointed to head the commandancy-general of Puebla in 1849, where
he remained until 1857, being promoted in the meantime to the rank of major general on
March 20, 1855, during the last days of Santa Anna's eleventh and final presidential term.
Recalled to head the Supreme Military Tribunal in 1857, Jarero subsequently retired and
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did not take an active role in the War of The Reform or the French Intervention. A
lifelong bachelor, Jarero died in Mexico City, at the age of 66, on June 25, 1867 and is
buried in the city's Panteón de San Fernando.

JUVERA, Julián, General de Brigada, was born in the town of Atitalaquia, in the
present-day state of Hidalgo, in 1784. He began his military career as a lancer in the
royalist Auxiliary Cavalry Battalion of Querétaro on September 16, 1810. After extensive
service against the insurgents, Juvera adhered to independence and briefly served in
Iturbide's Ejército Trigarante before opposing the monarchy in 1823 and pronouncing in
favor of Santa Anna's Plan de Casa Mata, thereby initiating a strong relationship with the
caudillo that would be amply reflected in his subsequent career. During the tumultuous
1820s and 1830s, Juvera remained loyal to Santa Anna in all of his political and military
gestures and created a substantive power base for himself in his native Quéretaro.
During the Texas Campaign of 1836, Juvera served as colonel of the Guanajuato
Auxiliary Cavalry Battalion in General Juan José Andrade's cavalry brigade, taking part
in the occupation of San Antonio de Béjar and in the subsequent retreat to Matamoros in
the wake of Santa Anna's disaster at San Jacinto. Four years later, Juvera was promoted
by Santa Anna to the rank of brigadier general on October 13, 1841, in recognition of his
his service in bringing Querétaro under santanista control during the coup against
General Anastasio Bustamante's centralist regime. Less than a year later, Santa Anna
appointed Juvera governor and commandant-general of Querétaro, a position he held for
two years, 1842-1844. As governor, he sponsored the construction of the Escuela
Lancasteriana, but his tenure was cut short by a political scandal that resulted in a call for
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popular elections, whereby Dr. Sabás Antonio Domínguez ascended to a short
governorship of six months, being succeeded once more by Juvera who governed until
December 22, 1844.
Although unemployed by the Paredes regime even unto the outbreak of war with the
United States, upon Santa Anna’s return from exile in August 1846, Juvera rallied to his
support and hastened to integrate himself into the reformed Army of the North at San
Luis Potosí. Upon his arrival with a contingent of troops, Santa Anna awarded his loyal
subordinate with an appointment to command the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, composed of the
5th and 9th Cavalry Regiments of the Line and the Cuirassier Battalion of Tulancingo
and the Activo Battalion of Morelia. At the subsequent battle of La Angostura, on
February 23, 1847, Juvera's cavalry guarded the right flank of General Francisco
Pacheco's 2nd Infantry Division and made a valiant headlong thrust for the American rear
at the Hacienda de Buena Vista. Though the bold move failed to generate support from
the supposedly nearby cavalry brigade of General José Vicente Miñón and was repulsed
with heavy loss by American artillery batteries perched on higher ground, Santa Anna
nevertheless rewarded Juvera’s audacity with promotion to the rank of major general that
same day on the battlefield. In the wake of the army’s subsequent withdrawal to San Luis
Potosí, Juvera was appointed to command the cavalry that remained of the Army of the
North.
In this station, he languished for several months until recalled to the defense of the
capital in August 1847 and given command of a cavalry brigade forming in the large
cavalry force assigned to puro federalist General Juan Álvarez, in the vicinity of the
entrenched position at El Molino del Rey. During the battle of September 8th, when the
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critical moment came for Álvarez to support the entrenched Mexican position with a
counterattack by his four thousand lancers, he failed to carry out the pre-conceived plan
put forth by Santa Anna and allowed his force to be committed piece-meal over
undesirable ground, whereby it was decimated by the superior firepower of the American
artillery, which in turn leveled its fire on the unaided defenders of the Molino and forced
their withdrawal. Unfortunately, Juvera's role in this action was limited to a concerted
though unsuccessful effort to animate his command in the third line of assault, which
became irretrievably entangled in the droves of fleeing men and horses of General
Manuel Andrade’s shattered brigade. Apparently, Juvera’s efforts did not escape his
chief’s notice and his actions did not elicit accusations of treason from Santa Anna, who
denounced Álvarez and some of his subordinates for their role in the defeat.
Remaining with the army thereafter, Juvera accompanied its withdrawal from Mexico
City on the night of September 15th and remained at the disposal of the federal
government during the following months. Greatly respected for his professionalism,
Juvera was appointed commandant-general of the interim seat of government at
Querétaro during the peace negotiations, a position he held until the ratification of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in February 1848, when he retired to his estates in the
countryside. Ten years later, in 1858, Juvera and his family hosted the newly wed first
couple of the nation, General Miguel Miramón and Concepción Lombardo, in their home
during their presentation and stay in Querétaro where Juvera arranged elaborate
celebrations. After nearly twelve years in retirement, Juvera died in Querétaro, at the age
of 76 years, on March 31, 1860. He was survived by his wife, María del Carmen Gelati
Fernández-Munilla, with whom he had several children. One of Juvera's grandsons and
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namesake, Julián Malo Juvera, became a Villista general and served as governor of
Querétaro, 1924-1925.

LANDERO y Bausá, José Juan de, General de Brigada, was born in Veracruz in 1802,
the son of a prominent lawyer, D. Pedro Telmo de Landero. He initiated his military
career at an early age with the pursuit of military arts studies at the prestigious Seminario
de Nobles in the town of Vergara. After specializing in the artillery and serving as an
officer with that arm under Santa Anna in the Texas Campaign of 1836, Landero was
promoted to the rank of brigadier general in 1842 for political support he rendered his
former commander in his pronunciamento against the centralist government of General
Anastasio Bustamante.
At the outbreak of war with the United States, Landero was posted to command the
garrison of his native Veracruz under the overall command of the able puro federalist,
General Juan Morales, with whom he had shared service in Texas in 1836. A staunch
santanista, Landero pronounced in favor of his former chief upon the latter's return from
Cuban exile on July 31, 1846 and with the aid of fellow centralist compatriot, General
Francisco Pérez, he successfully rallied the garrison of Veracruz to Santa Ana's cause
without his federalist commander's support or blessing. Thereafter, detecting political
instability in the city's populace, who had traditionally favored federalism, Santa Anna
dismissed the unenthusiastic, though popular Morales and left the politically reliable
Landero in command of the garrison. Soon thereafter, however, popular federalist
sentiment and a sudden change of heart amongst the troops restored General Morales to
overall command and relegated Landero to his original position of segundo cabo. He
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remained in this position at the onset of the unopposed American landing on March 9,
1847. Discouraged by the inferior number of troops at his disposal and a lack of
ammunition for the city's available heavy artillery, Landero adhered to a nonchalant
strategy whereby the pessimistic Morales concentrated all of the available Mexican
forces within the city in anticipation of a siege he had no hope of opposing successfully.
Four days after the commencement of the American bombardment of the city on March
21st, when the situation's hopelessness was exacerbated by merciless bombardment and
the expenditure of all available ammunition, the despondent, but defiant, Morales
resigned his position as garrison commander and relinquished command to his political
rival, Landero, who was obliged to seek terms from the Americans. Three days later, on
March 28th, the nearly intact 3,000-man garrison of Veracruz, along with the wholly
intact 1,000-man garrison of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, stacked their arms before
Scott's victorious army and were allowed to march out of the surrendered city. Thereafter,
an infuriated Santa Ana had both Morales and Landero imprisoned in the nearby Castle
of Perote to await court-martial on charges of ineptitude and treason, from which the pair
were subsequently liberated by American troops on their way to Mexico City following
the battle of Cerro Gordo.
Languishing in Veracruz until the advent of peace, the embittered Landero was
converted to liberal ideology following the war and pronounced in favor of the antisantanista Revolution of Ayutla in 1855. Thereafter, Landero became an ardent supporter
of Benito Juárez and actively opposed the conservatives in Veracruz during the War of
the Reform, 1854-1857. For a brief period, beginning in May 1861 and culminating in
July 1862, Landero served as interim governor and commandant-general of the entire
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state of Veracruz. Thereafter, during the French Intervention, Landero rallied to the
republican cause and fought with Juárez against the imperialists. Following the triumph
of the republican forces in 1867, Landero retired to private life and died in his native
Veracruz in 1869, at the age of 67, in the company of his wife, Juana Pasquel y Palma,
with whom he had six daughters.

LEÓN, Antonio de, General de Brigada, was born in Huajuapán, Oaxaca, on June 4,
1794, the son of Manuel de León and María de La Luz Loyola. After completing his
primary education in local schools, León initiated his military career as an ensign in the
Provincial Militia Company of Huajuapán, at the age of 16 years, in May 1811. After
taking part in 19 actions against the insurgents and winning promotion to the rank of
captain on April 18, 1817, León adhered to the independence movement and was
integrated into Iturbide's Ejército del Trigarante with the rank of lieutenant-colonel in
June 1821. Thereafter, León joined the federalist forces of Generals Vicente Guerrero and
Nicolás Bravo and fought in the ouster of the remaining royalist forces from Mexico at
the sieges of Puebla and Mexico City, winning promotion to the rank of colonel in
October 1822. The following year, León pronounced in support of Santa Anna's
republican Plan de Casa Mata and upon the collapse of Iturbide's monarchy, played an
instrumental role in declaring Oaxaca's sovereignty on June 10, 1823. Subdued by a
military expedition under General Manuel Rincón, León adhered to the central
government and served his native state as a deputy in the National Congress which
passed the federalist Constitution of 1824.
After establishing a puro federalist York Rite Masonic Lodge in Oaxaca, León served
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as commandant of his native Huajuapan, from April-August 1827, and in 1830, served
the Bustamante government in quelling a separatist rebellion in the south of Chiapas.
Two years later, in 1832, León supported Santa Anna's federalist rebellion against
Bustamante and was again elected to serve his state as a deputy to the failed National
Congress of that year. On June 19, 1834, León was appointed commandant-general of the
Department of Huasteca and in 1835, was named by Santa Anna to head the
commandancy-general of Oaxaca. Three years later, León briefly governed Chiapas and
helped pacify the rebellious Soconusco Region before serving under Santa Anna against
the French at Tampico in 1839. Rewarded for his support of the federalist Santa
Anna/Paredes coup against Bustamante, León was promoted to the rank of brigadier
general in January 1843 and served as governor and commandant-general of Oaxaca from
September 18, 1841 until November 13, 1843. Thereafter, León regained the
governorship of Oaxaca, which he held from October 17, 1844 until September 2, 1845,
when he retired into private life in the face of increasing conservative opposition. It was
under León's fourth term as governor that the subsequently famous Lic. Benito Juárez
initiated his political career as secretario de gobierno of Oaxaca.
Upon the outbreak of the reactionary Polkos Revolt in February 1847, León became
partisan to the installation of a revolutionary federalist government in Oaxaca which
despite its political differences with the emergent moderado central government, pledged
its wholehearted support to the national cause in the war with the United States. Thus, in
March 1847, León mobilized the activo militia units of Oaxaca and rushed at the head of
his Oaxaqueño brigade to the aid of Santa Anna's Army of The East, standing against
Scott's invasion forces along the National Road near Orizaba. Arriving just in time for the
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disastrous battle of Cerro Gordo, on March 27th, León's brigade was posted to the reserve
and did not see action in the main battle, but subsequently became the core from which
Santa Anna rebuilt his army for the defense of the Valley of Mexico.
Held in reserve during the battle of Churubusco, León's command played a pivotal
role in the battle of Molino del Rey and was posted to hold the center of the Mexican line
at the molino. With great bravado, León called the soldiers of the "Patria" Battalion to
attention on the eve of battle and issued a challenge for "those to take a step forward
amongst you who are prepared to die with me for our Motherland because we shall surely
not survive the coming battle."128 During the battle of September 8th, León was to be
seen at the forefront of his troops, directing their fire and encouraging them with sword in
hand. When the Mexican troops finally ran out of ammunition and the Americans
stormed the molino, vicious hand-to-hand fighting ensued, during which, León was
mortally wounded by a shot that struck him in the side. Rescued from the field by his
withdrawing troops who wrapped him in the folds of the national banner, León died later
that evening nonetheless. It was said that León's last words in consciousness were uttered
to Lieutenant-Colonel Miguel María de Echegaray of the 6th Light Infantry Regiment,
"Haga lo imposible por nuestra patria, que ella sabrá recompensar sus servicios."129
León died at the age of 53 years, and was survived by his wife, Manuela Torres de León,
with whom he had several children. A greatly revered hero of the war with the United
States, a bronze memorial to the slain general was erected on September 15, 1885, in
downtown Oaxaca's aptly named Alameda de León. A dedicated puro federalist who died
fighting on behalf of a conservative moderado government, León distinguished himself
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from the rest of Mexico's military hierarchy by being one of the few generals who served
the national cause unswervingly and refrained from partisanship. In his memoirs, even
the hypercritical Santa Anna referred to the general as "the brave León."130

MARTÍNEZ de Lejarza, Mariano, General Graduado, was born in Mexico City on July
30, 1808, the son of Manuel Martínez Chacón and Josefa Martínez de Lejarza, both
natives of Spain. At the age of seventeen years, Martínez gained a commission and
initiated his military career as a lieutenant in the Provincial Battalion of Meztitlán, being
promoted to the rank of captain by June 1827. In March 1829, Martínez rallied to Santa
Anna and pronounced against General Manuel Gómez Pedraza’s centralist regime in
support of General Vicente Guerrero's federalist presidential candidacy. After fighting
against the Spanish at Tampico, Martínez continued to cultivate a fruitful association
with Santa Anna that was amply reflected in his career.
In 1830, Martínez again defended Guerrero's presidency against the centralist coup of
General Anastasio Bustamante and fought to preserve his regime under Santa Anna in
Veracruz. With Bustamante's ultimate victory, Martínez was chastised for his opposition
and exiled to an obscure post in Tabasco, where he defiantly continued to cultivate
support for the santanistas and eventually pronounced in support of Santa Anna's coup
against the centralists on June 3, 1832. In recognition of his actions at the battle of
Acachapa on July 27, 1833, where he defeated pro-Bustamante forces in Tabasco, Santa
Anna promoted Martínez to the rank of lieutenant-colonel on August 20th and elevated
him to head the commandancy-general of Tabasco.
In December 1835, Martínez was attached to the garrison of Monterrey and was
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subsequently appointed commandant-general of Nuevo León on January 6, 1836. In this
capacity, Martínez provided logistical support for Santa Anna's army in Texas and sent a
300-man detachment under Colonel Rafael Vázquez to provide relief in the wake of his
chief's disaster at San Jacinto. In July 1839, Martínez was recalled to the capital and
occupied an administrative financial position in the war ministry before rallying to the
federalists and supporting General José Urrea's revolt against Bustamante in July 1840.
With the defeat of this rebellion, Martínez went on to support General Gabriel Valencia's
defection against Bustamante and pronounced in favor of Santa Anna’s Plan de
Regeneración in September 1841. Thereafter, Martínez was promoted to the rank of
colonel on January 20, 1842 and assigned to second General Francisco García Conde's
commandancy-general in Chihuahua. Due to García Conde's illness, Martínez briefly
served as commandant-general of Chihuahua from September 27-October 3, 1842.
During the Texian expedition against New Mexico, which necessitated General José
Mariano Monterde's absence in relief of Santa Fe, Martínez again served as commandantgeneral of Chihuahua from June-August 1843, after which he was promoted to the rank
of general graduado on October 3rd and assigned to the interim governorship of New
Mexico, where he served from April 1844-March 1845. During his term, Martínez was
noted for playing a key role in facilitating a peace treaty with the Apaches and Navajos in
Santa Fe that did much to improve Indian relations with the province.
Following Paredes' coup against Herrera's moderado government, Martínez fell out of
favor and left the army, settling in Chihuahua, where he served as chairman of a junta
assigned to draft a defense plan for the state in the face of an imminent American
invasion. With Santa Anna's return to power, Martínez was summoned to the Valley of
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Mexico in August 1847 and placed in command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, composed
of the Activo Battalion of Morelia and the Batallón de Invalidos, in General Manuel
María Lombardini's Army of the East defending Mexico City. Positioned in the reserve
during the battles of Padierna and Churubusco, Martínez's command was subsequently
posted with ten artillery pieces to defend the Garita de San Antonio against an impending
American attack following the battle of Chapultepec on September 8, 1847. Although the
Americans did not attack Martínez's position in force, he was obliged to withdraw from
Mexico City that night and reform with the main army at the Villa de Guadalupe Hidalgo.
After the war, Martínez served on the Supreme Military Tribunal for a time before
being assigned to head the commandancy-general of Chiapas upon Santa Anna's return to
power in 1853. The following year, Santa Anna transferred Martínez to head the
commandancy-general of Coahuila, where he died suddenly in Saltillo, at the age of 46
years, on December 18, 1854. He left behind a widow, Teresa Bolío of Chihuahua, with
whom he had several daughters.

MEJÍA, Francisco, General de Brigada, was born in Ixtapan, Cuernavaca in 1791. At the
age of twenty years, he initiated his military career by enlisting in the Royalist
Tulancingo squadron. After extensive active service against the insurgents during which
he participated in twenty engagements, Mejía was incorporated into Iturbide's Ejército
del Trigarante on March 2, 1821. After promotion to the rank of major, Mejía served on
Santa Anna's staff during the battle for Tampico in 1829 and was sent by Santa Anna to
present the captured Spanish standards to President Guerrero in the capital.
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Thereafter, he was appointed military commander of Iguala and supported Santa
Anna’s 1832 revolution against Bustamante's centralist regime. During Bustamante's
advance on Puebla, Mejía was captured and held captive in the village of Palacio, but was
subsequently released upon the cessation of hostilities. In 1833, Mejía was awarded the
newly-created Cruz de Tampico in commemoration of his services rendered in 1829 and
promoted to the rank of colonel. During the rebellion of August 1841, Mejía again
supported Santa Anna and was subsequently rewarded with promotion to the rank of
brigadier general and appointed segundo cabo to General Mariano Arista in command of
the Army of the North at Saltillo.
In June 1842, Mejía was appointed governor and commandant-general of the state of
Coahuila and in that post, received the Texian prisoners recovered from the Mier
expedition of that year. When ordered to arrange the summary execution of the prisoners
by President Nicolás Bravo, Mejía refused on moral grounds and resigned the
commandancy in 1843. After reconciling himself to the Herrera government, he was
assigned to command the post at Matamoros and in that position, tasked with
continuously threatening Texian border security by dispatching irregular cavalry raids
across the Río Grande. From 1845, Mejía was tasked with organizing a campaign against
Texas and was thus engaged when the war broke out with the United States.
In April 1846, Mejía and his troops from the Matamoros garrison opposed Taylor's
march from Corpus Christi and threatened battle at Arroyo Colorado before retiring back
to Matamoros, where Mejía set himself to the task of fortifying the town in anticipation
of the arrival of his superior, General Pedro de Ampudia, who was shortly thereafter
superseded by General Arista. Although assigned to command an infantry brigade in the
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Army of the North, Mejía missed the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero due to
a protracted illness, but was subsequently elevated to command the army after Arista's
dismissal. As commander, Mejía oversaw the army's withdrawal to Monterrey, where he
was credited with doing much to restore the troops’ morale. Although ordered to abandon
the city as indefensible in the wake of Taylor's approach, Mejía remained there until he
was again superseded by Ampudia and relegated to command the 1st Infantry Brigade.
Prior to the battle, Mejía served on the council of war that ultimately persuaded the
uninspired Ampudia to make a stand in the city in order to retain the mountain passes
leading south into the interior. During the battle for Monterrey, Mejía valiantly defended
El Fortín de La Purísima with the 300 soldiers of his dilapidated brigade, composed of
the 3rd Line Infantry Regiment and the Activo battalions of Aguascalientes and
Querétaro, being forced to abandon the position on the evening of the September 21st.
Mejía's own personal home was located near the bridge at La Purísima and the incessant
American bombardment obliged his own family to take shelter in the nearby home of a
neighbor. After the battle, Mejía accompanied the remains of the army to San Luis
Potosí, where he remained until Santa Anna's arrival and reorganization of the army,
whereupon Mejía was given command of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in General
Lombardini's division, composed of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 10th, and 11th Line Infantry
Regiments. In this capacity, he served at the battle of La Angostura, where he was in the
thick of the fight during Lombardini's drive on the American center.
After the army’s withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Mejía remained with the Army of The
North and subsequently accompanied it south under General Gabriel Valencia to oppose
Scott's invasion of the Valley of Mexico. Assigned to command the 1st Infantry Division
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(which included the famed San Patricio Battalion) at the battle of Contreras, Mejía
commanded the Mexican center at El Rancho de Padierna on August 20, 1847, when his
command was overtaken from the rear and decimated beyond recovery. During the
panicked fighting, which degenerated into a shameless rout within a mere 17 minutes,
Mejía was wounded in the leg and taken prisoner while attempting to rally his troops.
Paroled upon the cessation of hostilities, Mejía was retained in the army and was
assigned as commandant-general of Durango in 1849. Retiring to private life the
following year, Mejía returned to live at Monterrey with his family for a time until being
recalled to the commandancy-general of San Luis Potosí where he died in the town of
Venegas, at the age of 61, on December 2, 1852. He was survived by his wife of only
eight years, María Antonia Barragán Arizpe (1822-1895), with whom he had only a
daughter, Francisca, born in 1845.

MIÑÓN, Jose Vicente, General de Brigada, was born in the city of Cadiz, Spain in 1802.
Brought to Mexico as an infant, Miñón initiated his military career at the age of fourteen,
as a cadet in the Dragones del Principe Cavalry Regiment, on September 11, 1816. After
extensive service against the insurgents, during which he participated in three sieges and
fifty actions, Miñón adhered to Iturbide's Plan de Iguala and was incorporated into the
royalist Ejército del Trigarante in 1821. Two years later, Miñón adhered to Santa Anna's
anti-monarchical Plan de Casa Mata of 1823 and was promoted to the rank of lieutenantcolonel in reward for his support. In 1832, Miñón defended Bustamante's centralist
regime against the federalist forces of General Estéban Moctezuma and participated in
the battle of El Gallinero on September 18th, where he commanded the left wing of the
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victorious loyalist army. The following year, Miñón served as chief of staff in General
Mariano Arista's expedition against the federalist rebels of Morelia and was promoted to
the rank of colonel in recognition of his services.
Almost three years later, in April 1836, Miñón participated in Santa Anna's Texas
campaign and served at the battle of The Alamo, where he distinguished himself as
second-in-command of the fourth column assigned to invest the south gate. Following the
Mexican victory, Miñón was dispatched by Santa Anna to deliver orders to General José
Urrea to execute the Texian prisoners he had taken at Goliad and did not take part in the
subsequent disaster at San Jacinto. Following the army's withdrawal to Matamoros,
Miñón was recognized for his services in Texas with promotion to the rank of brigadier
general on March 19, 1836. In July 1840, he supported Bustamante's presidency against
the federalist rebellion of General José Urrea and took part in the destructive fighting in
the capital begun on July 15th. Almost two months later, Miñón defected in favor of
Santa Anna's coup against Bustamante and defended the former's regime in command a
2,720-man infantry brigade sent to aid General Juan Morales in pacifying the separatist
rebels of the Yucatán in August 1842.
Dissatisfied with the stance of General José Joaquín de Herrera's moderado regime
towards war with the United States, Miñón associated himself with federalist firebrand
Valentín Gómez Farías in a failed puro federalist plot to overthrow the government in
June 1845. Not taking an active role in the early phase of the war, upon Santa Anna's
return to power, Miñón was incorporated into the reorganized Army of the North at San
Luis Potosí and placed in command of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, composed of the
"Jalisco" Lancer Battalion, the 4th Cavalry Regiment of the Line, and the Activo Cavalry
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Battalions of Puebla and Oaxaca. In this capacity, Miñón led his brigade north, well
ahead of the main army and engaged the Americans on January 26, 1847, near the
Hacienda de Encarnación, where he overpowered a squadron of Kentucky cavalry and
took 82 prisoners, whose subsequent exhibition in San Luis Potosí did much to bolster
Mexican morale just prior to the army's exodus north. Assigned to screen the army's
movements and threaten Taylor's supply and communication lines with a direct assault on
Saltillo, Miñón failed to coordinate a concentrated attack in support of the main army
engaged a few miles east at La Angostura on February 23rd and his troopers were
scattered by the superior firepower of American batteries defending the Saltillo Road. It
is conceivable that had Miñón staged a more skillful attack, he could have supported a
successful cavalry penetration of the main American position at the Hacienda de Buena
Vista, whereupon the Mexican cavalry could have succeeded in turning the U.S. position
and cut off the line of retreat. Upon rejoining the army at Matehuala during its
withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Santa Anna removed Miñón from command and had him
arrested for incompetence.
Thereafter, Miñón remained unemployed pending an investigation into his actions at
the battle of La Angostura until following the termination of hostilities, when a special
military tribunal absolved him of guilt and restored him to rank. From 1850-1851, Miñón
served the moderado government of Herrera as commandant-general of Querétaro and
later defended Arista's presidency against a santanista rebellion led by Colonel José
María Blancarte in Guadalajara. Unemployed during Santa Anna's final presidential term,
upon his downfall, Miñón served briefly as interim head of the commandancy-general of
the Federal District, August 13-August 29, 1855.
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During the War of the Reform, Miñón sided with the conservatives and contributed to
the defeat of a liberal force led by Colonel Ignacio Mejía at the battle of Teotitlán, on
October 30, 1859, for which he was promoted to the rank of major general on November
3rd. Unemployed following the liberal triumph in 1860, Miñón rallied to the imperialists
and endorsed the French Intervention, serving on the General Staff until his arrest upon
the investment of the capital, on June 2, 1867, by the Republican forces under General
Porfirio Díaz. Briefly imprisoned for collaborating with the French, Miñón retired to
private life upon his parole and died in the capital at the age of 76, in 1878. His was
survived by his wife, María Ana Domínguez, with whom he had several children. One
historian referring to Miñón's treatment of the American prisoners taken at Encarnación
described him as "a most accomplished and elegant gentleman."131

ORTEGA, José María, General de Brigada, was born in Mexico City in 1793. Although
only ten years old, he embarked upon a military career as a cavalryman in the Royalist
"España" Dragoon Regiment on January 3, 1804. Heavily engaged against the insurgents,
Ortega participated in three sieges and five battles before adhering to Iturbide’s proindependence Plan de Iguala in 1821. Integrated into the royal Ejército del Trigarante as
a lieutenant-colonel of artillery, Ortega served thereafter as chief of artillery in General
Anastasio Bustmante's division. Assigned command of the provincias internas of
northeastern Mexico in 1822, Ortega then served as chief of light artillery in General
Nicolás Bravos' division during the campaign against the federalist forces of General
Vicente Guerrero in southern Mexico, which culminated in the capture and execution of
Guerrero at Culiapan, Oaxaca, on February 14, 1831. Five years later, in 1836, Ortega
131

Carelton, The Battle of Buena Vista, p. 146.

142

was placed in command of a portion of the artillery in Santa Anna's army during the
Texas campaign and was left in command of The Alamo after the fortress was taken by
the Mexican forces. In this capacity, Ortega oversaw the withdrawal of the intact artillery
train to Matamoros after Santa Anna's subsequent disaster at San Jacinto.
After supporting the Paredes/Santa Anna coup against Bustamante’s centralist regime
in early 1841, Ortega was promoted to the rank of brigadier general on October 24th and
assigned to head the commandancy-general of Nuevo León, where he remained until
January 1846, when he was made commandant-general of the department of San Luis
Potosí. Remaining there following the outbreak of war with the United States, Ortega
received the remnants of the shattered Army of the North in October and was tasked with
maintaining the organization of the troops until Santa Anna's arrival. Thereafter, Ortega
distinguished himself via his administrative talents during the reorganization of the army
and housed Santa Anna and his staff at his own personal residence. In reward for his
services, Santa Anna appointed Ortega to command the 3rd Infantry Division, made up of
three brigades headed by Generals Ángel Guzmán, Andrés Terrés, and Anastasio Parrodi.
Apparently, Santa Anna had originally given command of the division to General
Guzmán, but replaced him with Ortega shortly before the army's embarkation without a
clear indication as to why. At the battle of La Angostura, on February 23, 1847, Ortega
commanded the reserve of the Mexican army and supported Lombardini's assault on the
American center. During the latter half of the day, Ortega oversaw a gesture over
Lombardini's left towards the American right, but the assault was repulsed by the
superior firepower of the American artillery. Although scathing of the performance in the
battle of many of his generals, Santa Anna noted in his official report that Ortega
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"performed his duties to my satisfaction." Following the army's withdrawal to San Luis
Potosí, Ortega resumed the commandancy-general and did not accompany Santa Anna to
the capital nor take part in the defense of the Valley of Mexico. In August 1847, Ortega
was transferred to mobilize the regular forces of Jalisco and in November, reported to the
central government that he had mobilized a total of 823 men in Guadalajara.
Upon Santa Anna's return to power, Ortega was promoted to the rank of major general
and on July 16, 1853, and assigned to head the commandancy-general of Jalisco, where
he suppressed statewide ayuntamientos as his first order of business and attempted to
restore conservative power. Remaining in Jalisco as governor and commandant-general
until Santa Anna's downfall in 1855, Ortega later played a minor role on the conservative
side during the initial stages of the War of The Reform before retiring to private life. A
lifelong bachelor, Ortega died in humble conditions in Mexico City, at the age of 78, on
November 1, 1871.

PACHECO, Francisco, General de Brigada, was born in León, Guanajuato in 1795. At
the age of twenty-nine, he enlisted as an infantry cadet in Iturbide's Ejército del
Trigarante. His initial career was spent in his native Guanajuato, where he consistently
demonstrated centralist santanista political leanings, for which he was rewarded with
promotion to the rank of brigadier general on August 31, 1841, following his support of
the triumphant Santa Anna/Paredes coup against the government of General Anastasio
Bustamante. Two years later, in 1843, Santa Anna appointed Pacheco to second an
expedition that succeeded in crushing a major separatist rebellion in the Yucatán.
Pacheco distinguished himself in the campaign by overseeing the investment of
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Campeche with a mere thousand-man force at his disposal. After returning to head the
military garrison at León for a time, Pacheco pronounced against General José Joaquín de
Herrera's moderate government on January 8, 1846 and marched on the city of
Guadalajara with his forces in support of General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, a fiery
monarchic conservative whom Pacheco had previously supported in the coup of 1841. In
gratitude for his services, Paredes appointed Pacheco interim governor and commandantgeneral of Guanajuato in May of 1846, after which he was relegated once more to
garrison command at León.
Upon Santa Anna's return from exile, Pacheco was serving in command of the activo
troops from Guanajuato in General Gabriel Valencia's powerful contingent of auxiliary
troops collected from the Bajío. In this subordinate capacity, Pacheco marched with
Valencia to Santa Anna's aid at San Luis Potosí in November 1846, where he was
recognized by the Generalissimo as a potentially more reliable subordinate than his
superior and was elevated to command the 1st Infantry Division in the reformed Army of
The North (whereby Valencia was transferred to command the troops assembled at Tula
threatening Taylor’s supply line). Pacheco's division was composed of the 3rd and 5th
Infantry Brigades, headed respectively by Generals Francisco Mejía and José López
Uraga. At the head of his division, Pacheco marched north and finally reached the
Hacienda de La Encarnación on February 21st in anticipation of a great battle to be
fought in the vicinity of the nearby Hacienda de Buena Vista. At the battle of La
Angostura, on Febuary 23rd, Pacheco's division was placed on the Mexican center right
and with Lombardini's division on its left, and executed the main drive against the
American right wing, which momentarily succeeded in crumbling the American position
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before being forced to withdraw by the American artillery. Following the retreat to San
Luis Potosí, Pacheco accompanied Santa Anna in the defense of Mexico City and served
as foreign minister in August 1847. On September 8th, Pacheco fought at the battle of El
Molino del Rey at the head of the Activo Battalion of Hidalgo and in conjunction with the
brigade of General Francisco Pérez, conducted a desperate, but unsuccessful
counterattack in support of the beleaguered defenders of La Casa Mata.
After the war, Pacheco returned to Guanajuato, where he was appointed commandantgeneral in 1852. A fervent conservative, Pacheco was briefly imprisoned for complicity
in a santanista conspiracy against the liberal Juan Bautista Ceballos' government in 1853.
Upon his subsequent release, Pacheco supported Lombardini's conservative coup and
welcomed the return of Santa Anna, who rewarded his faithful subordinate with
promotion to the rank of major general and an appointment to the governorship and
commandancy-general of Guanajuato in June 1853. Nearly a month later, Pacheco was
briefly held captive by liberal rebels of the 3rd Light Infantry Battalion who pronounced
against the government in León, but were ultimately defeated by conservative troops
loyal to Pacheco.
After Santa Anna's downfall, Pacheco pronounced against the liberal government of
Ignacio Comonfort in conjunction with General Agustín Zires and raised his forces
against the liberals in Guanajuato. In this capacity, Pacheco successfully defended León
and Guanajuato for a time against the liberal forces of Generals Santos Degollado and
Epitacio Huerta. Ultimately defeated and apprehended by his adversaries, Pacheco was
exiled for three years at Havana, Cuba, until the issuance of a general amnesty in 1858.
During the War of The Reform, Pacheco adhered once more to the conservative cause
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and fought under General Miguel Miramón against the liberal forces in the Bajío. During
Miramón's brief presidency, Pacheco was appointed commandant-general of the
Department of León in 1859 and once again governor and commandant-general of
Guanajuato in 1860. He was serving in this capacity when appointed to command a
division in the conservative forces mobilized by Miramón to confront the liberal forces of
General Jesús González Ortega in Puebla. While leading his division at the battle of
Silao, on August 10, 1860, Pacheco was mortally wounded in action when a cannonball
tore off both legs and killed his horse. His widow, Concepción Plowes Sánchez de Haro,
was later made a dama de honor in the Imperial Household of Maximilian and Carlota. In
1881, after nearly fifteen years in disfavor because of her cooperative role in the imperial
regime, Sra. Plowes Sánchez de Hara was finally rehabilitated by the Mexican Congress
and granted a pension in the name of her deceased husband.

PARRODI, Anastasio, General de Brigada, was born in Havana, Cuba in 1805. After
joining the military, he came to Mexico at an early age and established himself in the
state of San Luis Potosí, where he acquired land. Although little is known of Parrodi's
early military service, he reached the rank of colonel by October 1836, when he led the
1st Activo Battalion of San Luis Potosí to Matamoros as part of a reinforcement intended
to aid Santa Anna's expedition against Texas. Following the campaign's disastrous end
and the army's withdrawal to Matamoros, Parrodi remained with the garrison and was
involved in subsequent incursions into Texas. In 1842, Parrodi pronounced in favor of
Santa Anna's coup against Bustamante's centralist regime and in recognition of his
loyalty, was promoted to the rank of brigadier general on June 12, 1843.
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Upon the outbreak of war with the United States, Parrodi was serving as commandantgeneral of Tamaulipas and in October 1846, found himself in command of the garrison at
Tampico facing a potential American investment of the city. Despondent over his
chances of sustaining a siege with only 870 men and a low ammunition supply, Parrodi
apprised Santa Anna of the situation in the bleakest of terms and sent a letter to the
commander-in-chief, dated October 3rd, stating that he could not defend the city.
Regarded as indefensible by Santa Anna, who was preoccupied with concentrating all
available forces in San Luis Potosí in anticipation of confronting Taylor's army in
northeastern Mexico, Parrodi was issued orders to evacuate the city and withdraw his
forces with all available artillery and supplies to the town of Tula, from which he would
proceed to join Santa Anna. However, the central government countermanded Santa
Anna's orders shortly thereafter and it was not until October 22nd that the confusion was
cleared and Parrodi allowed to withdraw. However, because the perplexing issuance of
orders had been detrimental to Parrodi's evacuation timeline, he was forced to execute a
flight rather than a withdrawal, with the result that much of the heavy artillery and
supplies remained in the city and fell into the hands of the Americans. After withdrawing
to Tula with 1,000 men and uniting with General Gabriel Valencia's assembled forces
from the Bajío, Parrodi proceeded to join Santa Anna at San Luis Potosí, where he
endured a cool reception from his chief and was arrested for incompetence at Tampico.
Reconciling himself to Santa Anna with the result that all charges leveled against him
were dismissed, Parrodi was assigned to the command of the 7th Infantry Brigade
(composed of the Activo Battalion of Puebla, the Fijo de México Regiment, and the
Guardacosta de Tampico Battalion) in General José María Ortega's 3rd Infantry
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Division. In that capacity, Parrodi led his command north and on February 23, 1847, was
engaged at the battle of La Angostura, where he led his brigade in Ortega's assault on the
American center late in the day. Returning with the army to San Luis Potosí, Parrodi
replaced Ortega in command of the 3rd Infantry Division when the latter resumed his
post as commandant-general of San Luis Potosí.
In that capacity, Parrodi languished for some months under the command of the newly
appointed general en jefe, General Gabriel Valencia, until the Army of the North was
summoned to aid Santa Anna's defense of the Valley of Mexico following the disaster at
Cerro Gordo. Due to his commander's dissatisfaction with Santa Anna's orders to take up
position at San Ángel, Parrodi accompanied the army to El Rancho de Padierna, where
his division was posted to the center of the Mexican line, holding the main fortified
position. During the battle of August 29th, Parrodi conducted himself admirably and was
wounded while encouraging his men, who sustained their position at considerable cost.
The following day at dawn, however, when the Americans fell upon the Mexican position
from both front and rear, Parrodi's division disintegrated into a panicked mass and in the
ensuing chaos, the badly wounded Parrodi fell into the hands of the enemy.
Paroled upon the resumption of peace in January 1848, Parrodi had recovered
sufficiently from his wound to accept an appointment on behalf of Arista's moderado
regime and head the commandancy-general of San Luis Potosí. Skeptical of Santa Anna's
return to power, Parrodi pronounced in favor of General Juan Álvarez's anti-santanista
Plan de Ayutla and was rewarded for his service with an appointment to the governorship
and commandancy-general of Jalisco on July 31, 1856. Serving in that post until
December, Parrodi opposed General Felix Zuloaga's reactionary Plan de Tacubaya and
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fought to uphold the liberal Constitution of 1857 in Jalisco. Promoted to the rank of
major general on February 9, 1857, Parrodi sided with the liberals during the ensuing
War of The Reform, but was defeated by conservative forces under General Luis G.
Osollo on March 10, 1858, at the battle of Salamanca, which resulted in the fall of
Guadalajara three days later, on March 13th.
Briefly elevated by the liberals to head the commandancy-general of the Federal
District in January 1862, Parrodi sided with the imperialists after the fall of Puebla in
May 1863 and endorsed the French Intervention. Rewarded by Maximilian with an
appointment to head the Inspectorate of Infantry, Parrodi was awarded the Order of
Guadalupe on April 10, 1865 and appointed commandant-general of San Luis Potosí.
Retiring shortly thereafter due to failing health, Parrodi died in Mexico City just before
the fall of Maximilian, at the age of 61, on January 9, 1867. Described by a contemporary
as “affable and good-natured, with a prominent Caribbean accent,” Parrodi was well
regarded for his bravery in combat, despite exhibiting a certain timidity when tasked with
higher level commands.132

PEÑA Y BARRAGÁN, Matías de la, General Graduado, was born to a wealthy
aristocratic family of Spanish origin in Mexico City in 1800. Amongst his close relatives
were two presidents of Mexico of the same surname, General Miguel Barragán and Lic.
Manuel de la Peña y Peña. After receiving his education in France, Peña y Barragán
returned to the capital and pursued a business career with his family while participating in
the civic militia of Mexico City. During the July 1840 federalist revolt of General José
Urrea, the arch-conservative Peña y Barragán defended the Bustamante regime in the
132
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capital and successfully held the National Palace, thereby gaining promotion from a
grateful Bustamante to the rank of general graduado on October 15th of the same year.
Thereafter, Peña y Barragán rendered distinguished service against the Yucatecan
separatist rebels and served briefly as commandant-general of Oaxaca upon the eve of
war with the United States.
Perceived as a potential threat to his forthcoming policy of appropriation, whereby
funding for the war would be secured at the expense of The Church via forced loans,
liberal vice-president Valentin Gómez Farías ordered Peña y Barragán and several
battalions of Mexico City militia to leave for Vercruz in February 1847, ostensibly to aid
in the port's defense against an impending American attack. Seen as a direct effort to
clear the capital of potential conservative opposition to his liberal policies, Peña y
Barragán refused to comply and revolted against the government on February 26th,
launching the so-called Polkos' Revolt. An indecisive power struggle continued in the
streets of Mexico City as Peña y Barragán's forces battled the loyalist troops of General
Valentín Canalizo until a cease-fire was arranged on March 23rd. Obliged to return to
Mexico City in the wake of the revolt, Santa Anna quickly appeased the dissidents by
rescinding the anti-clerical appropriation law and abolishing the office of vice-president,
thereby firing Gómez-Farias.
Reconciled to the government, Santa Anna assigned Peña y Barragán to command a
reserve infantry brigade in the defense of Mexico City. At the end of the cease-fire
following the battle of Churubusco, Peña y Barragán was assigned to command the
defenses of the Garita de San Cosme in conjunction with General Joaquín Rangel. After
the fall of Chapultepec on September 13th, Peña y Barragán conducted a defensive stand
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at San Cosme that prevented the entry of American troops into the capital for a few hours
until a lack of ammunition forced his withdrawal into the city. Following the war, Peña y
Barragán was appointed to head the commandancy-general of Veracruz, where he died of
cholera at the age of fifty, in Xalapa, on August 2, 1850.

PÉREZ, Francisco, General de Brigada, was born in Tulancingo, México in 1808. He
initiated his military career at the age of eighteen years as a cadet in the Activo Infantry
Battalion of Tulancingo and entered the regular army as a lieutenant in the elite
Cazadores Infantry Regiment in 1826. Ten years later, Pérez accompanied his regiment
north to Santa Anna’s aid in Texas, but arrived too late, meeting the remnants of the
defeated army at Matamoros in October 1836. Returning from the frontier in May 1837,
Pérez’s regiment was assigned to a special expeditionary force under the command of
General Juan Morales sent by the central government to put down a separatist rebellion in
the Yucatán. During his tenure of service in the tropical peninsula, Pérez distinguished
himself in the storming of a rebel fortress at San Miguel and was promoted to the rank of
colonel for bravery at the battle of Chiná in late 1841.
Recalled to the capital following the termination of hostilities in the Yucatán, Pérez
was promoted to the rank of general graduado in early 1846 and upon the outbreak of
war with the United States, was sent to aid in the fortification of Veracruz pending a
potential American landing. Just prior to Santa Anna’s return in July 1846, Pérez
supported the santanista segundo cabo of the Veracruz garrison, General José Juan de
Landero, in generating a pronouncement in Veracruz that secured a safe and welcome
landing for the returning caudillo. Recalled to aid in the reorganization of the Army of
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the North at San Luis Potosí in August 1846, Pérez was promoted by Santa Anna to the
rank of brigadier general and awarded command of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in General
Manuel María Lombardini’s 2nd Infantry Division, composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light
Infantry Battalions. At the battle of La Angostura on February 23, 1847, Pérez was thrust
into Lombardini’s place as division commander when the latter was severely wounded.
As commander, Pérez rendered distinguished service in overseeing the final effort against
the American left which contributed to the destruction of the isolated 1st Illinois Infantry
Regiment. Upon the army’s withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Pérez accompanied Santa
Anna in the defense of the Valley of Mexico and served on his staff while preparing the
defenses at Cerro Gordo.
Following the army’s disintegration at the battle of April 18, 1847, Pérez was assigned
to head a brigade in Lombardini’s Army of the East, which was composed of the 1 st, 3rd,
and 4th Light Infantry Battalions, along with the 11th Infantry Regiment of the Line. In
response to the American approach on the southern reaches of the capital, Pérez’s brigade
was assigned to garrison the defensive line at Churubusco and occupied a position
stretching along an embankment from the Churubusco bridgehead to the San Mateo
Convent. Hoping to support Valencia’s exposed Army of the North, Santa Anna shifted
Pérez’s command from Churubusco and placed his 3,500-man in a new defensive
position two miles east of San Ángel and ½ mile north of the village of San Gerónimo.
Ordered to remain strictly on the defensive, Pérez’s brigade failed to aid Valencia’s
beleaguered troops during the disastrous battle of August 20th and was forced to withdraw
to its original position at Churubusco, where Pérez valiantly contributed to its
unsuccessful defense before executing the orderly withdrawal of his troops to the safety
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of a hastily built up secondary defensive position below Chapultepec Castle. During the
subsequent battle of September 15th, Pérez’s dilapidated brigade, now composed of
barely 1,500 men of the 4th Light and 11th Line Infantry Battalions, contributed to the
defense of El Molino de Rey, holding the position at Casa Mata at considerable cost
before being forced to withdraw to the Greta de San Come by a lack of ammunition.
Upon the loss of the San Come Gate, Pérez was amongst the officers who counseled
Santa Anna to evacuate the capital and the following day, was assigned to second
Lombardi in command of the army assembled outside the capital at the Villa de
Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Immediately after the war, Pérez was assigned to head a special service commission
tasked with rebuilding the fortifications of Monterrey, and in 1850, was transferred to
command the garrison of his native Tulancingo. Enthusiastically endorsing Santa Anna’s
return, Pérez was rewarded for his fealty with an assignment as governor and
commandant-general of Puebla, where he remained until his chief’s demise in August
1855. Upon the liberal triumph, Pérez was perceived politically acceptable enough to be
retained in the army, securing an appointment on February 6, 1856, as senior justice of
the military court system. Aligning himself with the liberals thereafter, Pérez played a
minor role in the War of The Reform, but was appointed by the triumphant liberals to
head the governorship and commandancy-general of the Department of the Valley of
México. During the French Intervention, Pérez actively fought the imperialists and their
French allies and was appointed by Juárez to serve as commandant of the garrison at
Tulancingo, where he died suddenly, at the age of 56 years, in 1864.
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PINZÓN, Luis, General de Brigada, was born in Acapulco in 1792, reputedly the son of
a wealthy Spaniard and his mulatto mistress. He initiated his military career in 1810 at
the age 18, when he joined the ranks of the insurgent forces led by Morelos as a private
soldier. Following the demise of Morelos, Pinzón continued his adherence to the
insurgent cause and served as a junior officer in the forces of Galeana and Julián de
Ávila. In 1814, Pinzón joined the insurgent army of General Vicente Guerrero and rose to
the rank of colonel by 1821, when he followed his chief into the ranks of General Agustín
de Iturbide’s Ejército Trigarante. A close friend of Guerrero, Pinzón was described as
“one of his most loyal subordinates.”133
After supporting Santa Anna’s anti-monarchical Plan de Casa Mata in 1823, Pinzón
adhered to the federalist cause and in 1826, supported General Nicolás Bravo’s moderado
uprising against General Guadalupe Victoria’s presidency. Upon that uprising’s defeat,
Pinzón was exiled along with Bravo, from which he returned upon the granting of a
general amnesty by Santa Anna in 1829. In 1841, Pinzón pronounced against General
Anastasio Bustamante’s centralist regime in favor of Santa Anna’s Plan de Regeneración
and upon the latter’s ascension to power, Pinzón was promoted to the rank of brigadier
general on May 21, 1842. From 1844-1845, Pinzón served as commandant of the garrison
of Zacatula and was involved in moderado plots against the forces of General Juan
Álvarez.
Upon the outbreak of war with the United States, Pinzón was appointed commandant
of Puebla where he remained following Santa Anna’s takeover in July 1846. In the wake
of the American investment of Veracruz, Pinzón was ordered by Santa Anna to mobilize
his forces for the defense of Puebla and was subsequently incorporated as a brigade
133

Herrera Serna, México en Guerra, 1847-1848, p. 337.

155

commander into the Army of the East with which Santa Anna intended to halt Scott’s
invasion. During the battle of Cerro Gordo, Pinzón was entrusted with co-command of
the Mexican far right wing, which blocked the enemy’s advance along the National
Highway from a well entrenched position consisting of log and earthen works constructed
at the base of the highway at the top of a steep ravine beyond the southeast reaches of La
Atalaya about a half mile east of the main camp at the village of Cerro Gordo. During the
battle of April 18, 1846, Pinzón's 1,100 men and 23 artillery pieces successfully
maintained their position, but when the American forces flanked the Mexican left and
stormed the summit of El Telégrafo, threatening the Mexican route of escape, the
position’s viability was jeopardized and panic set in. When Pinzón’s co-commander,
General José María Jarero raised a white flag, Pinzón angrily rebuffed this premature
action and sought to rally the soldiery into prolonged resistance. Nonetheless, the rapidly
deteriorating situation obliged Pinzón to capitulate and he went into American captivity
along with Jarero and the survivors of their command. It is significant that although Santa
Anna admonished Jarero for his surrender of the right flank, Pinzón’s role was apparently
never questioned.
Following his realease upon the termination of hostilities, Pinzón retired from military
service and settled in his native Acapulco in the newly created state of Guerrero. Rallying
to Álvarez during the anti-santanista Revolution of Ayutla in 1853, Pinzón actively
opposed Santa Anna’s regime, but retired once again to private life following the toppling
of his old chief. Pinzón died at the age of 71, in the town of Cuadrilla de Corral Falso,
Guerrero on June 10, 1863. A valiant and dedicated patriot, Pinzón was described as “a
venerable old warrior who served his country faithfully in all of its wars and whose body
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was covered with the scars of wounds received during the war of independence.” 134 One
of Pinzón’s sons was the well-known juarista hero of the French Intervention, General
Eutimio Pinzón.

QUIJANO, Benito, General de Brigada, was born in Mérida, Yucatán, on December 24,
1800, the son of Lieutenant-Colonel Ignacio Quijano and Micaela Gutiérrez de Cosgaya.
He began his military career as a cadet in the royalist Activo Batallion of Merida, at the
age of twelve years, on December 25, 1812. After nearly ten years’ service in the royalist
army, Quijano adhered to the pro-independence Plan de Iguala and was integrated into
Iturbide's Ejército Trigarante in 1821. During the latter half of that year, Quijano served
under Santa Anna in the expulsion of the remaining royalist troops from Veracruz and
two years later, he pronounced in support of Santa Anna's anti-monarchist Plan de Casa
Mata. Thereafter, Quijano was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and served as
adjutant to the governor of Veracruz in 1823. Six years later, in 1829, Quijano again
served under Santa Anna in the defense of Veracruz against the Spanish and was
promoted to the rank of colonel for his services. During the political upheaval of the
1830s, Quijano enhanced his reputation with distinguished service in various antifederalist expeditions against Jalisco and Michoacán and served as commandant of the
garrisons at Tampico and Veracruz. In 1839, Quijano served under Santa Anna against
the French in the defense of Tampico and was awarded the Cross of Tampico for his
services.
In early 1840, Quijano defended Bustamante's regime against the forces of federalist
rebels generals José Urrea and José Antonio Mejía and commanded a brigade in the
134
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forces of General Gabriel Valencia at the battle of Acajete. Then in the Fall of 1840,
Quijano joined his commander, Valencia, and pronounced against Bustamante in support
of the Santa Anna/Paredes coup and was rewarded with promotion to the rank of
brigadier general in July of that year. Initially assigned to head the commandancy-general
of Tamaulipas in 1840, Quijano was later appointed commandant-general of Veracruz in
1843 by Santa Anna, where he remained until being transferred to a position on the
Supreme War Council in Mexico City on April 21, 1844.
Thereafter, he remained at the disposal of the Supreme War Council for a time even
upon the outbreak of war with the United States, until Santa Anna's return to power,
when he was assigned to Santa Anna's staff. In August 1847, Quijano was given
command of a cavalry brigade in the Army of The East, made up of the "Húsares de
Mexico" Battalion and the Activo Cavalry Battalion of Veracruz. Following the disaster
at Padierna, the remnants of the cavalry from Valencia's destroyed Army of The North
were integrated under Quijano's command. During the battle of Churubusco, Quijano's
brigade was posted to cover the Mexican far right in the vicinity of the Hacienda de
Portales. When the Americans succeeded in turning that position, Quijano's brigade
launched a counterattack against the American left in order to alleviate pressure on the
entrenched infantry. The attack was mounted over difficult ground however, and the
Americans repulsed Quijano's gesture with ease, sending the Mexican cavalrymen reeling
back in utter disorder. Following the battle, Quijano was selected to serve as a
commissioner along with General Ignacio Mora y Villamil in arranging terms for a
temporary cease fire with the Americans, ratified on August 23rd, which served to give
Santa Anna some time in preparing the forthcoming defense of the capital. During the
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battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec, Quijano commanded a brigade of cavalry and
following the army's evacuation of the capital, was appointed segundo cabo to General
Juan Álvarez in command of the cavalry that remained in the army assembled at the Villa
de Guadalupe Hidalgo.
After the war, Quijano served as commandant-general of the Department of México,
from 1847-1849. Three years later, in 1851, he was appointed once again to serve on the
General Staff and later served as interim chief of that organization in 1854. A committed
liberal following the war, Quijano opposed Santa Anna in 1855 and became a diputado
representing his home state of Yucatán in the liberal congress of Benito Juárez’s
presidency. In February 1858, Quijano opposed General Felix Zuloaga's Plan de
Tacubaya and pronounced for the liberal constitution of 1857, which he had signed
previously during Juárez's presidency. Committed to the liberal cause, Quijano supported
Juárez in the War of The Reform and took the field against the conservative forces of
General Miguel Miramón, commanding a cavalry brigade at the battle of Calpulalpan in
1860. A close friend of Juárez, Quijano was appointed governor of Yucatán in 1863 and
assigned to mobilize the forces of his state to battle the imperialists. Discouraged by the
fall of Puebla in May of 1863, Quijano fled to New York City, where he helped found El
Club Mexicano as a rallying point for exiled Mexican liberals. While serving as the club's
first president, Quijano died in New York, at the age of 64, on May 25, 1865. He was
survived by his wife, Dolores Pérez Palacios, with whom he had several children.

RAMÍREZ, Simeón, General Graduado, was born in the village of Texcoco, México in
1803. He initiated his military career at the age of thirteen, as a cadet in the Permanente
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Auxiliary Militia Battalion of Texcoco and was shortly thereafter promoted to the rank of
lieutenant. After extensive service against the insurgents which included participation in
the defense of Actopan, the battle of Arenal, and the storming and razing of the major
rebel base camp at Cerro de Rinconada, Ramírez adhered to the independence movement
and was integrated into Iturbide’s Ejército del Trigarante in 1821. After service under the
command of General Vicente Filisola against the separatists in Guatemala in 1822,
Ramírez adhered to Santa Anna’s anti-monarchical Plan de Casa Mata and participated
in the expulsion of the remaining royalist troops from the Fortress of San Juan de Ulúa.
After defending Veracruz’s coastline against Spanish privateers, 1827-1828, Ramírez
supported the Santa Anna/Paredes coup against General Anastasio Bustamante’s
centralist regime in 1832 and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel upon Santa
Anna’s ascension to the presidency. In 1834, Ramírez opposed a federalist rebellion in
central Mexico and served in the forces of General Arista at the siege and storming of
Morelia.
The following year, Ramírez served under Santa Anna against the federalist rebels of
Zacatecas and took part in the investment of the city in May 1835, whereby local
Zacatecan military power was decidedly broken and a blossoming separatist movement
brought under control. In reward for his services, Ramírez was promoted by Santa Anna
to the rank of coronel graduado, but following his chief’s downfall the following year, he
defended Bustamante’s regime against a federalist rebellion in the Bajío, taking part in
the battle of Hacienda de San Ysidro under the command of General Mariano Paredes y
Arrillaga. In 1841, Ramírez pronounced in favor of Santa Anna’s Plan de Regeneración
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and was promoted to the rank of coronel efectivo upon the caudillo’s renewed ascension
to the presidency.
Dissatisfied with the war stance of General José Joaquín de Herrera’s moderado
administration, Ramírez rallied to Paredes’ centralist coup of 1845 and was promoted to
the rank of general graduado in appreciation of his fealty. Following the Mexican defeats
at Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero, Ramírez was sent north from the capital at the head
of an infantry brigade composed of the 2nd and 3rd Light Infantry Regiments and the
Activo Battalion of Aguascalientes. Upon joining the Army of the North at Monterrey in
mid-1846, Ramírez was appointed commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade and assigned to
oversee the fortification of the city’s defenses in the face of an imminent American
investment of the city. Serving in the defense of the works at Cerro del Obispado,
Ramírez assisted the army’s withdrawal to San Luis Potosí following the city’s
capitulation and embraced Santa Anna’s return from exile, serving at the battle of La
Angostura as a staff officer.
Remaining at Santa Anna’s side following the army’s retreat to San Luis Potosí,
Ramírez subsequently rendered solid service at the battle of Cerro Gordo as a staff officer
before returning to the field and being assigned to command an infantry brigade in the
defense of the capital. During the battle of September 8th, Ramírez’s brigade was
assigned to occupy a defensive position behind a dry irrigation ditch linking the Casa
Mata and El Molino del Rey. Discouraged by his troops’ lack of ammunition and poor
morale, Ramírez rendered a poor performance in the battle. Despite his troops’ dogged
and determined defense of their position, when ammunition began to run low, Ramírez
unexpectedly “took flight” and abandoned his post without warning, thereby precipitating
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a panic amongst his troops which resulted in a general retreat that left the remaining
troops at Casa Mata utterly exposed. Evading punishment for his actions, Ramírez was
assigned to the command of an ad-hoc brigade, composed of the 1st and 12th Infantry
Regiments of the Line, the 2nd Light Infantry Regiment, and the “Fijo de México”
Infantry Battalion. Positioned to guard the Garita de Belén in a secondary defensive role,
Ramírez failed to support General Andrés Terrés y Masaguér’s troops in the defense of
the gate during the battle of September 18th and again unexpectedly retired without
authorization without rejoining the army or assisting in its evacuation from the capital
that night.
Employed by the moderados in minor administrative posts, Ramírez enthusiastically
supported Santa Anna’s return in 1853 and was promoted to the rank of brigadier general
during his last days in power, on January 2, 1855. Opposing the anti-santanista
Revolution of Ayutla in 1855, Ramírez supported the conservative cause during the
subsequent War of The Reform, dying at the village of San Juan del Río, Querétaro just
before the liberal triumph, at the age of 57, on February 9, 1860. He was survived by his
wife, María Antonia Benigna Padilla, with whom he had two surviving children.

RANGEL, Joaquín, General de Brigada, was born in Mexico City in 1803. He initiated
his military career at the age of twenty in 1823, as a cadet in the Permanente Artillery
Brigade. Rising to the rank of captain in 1826, Rangel served as director of the Santa Fe
munitions manufacturing plant from June 1830-November 1832, but retired from active
service with the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1833 due to his dissatisfaction with the
central government at having been retained in administrative rather than combat
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positions. Nearly ten years later, Rangel rallied to Santa Anna’s pro-federalist Plan de
Regeneración and actively participated in the ouster of General Anastasio Bustamante’s
centralist regime. Elevated by Santa Anna to the rank of colonel, Rangel was appointed to
head the construction of fortifications in Tacubaya and then supervised the survey and
construction of a road between the village of San Ángel and the causeway of Niño
Perdido. In 1844, Rangel was appointed by Santa Anna to assist in the construction of the
great Monumento de la Independencia in the capital and upon that project’s successful
termination, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and appointed commanderin-chief of artillery. After defending Santa Anna’s regime against the federalist rebellion
of late 1844, on June 7, 1845 he initiated an unsuccessful pro-santanista, puro federalistbacked pronunciamento against the moderado government of General José Joaquín de
Herrera. Regarded as a politically unreliable and potentially dangerous santanista, Rangel
was arrested and subsequently dismissed from service upon his capture by government
forces in June 1845.
Briefly imprisoned and exiled to the village of Huichapan for nearly two years, Rangel
languished in obscurity until August 1846, when he pronounced in Tula in favor of Santa
Anna and the restoration of the Constitution of 1824. Rushing to meet his chief’s landing
party at Veracruz, Rangel was well received by Santa Anna and appointed to reorganize
the elite “Supremos Poderes” Grenadier Battalion that became Santa Anna’s personal
escort. Appointed interim commander-in-chief of artillery, Rangel spent the early days of
Santa Anna’s presidency overseeing the improvement of roads in the capital and the
mobilization of the city’s National Guard units. In September 1846, Rangel marched
north of his own accord to the aid of Tampico, but returned to Mexico City upon the
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port’s fall in October. Appointed by Santa Anna to command the capital’s powerful
Ciudadela garrison, Rangel was courted by interim president Valentín Gómez Farías to
help maintain the federalist regime, but upon the outbreak of the reactionary Polkos’
Revolt in February, Rangel suddenly switched sides and aided in the demise of the puro
federalists.
Upon the conflict’s resolution by Santa Anna, Rangel was appointed to command an
infantry brigade, composed of the “Supremos Poderes” Grenadier Battalion, the “Mixto
de Santa Anna” Infantry Battalion, the San Blas National Guard Battalion, and the Activo
Battalions of Matamoros and Morelia, in General Manuel María Lombardini’s Army of
the East. Held in reserve during the battle of Cerro Gordo, Rangel rallied to Santa Anna’s
side in August 1847 and promulgated a defense measure for a sector of the capital’s
southern front which was approved by Santa Anna, whereby Rangel was authorized to
organize a force with which to aid in the defense of the capital. Designated commander of
the 3rd Infantry Brigade in the army defending the southern approaches to the capital,
Rangel’s troops occupied a reserve position in support of the fortified line at Churubusco.
In this capacity, Rangel took part in the battle of August 20th and greatly distinguished
himself in the defense of the San Mateo Convent. Thereafter, Rangel and his brigade
were assigned to occupy an old powder mill on the north end of a defensive line
established between El Molino del Rey and Casa Mata.
During the battle of September 7th, Rangel furthered his reputation as a commander by
directing the tenacious defense of the mill against repeated American infantry assaults
and cannonades. Even upon the American rupture of the center position, which severed
communications with the defenders of Casa Mata, Rangel continued to fight tooth and
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nail against the Americans until a dwindling ammunition supply forced him to execute an
orderly withdrawal towards Chapultepec Castle. Subsequently, in preparation for an
impending American attack on Chapultepec, Santa Anna placed Rangel’s brigade in a
courtyard behind a walled park at the base of the castle’s heights. Defending their
position to the last, Rangel’s brigade was decimated during the battle of September 15th,
with one battalion, the gallant San Blas, losing its commander and suffering near
annihilation. Retiring in the face of the untiring American onslaught, Santa Anna shifted
the remains of Rangel’s brigade to the defense of the Garita de San Cósme, where he left
Rangel in command with General Matías de la Peña y Barragán acting as segundo cabo.
Here, Rangel distinguished himself once more, “fighting like a lion” against the
American advance down the Belén causeway.135 Forced to relinquish his initial position,
Rangel rallied his command at Santo Tomás and with the aid of disparate forces under
the command of General Anastasio Torrejón, launched a determined counterattack that
succeeded in momentarily halting the American assault. Forced to withdraw to the
ramparts of the main gate, Rangel succeeded in rallying a few elements of his fleeing
command and organized a desperate defense in conjunction with General Peña y
Barragán. While courageously exposed to the enemy’s fire, Rangel was struck down and
carried from the field bleeding profusely from a severe leg wound. Thereafter, when a
dwindling ammunition supply finally forced his troops to withdraw, the incapacitated
Rangel was carried along and he subsequently accompanied the army’s late-night
evacuation of the capital.
Upon Santa Anna’s abdication, Rangel was arrested by the newly empowered
moderado authorities and imprisoned for two months before being stripped of rank and
135
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dismissed from the army. From 1852-1853, Rangel served as a deputy to the National
Congress from the Federal District and upon Santa Anna’s return to power, was restored
to rank and named honorary commander of the prestigious Corporación de Mutilados.
Following the Revolution of Ayutla, Rangel was appointed by liberal President Ignacio
Comonfort to command the “Libertad” National Guard Battalion of the Federal District
and assigned to supervise the fortification of the capital in opposition to General Felix
Zuloaga’s reactionary rebellion. Assigned to an administrative post in the Artillery
Inspectorate in 1856, Rangel retired from the army soon thereafter and did not play an
active role in the War of the Reform or the French Intervention. After seventeen years in
retirement, Rangel died of a fever, surrounded by his family, near the capital in the
Cacahuatl de San Pablo, at the age of 71, in 1874. Described by one source as “tall and
light complected, with a prominent forehead, long nose, gray eyes, and blonde
moustache,”136 Rangel was described by another as “energetic, limber, and prone to
fighting like a lion in battle.”137

REQUENA, Tomás, General de Brigada, was born in Campeche, Yucatán, in 1799.
After integration into Iturbide's Ejército del Trigarante and his subsequent adherence to
Santa Anna's Plan de Casa Mata, Requena specialized in the artillery and rose to the rank
of lieutenant-colonel by 1829. During the separatist disturbances of 1830, Requena
defended Bustamante's regime against the federalists and served in his native Yucatán as
chief of artillery in the punitive expedition of General Miguel Barragán. In February
1830, following the successful execution of the campaign, Requena was appointed
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membership in the peace commission that secured a favorable treaty with rebel leader, D.
Manuel Carabajal. Two years later, in 1832, Requena supported the Paredes/Santa Anna
coup against Bustamante and was rewarded for his services with promotion to the rank of
colonel.
A moderate federalist with firm liberal convictions, Requena briefly served as chief of
artillery during the campaign against Texas in 1836 until replaced by Colonel Pedro de
Ampudia, whom Santa Anna considered more politically reliable. In the wake of Santa
Anna's debacle at San Jacinto, Requena served as a delegate from his native Yucatán in
the constitutional convention promulgated by President José Justo Corro that ratified the
Siete Leyes Constitucionales, which strengthened the federalist Constitution of 1824. In
1839, Requena again rendered service against the separatists in Yucatán and at the head
of a small punitive force, defeated the rebel troops of indigenous leader, Iman, at the
battle of Tizimín, for which he was promoted to the rank of general graduado on May
19, 1840 and appointed commandant-general of Tabasco.
At the outbreak of the war with the United States, Requena was promoted to the rank
of brigadier general and appointed chief of artillery to the Army of the North. At the
battle of Palo Alto, on May 8, 1846, Requena's deficient artillery serviced by
insufficiently trained gunners dueled hopelessly with the American batteries and was
severely outgunned, the Americans having fired 3,000 shots as compared to a bare 653
shots fired by the Mexicans.138 On the next day, at the battle of Resaca del Guerrero,
Requena's artillery was silenced by an American cavalry charge that withered the
Mexican right flank and forced the collapse of the entire army. Thereafter, during
General Francisco Mejía's illness, Requena briefly commanded the decimated Army of
138
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the North and directed its withdrawal to Monterrey from Linares, beginning on July 9 th.
Superseded in command by Ampudia, Requena continued to serve as segundo cabo and
chief of artillery in the army and with General Mejía. He was amongst those who
counseled Ampudia to defend Monterrey at all costs in opposition to Santa Anna's orders
to abandon the city as indefensible. In anticipation of the American attack, Requena ably
supervised the fortification of the positions at Purísima Bridge and La Tenería and
skillfully directed the artillery during the battle itself, utilizing the skills of the
experienced gunners serving in the San Patricio Battalion to bolster his own under-trained
and demoralized crews. Upon the loss of key positions at Teneria, Independence Hill, and
the Bishop's Palace on September 24th, Requena was appointed by Ampudia to serve on
the peace commission that negotiated terms of capitulation with the Americans.
Apparently, the negotiations proved fruitful, as the Mexican army fetched generous peace
terms and was allowed to march out of the city intact and under arms.
After assisting the army's withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Requena helped found the
anti-santanista Red Comet Society in protest over Santa Anna's appointment to overall
command in October. It seems that Requena began to cause such a stir amongst the
officer corps, that Santa Anna promptly dismissed him from the army and replaced him
with a more politically reliable subordinate. Thereafter, Requena remained unemployed
and did not serve again during the war with the United States. Following the armistice, he
was appointed by the new government to head the commandancy-general of
Aguascalientes in November 1848 and then transferred as commandant-general to
Jalisco, where he died suddenly in Guadalajara, at the age of 51, on October 31, 1850.
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RINCÓN, Manuel, General de División, was born in Perote, Veracruz on July 30, 1784,
the son of peninsulares José Miguel Rincón and Micaela Calcáneo. He initiated his
military career by joining the insurgent forces in 1809 and served thereafter against the
realistas in central Mexico until October 29, 1821, when he pronounced in favor of
Iturbide's pro-independence Plan de Iguala and was incorporated into the royal Ejército
del Trigarante as a colonel of infantry. During Iturbide's monarchy, Rincón was
appointed to head the inspectorate of militia in Veracruz and commissioned with the
purchase of vessels for the fledgling Mexican navy. After organizing the 9th Infantry
Regiment of the Line and being appointed its colonel, Rincón pronounced in favor of
Santa Anna's anti-monarchical Plan de Casa Mata and was rewarded by the emergent
federal government with promotion to the rank of brigadier general, on December 23,
1823. During General Guadalupe Victoria's presidency, Rincón occupied positions of
increasing responsibility and served consecutive terms as secretary of war and president
of the Supreme Military Tribunal. In 1829, Rincón pronounced in favor of General
Vicente Guerrero's Plan de Perote and endorsed his presidency in opposition to the
centralist forces of General Manuel Gómez Pedraza.
That same year, Rincón served under Santa Anna against the Spanish at Tampico and
was subsequently promoted to the rank of major general in 1837. Almost two years later,
in November 1838, Rincón was serving as governor and commandant-general of
Veracruz when he was confronted with the French invasion led by Admiral Charles
Baudin. Advised by Santa Anna to surrender the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa and seek
favorable terms with the invaders, Rincón capitulated to Baudin's forces on November
28th and allowed them free use of the harbor in exchange for the city's neutrality.
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Enraged with Rincón's passivity, the federal government replaced him with Santa Anna
and ordered him to return to the capital to face a court-martial for his conduct. Although
subsequently absolved of guilt and restored to rank, the 55 year-old Rincón retired from
active service and was relegated to membership in the Cuerpo de Inválidos. Recalled by
Santa Anna to head the commandancy-general of México in 1843, Rincón spent the rest
of the 1840s acting as deputy from Cuernavaca in the National Legislative Assembly.
In retirement upon the outbreak of war with the United States, the 63 year-old Rincón
rallied to the national banner of his own accord and tendered his services to Santa Anna,
who appointed the old veteran segundo cabo to General Manuel María Lombardini in
command of the reserve Army of the East defending the Valley of Mexico in early March
1847. Disgusted with the puro federalist policies enacted by vice-president Gómez
Farías, Rincón resigned from the service in late March, but was reinstated by Santa Anna
in August and appointed to command the vital defenses at Churubusco in anticipation of
an American strike against the southern approaches to the capital. In this capacity,
Rincón rendered distinguished services during the desperate battle of August 20, 1847,
during which his garrison held the San Mateo Convent and nearby bridge for most of the
day until a lack of ammunition forced their withdrawal. Wishing to conserve his stock in
the hopes that Santa Anna would send him a replenishment from some other point on the
battlefield, Rincón devised the deceptive measure of allowing the attacking American
troops to get as close as possible to the Mexican position before the latter opened fire. In
practice, the strategy proved quite successful and the withering fire unleashed by the
Mexican troops forced their attackers' initial withdrawal and delayed their investment of
the position for most of the day. As his soldiers' ammunition eventually ran out at around
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4 P.M., Rincón ordered a general retreat and escaped with a body of troops into Mexico
City, where he rejoined Santa Anna.
Remaining with the army even after its evacuation from Mexico City to the Villa de
Guadalupe Hidalgo on September 15th, Rincón subsequently left the service in January
1848 due to a severe illness and retired to his estates in Cuernavaca, where he died
shortly thereafter at the age of 65, on September 24, 1849. He was survived by his wife,
Josefa Calderón, with whom he had several children. A professional military man with a
minimum interest in politics, Rincón was described by one source as "a gallant old
Spaniard." A moderate federalist, it is interesting to note that even though Rincón
resigned from the army in protest over Gómez Farías' attacks against the Church in
March 1847, he refused to support the reactionary Polkos' Revolt, which fostered disunity
amongst his countrymen in the face of a foreign invader.

SALAS, José Mariano, General de Brigada, was born in Mexico City on May 11, 1797.
At the age of sixteen years he entered military service as a cadet in the Royalist Infantry
Regiment of Puebla on November 6, 1813. After serving against the insurgents for nearly
eight years, Salas pronounced for the independence movement in 1821 and adhered to the
Plan de Iguala, being integrated into Iturbide's Ejército del Trigarante with the rank of
captain. The following year, Salas served under Santa Anna in the ouster of the remaining
Spanish troops from the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa. Four years later, in 1826, at the
head of the 10th Line Infantry Battalion, Salas adhered to General Vicente Guerrero's
Plan de Montaño and with Santa Anna, defended the federalist presidency of General
Guadalupe Victoria against the moderado rebels under General Nicolás Bravo. In 1829,
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Salas served again under Santa Anna against the Spanish in the defense of Tampico and
was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in reward for his services. After
supporting Santa Anna's 1831 rebellion against General Anastasio Bustamante’s
centralist regime, Salas served as an aide in the War Ministry before being attached to the
commandancy-general of México in 1834.
After subsequent promotion to the rank of colonel, Salas was attached to the
commandany-generals of Guanajuato and Jalisco until recalled by Santa Anna to take
command of the Permanente “Jiménez” Battalion in the Army of the North for the
upcoming Texas Campaign of 1836. In this capacity, Salas seconded an assault column
against the eastern wall of The Alamo and under the command of General José Urrea,
rendered distinguished service against the Texian rebels at the battles of Goliad and
Coleto. After the disaster at San Jacinto, Salas was assigned command of the reserve and
covered the army's withdrawal to Matamoros. Despite the failure of the Mexican forces
in Texas, Salas was nonetheless promoted to the rank of brigadier general for his
services, with patent from March 19, 1836.
During the federalist revolt of 1839, Salas successfully defended the centralist regime
of Bustamante against the rebels of General José Antonio Mejía and fought at the battle
of San Miguel La Blanca, where he was carried from the field covered with seven
bayonet wounds and a fractured rib. During the subsequent July 1840 revolt of his former
chief, General José Urrea, Salas returned to the centralist standard and defended the
National Palace. Subsequently, Salas supported Santa Anna's coup against Bustamante
and was rewarded with the commandancy-general of México. Following Santa Anna's
downfall in 1844, Salas was dismissed from the service by the moderates, but was
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ultimately recalled by President José Joaquín de Herrera to head the commandancygeneral of México once more. In reward for supporting his January 1846 coup against
Herrera, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga assigned Salas command of the Ciudadela,
where he remained following the outbreak of war with the United States.
Dissatisfied with both the conduct of the war and the monarchist aspirations of the
Paredes regime, Salas involved himself in an intricate liberal/santanista plot to restore
Santa Anna to power. Having hesitatingly aligned himself with the fiery liberal, Lic.
Valentín Gómez Farías, Salas revolted against Paredes' when the latter left the capital to
take command of the army and elevated himself to power with the backing of the
powerful Mexico City garrison, on August 5, 1846. As acting chief executive, Salas
proclaimed the unity of the Mexican federation and opposition to the United States,
restored freedom of the press, called for new congressional elections, and declared the
federalist Constitution of 1824 in effect. After subsequent elections elevated Santa Anna
to the presidency and Gómez-Farías to the vice-presidency, Salas denounced the
executive office on December 23rd and returned to command of the Ciudadela. An
enemy of the puro federalists, perhaps it is worth noting that the conservative Salas
initially refused to hand off power to Gómez Farías, whom he mistrusted, and later
supported the Polkos’ Revolt against him, throwing the weight of his troops behind the
rebels whose intervention brought an end to the aspirations of the puro federalists in
March 1847. It appears that Salas' complicated political gestures during this chaotic
period reflect the actions of a moderate conservative santanista, who was willing to
accept the puro federalists if they helped restore Santa Anna to power, but thereafter
strongly opposed to them.
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Somewhat unsettled by his potential unreliability, Santa Anna assigned Salas to the
unenviable task of mobilizing guerrilla forces to harass Scott's advance from Veracruz
until transferring him to second General Gabriel Valencia in command of the Army of the
North. After the disaster at Cerro Gordo, Salas assisted the Army of the North's march
from San Luis Potosí to aid in the defense of the Valley of Mexico and supported
Valencia's selection of a suitable defensive position for the army at El Rancho de
Padierna. During the battle of August 20, 1847, Salas commanded the 3rd (Reserve)
Division, composed of General Santiago Blanco's 4th Infantry Brigade and General
Anastasio Torrejón's 3rd Cavalry Brigade, behind the primary position at Padierna at the
western base of La Loma del Pelón. When the American attack swept the Mexican forces
from their positions and precipitated a rout along the Camino de Anzalde by way of the
village of San Gerónimo, Salas attempted to rally the panicked troops, sword in hand, and
led a counterattack with a small group of cavalry, but was ultimately repulsed and
captured by U.S. troops along with 824 of his men. Following the armistice, Salas was
paroled and assigned to head the commandancy-general of the new seat of government at
Querétaro.
Thereafter, Salas played a conspicuous role in Santa Anna's return to power in 1853
and was rewarded for his efforts with promotion to the rank of major general. Remaining
in command of the guarnición at Mexico City during most of Santa Anna's final
presidential term, Salas adhered to the conservative side during the War of the Reform
and briefly occupied the presidency once more on behalf of General Miguel Miramón,
January 21-February 2, 1859. Following the conservative defeat in 1860, Salas
cooperated with the monarchists and on July 18, 1863, was appointed to serve on a three-
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member provisional regency established by the French to manage the government in lieu
of Maximilian's ascension to the throne. Thereafter, Salas retired from public life and
died at La Villa de Guadalupe Hidalgo, at the age of seventy, on December 24, 1867. He
was survived by his wife, Josefa Cardeña, with whom he had several children.

TERRÉS y Masaguér, Andrés, General de Brigada, was born in Barcelona, Spain in
1777. He entered the Royal Artillery as a cadet at the age of thirteen years, on December
13, 1790, and served in the Marquis de La Romana's expeditionary force in Germany.
After repatriation to Spain with the bulk of La Romana's force, Terrés was integrated into
General Joaquín Blake's Army of Galicia, which was destroyed by Napoleon on
November 10, 1809, at the battle of Espinosa, where Terrés was among the captured.
Upon his subsequent parole, Terrés continued service against the French in the Army of
Asturias until the close of the Peninsular War in 1814. Thereafter, Terrés was transferred
to service in Cuba and then went to Mexico in the service of the realistas, under whom he
rose by 1821 to the rank of lieutenant-colonel of the Provincial Infantry Regiment of
Guadalajara. After brief service in Iturbide's Ejército del Trigarante, Terrés supported
Santa Anna's Plan de Casa Mata and thereafter consistently supported either the
santanista or conservative cause during the tumultuous 1820s and 30s. In reward for his
support in the ouster of General Anastasio Bustamante's centralist regime in 1841, Santa
Anna promoted Terrés to the rank of colonel on April 12, 1842 and assigned him
command of the 2nd Line Infantry Regiment in the garrison of Mexico City.
Upon the outbreak of war with the United States, Terrés was sent north at the head of
his regiment as a part of General Pedro de Ampudia's supplementary force sent from the
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capital to reinforce General Francisco Mejía's troops facing the Americans at Matamoros.
By May 1846, Terrés was summoned back to Mexico City, where he remained inactive
for a time at the disposal of the Supreme War Council. Upon Santa Anna's return from
exile, Terrés organized a force of 1,200 men, complete with a corresponding artillery
train, and marched to his aid at San Luis Potosí, where he was well received by the
commander-in-chief in November of 1846 and placed in command of the 6th Infantry
Brigade, composed of the "Fieles de Santa Anna" Infantry Battalion and the Activo
Battalions of Aguascalientes, Guadalajara, and Querétaro, in General José María Ortega's
3rd Infantry Division. In this capacity, Terrés rendered solid service at the head of his
brigade at the battle of La Angostura, where his command saw action during the latter
part of the battle despite being held in reserve for most of the day. Apparently, Terrés was
promoted by Santa Anna to the rank of brigadier general in recognition of his service
upon the very battlefield on February 23, 1847.
Upon the army's subsequent retreat to San Luis Potosí, Terrés' command returned with
Santa Anna to the capital, where he was assigned to garrison duty once more. After the
liquidation of Santa Anna's army at Cerro Gordo, Terrés was given command of an 800man brigade, composed of the 2nd Light Infantry Regiment and the Activo Battalion of
Mexico City, in General Manuel María Lombardini's reorganized Army of The East
defending the Valley of Mexico in July 1847. Although, he did not initially see action
during the battles for Mexico City, in the wake of the army's disintegration via the
disasters of September 13th at El Molino del Rey and Chapultepec, Santa Ana placed him
in command of a makeshift force of 200 troops and three artillery pieces guarding the
Garita de Belén with instructions to hold the gate at all costs, should the Americans
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attempt to access the capital from that direction. In addition to Terrés' force, Santa Anna
left several small infantry detachments in nearby support, should the American assault
materialize more rapidly than expected and he be unable to arrive with reinforcements in
time from the Garita de San Cósme, where he expected the main attack to occur. At
around one in the afternoon, when the Americans came roaring down the Belén causeway
in force and bore down heavily upon the troops defending the garita, Terrés came to find
that the detachments left by Santa Anna in his support had dissipated and abandoned the
field. Suspecting treachery, Terrés abandoned his position and ordered his troops to seek
refuge in the heavily fortified Ciudadela about 100 yards to the north. In the meantime,
upon hearing the guns thundering at the Belén Gate, Santa Anna rushed from the Garita
de San Cosme to halt the American onslaught with a handful of troops and came upon a
sight that he was loath to believe; the Americans had already breached the entrance and
were flooding past. Demanding to know where Terrés was and why he had not been
notified of the American attack, he was met by several junior officers of Terrés'
command who had marched to the sound of the guns from nearby positions, claiming that
they had been initially ordered to withdraw by Terrés himself. Infuriated, Santa Anna
sought out Terrés and came upon the disconcerted general in the Ciudadela, taking refuge
in a doorway behind the line of fire. At this sight, Santa Anna became white with rage
and leapt upon the hapless general, tearing the epaulets from his uniform and striking him
across the face with his riding crop.139
Stripped of his rank and placed under arrest, Terrés was in the process of being
removed from the field when he fell into the hands of the Americans. After his
subsequent parole, Terrés was formally absolved of guilt for his actions of September 13,
139
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1847 by a military tribunal and rehabilitated. He was serving as a magistrate on the
Supreme Military Tribunal when he died in Mexico City at the age of 72, on February 12,
1850. During Santa Anna's subsequent return to power, Terrés' rank was formally
restored and a pension granted to his surviving widow and daughters.

TORREJÓN, Anastasio, General de Brigada, was born in Llanos de Apan, in the
present-day state of Hidalgo, in 1802. He initiated his military career at the age of
fourteen, as a cadet in the royalist “Realistas de Apan” Cavalry Regiment, on July 29,
1816. After promotion to the rank of lieutenant, Torrejón saw extensive service against
the insurgents and was involved in twelve actions and two sieges before being promoted
to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and pronouncing for independence in support of
Iturbide's Plan de Iguala in 1821. Two years later, Torrejón pronounced in support of
Santa Anna's Plan de Casa Mata and fought against the royalist forces at the head of the
3rd Cavalry Regiment at the battle of San Lázaro, where he gallantly led the charge that
broke the royalist forces and expelled them from the town. After demonstrating
considerable prowess on behalf of the conservatives throughout the 1830s, in July 1840,
Torrejón supported the centralist regime of General Anastasio Bustamante against the
federalist rebels led by General José Urrea, but subsequently turned against Bustamante
and supported Santa Anna's coup of September, for which he was rewarded with
promotion to the rank of brigadier general on December 1, 1841. Four years later,
Torrejón pronounced in favor of General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's arch-conservative
agenda and helped oust the moderado regime of General José Joaquín de Herrera.
Thereafter, in light of imminent hostilities with the United States, Torrejón marched
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north at the head of a cavalry brigade and incorporated himself into General Francisco
Mejía's forces at Matamoros, facing the American buildup across the Río Grande.
Ordered to secure a crossing for the Army of the North across the river below Matamoros
and cut Taylor from his base at Point Isabel with the intention of forcing battle on ground
of his own choosing, Torrejón and his 1,600-man cavalry detachment precipitated the
skirmish at El Brazito on April 25, 1846, whereupon war was declared by the United
States based upon the presumption that "American blood has been shed on American
soil." Thereafter, Torrejón's cavalry covered Arista's crossing and was engaged at the
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca del Guerrero. At the former, Arista held Torrejón largely
responsible for the army's defeat for botching a charge against the American position that
Arista hoped would scatter their artillery. Because he disagreed with the army's
disposition and believed the ground to be unsuitable for a massed cavalry assault,
Torrejón unenthusiastically committed his troopers piece-meal and their attack was easily
repulsed by the famous American "flying artillery." Designated commander-in-chief of
cavalry in the Army of the North upon the army's withdrawal to Monterrey, Torrejón was
tasked with harassing and inflicting attrition on the American advance with his
dilapidated brigade, composed of barely 280 men of the "México" Light Cavalry
Regiment and the 1st, 7th, and 8th Cavalry Regiments of the Line. Discouraged by the
low number of troops available and a lack of supporting light artillery, Torrejón
abandoned his position at the town of Marín upon first sight of the Americans and
withdrew into Monterrey proper on September 18, 1846.
After assisting in the defense of city, Torrejón's command was integrated into the
reformed Army of the North at San Luis Potosí and Torrejón was appointed by Santa
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Anna to command the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, composed of the 3rd, 7th, and 8th Cavalry
Regiments of the Line and the Activo Cavalry Battalion of Guanajuato. In this capacity,
Torrejón rendered solid service at the battle of La Angostura, on February 23, 1847,
where he was credited with conducting the assault which succeeded in turning the U.S.
left, whereby his command and that of General Pedro Ampudia gained the American rear
in strength until halted by the superior firepower of Taylor's repositioned batteries.
Following the army's withdrawal to San Luis Potosí, Torrejón remained with the Army of
the North and was appointed overall cavalry commander.
Coming under the command of General Gabriel Valencia, Torrejón marched with the
army to Santa Anna's aid in the defense of the Valley of Mexico in July 1847. At the
subsequent battle of Padierna where the Army of the North was utterly destroyed,
Torrejón escaped the battlefield by rough paths and managed to reach the village of San
Gerónimo and the safety of the Mexican lines at Churubusco. In view of his flight from
the battle, Torrejón was accused by his superior, General José Mariano Salas, of
mismanaging the cavalry and failing to support the infantry's position at El Rancho de
Padierna, thereby precipitating the Mexican disaster. Although discredited for his role in
the battle, Santa Anna retained Torrejón and following the battle of Molino del Rey,
assigned him command of the cavalry brigade formerly led by the disgraced General
Manuel Andrade in the Army of the South. In this capacity, Torrejón assisted in the
defense of the Garita de San Cosme following the battle of Chapultepéc on September
13, 1847.
Following the war, Torrejón remained at the disposal of the War Ministry, but
remained unemployed until Santa Anna's return to power, when he was appointed to head
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the commandancy-general of Michoacán in 1854. Thereafter, Torrejón retired to private
life and died near the capital at the village of San Martín Texmelucam, at the age of 56,
on June 11, 1858.

VALENCIA, Gabriel, General de División, was born in Mexico City in 1799. At the age
of eleven years, he enlisted as a cadet in the Royal Tulancingo Provincial Cavalry
Regiment on March 19, 1810. After extensive service against the insurgents, Valencia
was incorporated into Iturbide's Ejército del Trigarante on March 2, 1821 and was
present at the sieges of Morelia, San Juan del Río, Querétaro, and Mexico City as a
captain in the 4th Line Infantry Regiment. After subsequent promotion to major in late
1821, Valencia served under Santa Anna in ousting the remaining Spanish forces in
Mexico from Veracruz. After supporting Bustamante’s centralist coup against Guerrero’s
presidency in 1830, Valencia was rewarded with promotion to the rank of brigadier
general in early 1831. The following year, Valencia gathered a force of 600 men under
his command and lent support to the santanistas in Guanajuato during the revolt against
Bustamante. In 1835, Valencia was appointed to head the commandancy-general of
México and the following year, he accompanied Santa Anna into Texas as a staff officer,
but did not see any action in that disastrous campaign. Returning from Texas to head
once again the commandancy-general of his native Mexico City, he again served under
Santa Anna at Tampico during the French "Pastry War" of 1839. The following year, in
the service of the centralist Bustamante, he was sent with 1,600 men to oppose the
federalist rebellion of Generals José Urrea and José Antonio Mejía in Puebla, where he
succeeded in capturing and executing Mejía at the bloody battle of Acajete. In 1841, he
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joined Generals Manuel Lombardini and Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in supporting Santa
Anna's coup against Bustamante, acting as the veritable swingman with his 4,000-man
Mexico City garrison whose contribution would have ensured victory to whichever side
he had chosen to support.
In gratitude for his services and with the intention of decisively winning the ambitious
upstart over, Santa Anna promoted Valencia to the rank of major general and lavished
expensive gifts and generous allowances upon him. A mere three years later, however,
the ever-intriguing Valencia joined with federalist General Juan Álvarez in deposing
Santa Anna and later assisted the centralist Paredes in ousting the moderate liberal
General José Joaquín de Herrera from the presidency, whereupon Valencia was named
president of the “Council of State” by the conspirators until a rightful head of state could
be determined. Believing he had finally consolidated presidential power in his hands, the
usurper Valencia began to help himself to public funds until the inveterate Paredes
notified him that he was claiming the presidency and that he "would shoot anyone
opposing him---archbishop, general, magistrate, or anyone else."140 Lacking the support
necessary to confront Paredes, Valencia abandoned his claim to the presidency and was
relegated to membership in the “General War Council.”
Upon Santa Anna's return from exile, the politically unreliable Valencia was
transferred from command of the Mexico City garrison to command of all Mexican
forces in Guanajuato, where he successfully roused the troops of that state and
contributed 5,000 men to the reorganization of the Army of the North at San Luis Potosí,
in the hopes that he would be rewarded by his former chief with a coveted position in the
reformed army. However ingratiated he might have been with Valencia's contribution,
140
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Santa Anna decided to keep the headstrong Valencia at arm's length and dispatched him
to command the Mexican forces threatening Taylor's supply lines at Tuna, 125 miles
northeast of Saltillo. Embittered by this lackluster appointment, Valencia joined the antisantanista Red Comet Society and momentarily satiated his ambitions by drawing up
insubordinate plans for an offensive against Taylor's supply lines, in the face of explicit
orders from Santa Anna to stay put. After languishing at Tula for several months,
Valencia was relieved of command and appointed to head the much-reduced Army of the
North at San Luis Potosí in May 1847 by santanista war minister General José María
Tornel y Mendivil, who feared the rumors of a conspiracy being drawn up by Valencia in
Northeastern Mexico and sought a "safer" place for him. Apparently, this move, although
considered prudent at the time in anticipation of an imminent Mexican victory over
Scott's forces in the vicinity of Jalapa, would soon come back to haunt Tornel and Santa
Anna.
Desperate for reinforcements in the wake of his immitigable disaster at Cerro Gordo
and unable to remand Valencia's assignment without generating ridicule and accusations
of nepotism from the army, Santa Anna resigned himself to work with an unreliable
subordinate and ordered Valencia to bring the Army of the North to his aid in the Valley
of Mexico. Valencia, in turn, was only too glad to comply, eager as he was to outshine
his superior and crush the Americans, and he arrived with his 4,000-man army in the
vicinity of the capital on July 27, 1847. Ordered by Santa Anna to occupy a secondary
defensive position at San Ángel, on the right of Santa Anna’s primary defensive line,
Valencia immediately scorned that inconspicuous position and moved his army forward
to a hill about five miles south at El Rancho de Padierna, near the town of Contreras.
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After surveying the ground and entrenching his batteries, Valencia determined his
position to be impregnable and ignored an infuriated Santa Anna’s orders that his army
withdraw and reoccupy the position at San Ángel. When his batteries repulsed an
American frontal gesture upon his position on the afternoon of August 19th, Valencia
considered his plan to inflict a resounding blow upon the Americans an imminent reality
and celebrated amongst his officers with drinks to his coming victory. On the morning of
August 20th, however, the Army of the North awoke to find itself attacked from both the
front and rear by American troops who had penetrated the impassable pedregal protecting
Valencia’s right flank against all odds. The battle lasted a mere 17 minutes as Valencia’s
troops broke and fled upon realizing that the Americans had outflanked their position and
that reinforcements were not forthcoming from Santa Anna.
Upon his escape from the battlefield, Valencia was careful to avoid the Americans and
disobeyed Santa Anna's orders to present himself and face charges, fearing the latter as a
veritable death sentence. Instead, Valencia made his way to Toluca, where he began
forming a small force and entered into conspiracy dealings with other Red Comet Society
members, such as Generals Pedro de Ampudia, Juan N. Almonte, and Valentín Canalizo,
in whose company he pronounced against Santa Anna in favor of continuing the war just
after the termination of hostilities. Seen as a threat to the establishment of peace, the
Americans pursued Valencia and captured him near the capital on January 2, 1848.
Paroled following the termination of hostilities, Valencia died suddenly in the capital
of an apoplectic attack, at the age of fifty years, on March 23, 1848. He left behind a
widow, Guadalupe Carranza de Valencia of Mexico City with whom he had three
daughters. Valencia was described as a heavyset, bull-necked man of average height, but
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not unusually broad, with small side whiskers and a heavy mustache. Justin Smith
characterized him as “destitute of every principle of honor and honesty” and to “have a
hard cruel look about his cold blue eyes.” Often described as overly ambitious and
headstrong, it was rumored that in anticipation of a great victory over the Americans on
the eve of his disaster at Padierna, Valencia carried in his pocket the names of the men he
would appoint to his cabinet upon assuming the presidency. Despite the negative claims
of his detractors, it is evident that Valencia exhibited a certain charismatic panache and
enjoyed an extremely popular following amongst the common soldiers, who tended to
follow him with complete confidence.

VÁZQUEZ, Ciriaco, General de Brigada, was born in the city of Veracruz in 1794. On
December 29, 1809, Vázquez initiated his military career at the age of fifteen years as a
cadet in the Royalist Veracruz Infantry Regiment of the Line, where he served alongside
his friend, Antonio López de Santa Anna. After over ten years' service against the
insurgents, Vázquez rallied to the independence movement and pronounced in support of
Iturbide's Plan de Iguala in Veracruz on March 30, 1821. The following year, he served
under his old friend, Santa Anna, in the expulsion of the Spanish from San Juan de Ulúa
and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel for his distinguished service.
Attached to the commandancy-general of Veracruz as a staff officer, Vázquez returned to
serve under Santa Anna during the campaign against the Spanish at Veracruz, where he
served as chief of staff and secured promotion to the rank of colonel in September 1829
via his courage on the battlefield. Following the Spanish defeat, Vázquez was sent to
Havana, Cuba, as part of a commission to negotiate the terms for their capitulation and
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withdrawal from Mexican territory.
During Santa Anna's coup against Bustamante in 1831, Vázquez pronounced for the
santanistas in Veracruz and secured the commandancy-general of that state in reward,
where he remained as governor and commandant-general until 1834. For his services
against Bustamante, Santa Anna promoted Vázquez to the rank of brigadier general on
October 17, 1832 and assigned him successive command of the garrisons at Veracruz,
Xalapa, and Isla del Carmen during the 1830s. Falling temporarily out of grace with both
General José Joaquín de Herrera’s moderado government and the centralist regime of
General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Vázquez remained unemployed until Santa Anna's
return to power in August 1846, when he was recalled to join the reformed Army of the
North at San Luis Potosí and assigned to command an infantry brigade, composed of the
4th Light Infantry Regiment and the "Flying" Artillery Battalion.
In this capacity, Vázquez marched north in February at the head of his brigade
(designated a veritable corps d'observation) and protected the right flank of the army,
observing enemy movements in the region between Tamaulipas and Matehuala.
Following the battle of La Angostura, Vázquez returned to Mexico City with Santa Anna
and was assigned to command an infantry brigade in the Army of the East, facing Scott's
invasion by way of Veracruz. When Santa Anna prepared his army to give battle and
entrenched his troops on high ground blocking the National Highway near Orizaba in the
vicinity of Cerro Gordo, Vázquez was given command of the extreme left of the Mexican
line on a steep hill known as El Telégrafo. Initially glossing over the importance of the
position at El Telégrafo in the belief that the seemingly impenetrable terrain beyond the
hill would secure his left flank, an American gesture in that direction on April 17th hinted
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to its importance in the coming battle and so Santa Anna reinforced the position with 100
men and an artillery battery, assigning his redoubtable subordinate and old friend to hold
the position at all costs. During the battle of April 18th, Vázquez skillfully directed his
troops' fire, but could not halt the American onslaught once they had gained a foothold on
the position. As his panicked troops fled in disorder towards their main camp at the
village of Cerro Gordo, Vázquez gallantly sought to rally them, sword in hand, but was
killed defending his artillery pieces in the ferocious hand-to-hand combat that ensued as
the Americans engulfed the hill and fell upon the rear of the Mexican position. A
Mexican version of the battle claims that Vázquez "died a glorious death in all of his
energies amidst the terrible tumult of battle."141 It was said that contrary to all mutually
understood mores of military courtesy, the Americans left Vázquez's body to rot on the
field and several eyewitnesses reported seeing his cadaver laying amongst those of his
fallen troops days after the battle with his uniform shorn of its medals and insignia and
his boots missing. Considered a martyr by his countrymen, there still exists a monument
at Cerro Gordo commemorating the general's death and the central park in Veracruz bears
his name. Apparently, Vázquez was married at the time of his death and left several
orphaned children.
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Figure 1: The Battle of Palo Alto, May 8, 1846 (Source: Frazier, p. 309)

Figure 2: The Battle of Monterrey, September 20-24, 1846 (Source: Frazier, p. 273)
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Figure 3: The Battle of Resaca del Guerrero, May 9, 1846 (Source: Frazier, p. 355)
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Figure 4: The Battle of La Angostura, February 23, 1847 (Source: Frazier, p. 59)
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Figure 5: The Battle of Cerro Gordo, April 16, 1847 (Source: Frazier, p. 90)

Figure 6: The Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, August 20, 1847 (Source: Frazier, p.
112)
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Figure 7: The Battle of Chapultepéc, September 12, 1847 (Source: Frazier, p. 92)
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Figure 8: The Battle for the Mexico City Garitas, September 12, 1847 (Source: Time-Life,
p. 205)
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1. Major-General Antonio López de Santa Anna. Photo Credit: INAH.
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2. Major-General Juan Álvarez. Photo Credit: INAH.
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3. Major-General Gabriel Valencia. Photo Credit: Alcaraz, Apuntes.

10. Major-General José María Tornel y Mendivil. Photo Credit: INAH.
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5. Brigadier-General Antonio León. Photo Credit: Alcaraz, Apuntes.

6. Brigadier-General Ciriaco Vázquez. Photo Credit: Alcaraz, Apuntes.
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7. Brigadier-General Casimiro Liceaga. Photo Credit: Private Collection.

8. Major-General Manuel Rincón. Photo Credit: Churubusco en la acción military del 20
de agosto de 1847.
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9. Major-General Vicente Filisola. Photo Credit: INAH.

10. Brigadier-General Antonio Gaona. Photo Credit: INAH.
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11. Brigadier-General Benito Quijano. Photo Credit: Private Collection.

12. Major-General Pedro de Ampudia. Photo Credit: Alcaraz, Apuntes.
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13. Brigadier-General Manuel Andrade. Photo Credit: INAH.

14. Brigadier-General Antonio Canales. Photo Credit: Saldivár, Historia Compendiada
de Tamaulipas.
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15. Brigadier-General Mariano Martínez de Lejarza. Photo Credit: INAH.

16. Brigadier-General Gordiano Guzmán. Photo Credit: Jiménez Camberas, Gordiano
Guzmán, insurgente y federalista.
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17. Brigadier-General Tomás Moreno. Photo Credit: Los gobernantes de Guerrero.

18. Brigadier-General Sebastián Guzmán. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.
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19. Major-General Valentín Canalizo. Photo Credit: Albúm Mejicano.

20. Brigadier-General Luis Pinzón. Photo Credit: Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de
Geografía.

206

21. Major-General Anastasio Bustamante. Photo Credit: INAH.

22. Brigadier-General Domingo Echegaray. Photo Credit: INAH.
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23. Brigadier-General Pedro García Conde. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.

24. Brigadier-General José Mariano Monterde. Photo Credit: INAH.
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25. Brigadier-General Ignacio Mora y Villamil. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.

26. Brigadier-General Juan Agea. Photo Credit: Private Collection.
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27. Brevet Brig.-General José María García. Photo Credit: Los gobernantes de Oaxaca.

28. Brigadier-General Martín Perfecto de Cós. Photo Credit: Pictorial History of Mexico
and the Mexican War.
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29. Major-General Julián Juvera. Photo Credit: Los gobernantes de Querétaro.

30. Brigadier-General Ignacio Martínez Pinillos. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.
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31. Brigadier-General Joaquín Rangel. Photo Credit: Private Collection.

32. Brigadier-General Juan Nepomuceno Pérez. Photo Credit: Escuela Secundaria
Técnica Juan N. Pérez.
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33. Brigadier-General José Ignacio Basadre. Photo Credit: Private Collection.

34. Brigadier-General Francisco Pérez. Photo Credit: Private Collection.
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35. Major-General Mariano Arista. Photo Credit: Time-Life, The Mexican War.

36. Brig.-Gen. José Cósme Urrea. Photo Credit: Benson Latin American Collection.
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37. Major-General José Mariano Salas. Photo Credit: Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes.

38. Brigadier-General Agustín Escudero. Photo Credit: Carreño, Jefes del Ejército.
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39. Major-General Manuel María Lombardini. Photo Credit: Private Collection.

40. Brigadier-General Anastasio Parrodi. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.
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41. Brigadier-General José María Ortega. Photo Credit: INAH.

42. Brigadier-General José Vicente Miñón. Photo Credit: Private Collection
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43. Brigadier-General Juan Nepomuceno Almonte. Photo Credit: INAH.

44. Brigadier-General Santiago Blanco. Photo Credit: Sánchez Lamego, Generales de
ingenieros.
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45. Brig.-General Pedro María Anaya. Photo Credit: Rivera Marín, Si hubiera parque.

46. Major-General José Joaquín de Herrera. Photo Credit: Private Collection.
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47. Major-General Nicolás Bravo. Photo Credit: Gran Enciclopedia Salvat.

48. Major-General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. Photo Credit: Rivera Cambas, Los
gobernantes de México.
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49. Brevet Brigadier-General José María García Conde. Photo Credit: INAH.

50. Brigadier-General Tomás Requena. Photo Credit: Private Collection.
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51. Brigadier-General Francisco Pacheco. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.

52. Brevet Brigadier-General José María González de Mendoza. Photo Credit: Private
Collection.
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53. Brig-Gen. Rómulo Díaz de La Vega. Photo Credit: Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes.

54. Brigadier-General Martín Carrera. Photo Credit: Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes.
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55. Brig.-Gen. Manuel Micheltorena. Photo Credit: Benson Latin American Collection.

56. Brigadier-General Lino José Alcorta. Photo Credit: Carreño, Jefes del Ejército.
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57. Brevet Brigadier-General Benito Zenea. Photo Credit: INAH.

58. Brigadier-General José Juan de Landero. Photo Credit: Pasquel, Leonardo, Pedro
Telmo, José Juan, y Francisco de Landero.
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59. Brevet Brigadier-General Antonio Corona. Photo Credit: Private Collection.

60. Brevet Brigadier-General José López Uraga. Photo Credit: Archivo Casasola.
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